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Christus vincit, Christus regnat, Christus imperat.

A B S T R A C T
This dissertation provides an international perspective on the prob-
lem of constitutional engineering. At its heart it is an assessment of
the direction and magnitude of constitutional effects on the quality
and robustness of government, taken from two major constitutional
paradigms: that of constitutional regime types and that of inclusive-
versus-exclusive democratic competitiveness. Constitutional perfor-
mance is evaluated in terms of effects on measurements of gover-
nance across dimensions such as rule of law, social welfare and fiscal
management, which are measured based on citizen perceptions and
other aggregates. The analysis moves in four stages. First, an analy-
sis of regime types treated endogenously. Second, an estimation of
regime type effects on three dimensions of good governance. This
is proceeded by another estimation exercise, this time on the regime
type effects on fiscal management. Finally, there is an assessment of
the social welfare effects of power-sharing institutions. I find evidence
in favour of the hypothesis that alloy constitutional models attenuate
the effects of presidentialism and parliamentarism. The presidential
system is also found to perform well with respect to fiscal manage-
ment. Power-sharing institutions generally have positive effects on
social welfare but these remarks must be qualified by the extent to
which power-sharing institutions tend toward rent-seeking and inef-
ix
ficiency, and by the extent to which under stronger controls, related
to making national aggregates more commensurable, this evidence
appears to dissolve.
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Part I
E N D O G E N O U S C O N S T I T U T I O N S

1
C A N G O V E R N M E N T B E I M P R O V E D W I T H
I N T E RV E N T I O N S I N C O N S T I T U T I O N A L D E S I G N ?
The title of this introduction asks whether it is possible to improve
government via constitutional engineering. Perhaps replacing bad
political institutions that exacerbate existing political conflict to the
point of incapacitating efficacious political action and spawning gen-
eral disillusionment and radicalism, with institutions that facilitate
policy solutions to major crises, can improve the quality of politi-
cal institutions but also in a more general sense of ameliorating gov-
ernment by favouring virtues that enhance the execution of political
power. The case of revolutionary France, for example, posits a persua-
sive instance of political institutions coming into existence that were
plain-bad, leaving the nascent French Republic adrift in war, mutual
social hatred and revolutionary terror. The constitutional proposal of
the Jacobins supported the implementation of such a populous exec-
utive body that the system would have never worked, which led in
turn to more chaos and violence.
Of course, I do not wish to be accused of praising some techno-
cratic efficiency as was fashionable in the bad old days of nineteenth
century positivism or the fascist sense of Gleichschaltung (that all sec-
tors of society must undergo nationalist justification). Nevertheless,
3
4 can government be improved with interventions in constitutional design?
we are in no position to dismiss the possibility that certain institu-
tional constellations possess a tendency to disequilibrium that com-
pel citizens and leaders to act in desperation. History is replete with
such examples. During the prelude to the Spanish Civil War leaders
of the parliamentary system overturned heads of government at an
astonishing rate at a time when Spanish society contained the largest
population of avowed anarchists in modern history and a Commu-
nist Party with a larger membership base than that of the Russian
Bolsheviks in 1917. [172, p.107] During these periods of extraordi-
nary crisis and polarization the qualities of political institutions have
a differential impact on outcomes. Modern innovations suggest that
modern Europe is becoming, more or less, wise to Jacobinism. Take
for example, the Federal German Republic’s adoption of the Con-
structive Vote of No-confidence, which requires the legislative assem-
bly to present an alternative feasible government coalition before it
can pass a vote of no confidence. This measure ostensibly prevents
the vote of no confidence being used for solely destructive purposes
and enabling a litany of short lived governments that would under-
mine faith in the political system. Another educational example of
this type of constitutional engineering is the election rule used for the
Nigerian presidency. Nigeria has a problem with social conflict boil-
ing over from the astonishing diversity of ethnno-linguistic groups.
About 70 percent of the population are split between four groups,
the Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo and Fulani. Much of this ethnic heterogene-
ity is reflected in the provincial political boundaries as well. As such,
the election rule used to elect the Nigerian president was forged to
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encourage a winning candidate to emerge who had the broad en-
dorsement of Nigerians across a large cross-section of these ethnic
differences. The winning candidate must not only win a nationwide
majority but he must also win at least one quarter of the vote in two-
thirds of the states. Horowitz supports the Nigerian electoral rule
while Shugart and Carey remain a little more circumspect about its
viability when no candidate can fulfil the rigorous minimal require-
ments for presidential victory, proposing instead the double comple-
ment rule as a viable alternative. [199, p.218] The Jacobin error is to
view the entire constitutional framework as a construction of natural
law and natural rights. Certain aspects of the constitution should be
viewed as instances of positive law - those aspects that Mill referred
to as the elements of structural and procedural contrivance. [161] A com-
munity’s interest in perfecting these elements of the constitution is
based on prudential reason. The positive aspects of the constitution
ought to be tailored to the exigencies, finite resources and particular
circumstances of a political community.
Constitutional engineering is, at first glance, incongruous with the
tenet of methodological individualism. Ostensibly, everything that
happens to political institutions, and in political institutions, can be
broken down to the sum of movements of the individuals in society.
Is this a problem? Yes and no. Certainly the political ecology of the
state is influenced by what individuals believe and do in society at
large and this information feeds back into the arena of politics via
the electoral system. On the other hand, there is a sense in which
constitutional design determines political behaviour exogenously by
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fixing the règles du jeu, which in turn shape political action. These
institutional effects that have the potential to change with variation
in constitutional design are of first order importance to scholars of
politics and constitutional law.
1.1 constitutional thought in history
The word constitution comes from the Latin constitutio, which signi-
fied in the ancient Roman Empire an imperial edict or decree concern-
ing the administration or governance of the body politic. It translates
from the earlier Greek term politeia, which comprehends a much more
broad concept of the overall coherence of a society and its capacity to
flourish. One might say that the Hellenistic origin of constitution is
closer to the corporal usage of the word to refer to one’s physical
health. In fact, this is the imagery that Cicero invokes in On the Com-
monwealth. 1 The constitution, qua written document, finds its first
precedent in the urban charters granted by certain potentates of the
High Middle Ages of Western Europe to several cities; those of North-
ern Italy in particular. In order to understand constitutionalism and
constitutional design we must first understand the intellectual history
of constitutional thought and also how the body it constitutes has
changed - how we moved from governments of cities to governments
of nations.
1 As characterized by St. Augustine of Hippo in De Civitate Dei. [189, p.586]
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1.1.1 Greeks
The study of political systems as a problem in constitutional engineer-
ing, that is to say, how to explicitly manipulate institutional protocols
on licit political action in order to bring about certain outcomes, is a
tradition whose earliest known documentation is in the records left
by scholars of the ancient Greek city-states. Perhaps the earliest in-
stantiation of a separation of powers in political institutions was the
Spartan constitution putatively established by the lawgiver Lycurgus
in the 8th century BC. Known as the Rhetra (probably from a Dorian
expression for ‘proclamation’) this document gave a series of basic
injunctions concerning the governance of the Spartan polis. Classicist
Ehrenberg offers the following account of what a translation of the
Rhetra would have read:
(1) Found a sanctuary of Zeus Syllianus and Athena Syl-
liana; (2) arrange the phylae and obae; (3) establish as the
gerusia thirty [men] including the archagetae [kings]; (4)
hold the assembly from season to season between Babyka
[a bridge] and Knakion [a stream]; (5) thus put proposals
[to the damos] and decline to do so. The damos shall have
the right of refusal (?) and the power... If the damos speaks
crooked, the elders and archagetae shall refuse it (?).
[73, p.26]
We see the atavism of a system of checks and balances in the power
of oversight that the ephoroi had over the bicephalous kingship of the
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archagetae (ancient Sparta had a dual kingship). The mythos of the
Spartan constitution continually occupied the imagination of consti-
tutional thinkers, and it is manifestly the chief inspiration for Plato’s
republic of philosopher kings. In The Republic Plato’s Socrates pro-
poses to his interlocutors that in order to understand what is a just
man we must first understand what is the justly constituted city.
Constitutional design problems in fact amount to the earliest exam-
ples of political science scholarship and intersect key ideas about hu-
man nature and the essence of coercive power. The Republic answers
the question of what is the optimal mode of political organization in
light of the Greek traditions of democracy and oligarchy. Plato wit-
nessed the excesses of Athenian democracy that condemned a good
man Socrates to death for ostensibly pursuing truth. Plato’s answer
to the problem was a sort of intellectual oligarchy - a Kingdom of
Philosophers trained in the Athenian academy. I do not wish to con-
demn or praise Plato’s ideas here but rather highlight the manner of
exposition in The Republic. Plato recognized that one cannot forward
a theory of what rules should govern the political behaviour of man
without an understanding of how man works - a theory of man’s soul,
as it were.
1.1.2 Heretics
The Renaissance, properly so called, represents a point of departure
for the history of constitutional thought. The medieval order is chal-
lenged by what may be called the arrogation of modernism: the ulti-
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mate replacement of divine law with human reason denuded of all
such theological notions traditionally adumbrated by the Scholastics.
The reformers do not sing ‘Agnus Dei’, they sing Sinatra, ‘I did it my
way’. And this is where modern constitutional engineering is born,
i.e., from the premise that we can build institutions to do things for
us rather than taking them for granted as something which is given
by a fixed human nature in natural law. 2 In the Middle Ages, the
concept of a sacral kingship was acceptable in one sense in which it
reflected the centrality of the family in regulating the rhythms of life
and death in the Christian Weltanshauung. We must bear in mind that
the triune God of the Catholic Church is not a metaphor of the fam-
ily. This is an upside down picture. The family is the metaphor. The
Trinity is the ‘phor’. But more straightforwardly, the sacral kingship
was approved by Papal coronation. If the Roman Pontiff excommuni-
cated a ruler it meant that the ruler’s subjects were no longer morally
bound to obey said ruler. As such the rationalism of the enlighten-
ment displaces the justification of the monarchy on the basis of eccle-
siastical law. Suddenly the state is not what it is, it is what it does,
or more specifically what it does for the members of its body (not
God). This is not to say that during the Middle Ages there existed a
formal theory of the royal absolutism. Rather, such a theory did not
express itself until the Protestant Reformation under the pens of men
such as Jean Bodin and Robert Filmer. The linear path of Marxist and
Weberian historiography is a gross simplification. In fact, long before
the emergence of social contract theory with Hobbes and Locke dur-
2 In other cultures ’natural law’ goes by other names such as ‘Tao’ or ‘Rita’.
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ing the so called Aufklärung 3 we can find in the work of John of
Salisbury a theory of the citizens’ right to civil disobedience in his
manuscripts Norman Anonymous and Policraticus composed back in
the 12th century. Likewise, the concept of the state does not begin
with Machiavelli’s The Prince, but has earlier antecedents in the con-
cept of a ‘commonweal’ in Cicero. If we were to extract the essential
difference of pre-reformation constitutionalism it would be Gratian’s
observation that the laws of princes are not sovereign over ecclesias-
tical law. [29, p.145]
Emblematic of the shift in thought in post-reformation thought is
Hobbes’ work Leviathan. Prior to the Reformation, Church-State rela-
tions were conceived under the doctrine of the ‘two swords’, which
can be traced back to Pope Gelasius I of the fifth century. [29, p.279]
The doctrine of the Two Swords held that the Church is a spiritual
sword protecting souls, whereas lay kingship instantiates the secu-
lar sabre protecting life, morals and property in the interests of the
Church. Hobbes, a materialist, posited a justification for political au-
thority on the basis not of a divine commission invested in the ruler
but in terms of the physical security that the ruler provided his sub-
jects. Hobbes was not an anarchist. He believed that in the vacuum of
secular power men will chew each other to pieces. In this condition of
nature the benefits of a long life, commerce and culture would not be
possible because of the ever present threat of physical violence. This
notion seems intuitive when we reflect on the hazards of life in areas
3 The German origin of the term ‘Enlightenment’ - the so called Enlightenment was
by and large an exclusively Northern European intellectual movement.
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of the world today where the rule of law has decayed; where a state
of civil war is present for example. In Hobbes not only do we find
the germ of modern social contract theory - the idea that the state’s
legitimacy comes from the at least tacit assent of its members in a
transaction of liberty for public goods, but also the notion of the state
itself as a body, the Leviathan or artificial person. This personhood of
the state is derived from its function as an artificial representation of
its constituent members, which is hinted at in the Latin root personata
meaning a character represented on stage.
Hobbes is a milestone in the history of constitutional thought be-
cause he creates a new school of thought that prepares the way for
republican constitutionalism by offering justification for the state in
terms of purely naturalistic grounds of security. The key factor in
this intellectual development is the Protestant Reformation in Eng-
land and parts of Western Europe such as the Dutch Republic that
provides shelter to new naturalistic philosophers. Among these was
Hobbes who following the initial push by Machiavelli in this direc-
tion, declared that the necessity for a sovereign civil government to
provide citizens a commodious life required ecclesiastical authorities
to be subordinate to the civil authority. For the civil government to
provide man a pact with which he is delivered from the condition of
nature where he is hostage to the violent quest for power among men
in a state of anarchy, the civil authority must have effective and exclu-
sive use of the exaction of force by which laws are upheld. Hobbes
is positing here a moral claim that man’s only just fidelity is fidelity
to the authority that can fulfil the exclusive and effective governing
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authority. For if the civil authority cannot protect life and property
through laws enjoining subjects’ obedience, it is not a true Common-
weal but simply another contender in the condition of nature. There is
no social contract. Hobbes goes on to argue that this authority cannot
be divided. As such, the modern notion of a separation of powers is
absent from Hobbes’ writings and its ancient concatenation rejected.
However, Hobbes is truly one of the first modernists for, by the as-
sumption of the civil authority’s exclusivity in matters of temporal
power within its corresponding territory, he pronounces the necessity
for the Church’s temporal power to be dependent on the will of the
civil authority. This insight is a rupture of early modernity with me-
dieval thinking. The notion that the Church and the State participate
in a separation of prerogatives was given expression by St. Augustine
of Hippo in his work City of God, wherein the author lays down an
intellectual foundation for the development of separate canon law in
the Low Middle Ages. Later during the counter-reformation, the ques-
tion of the Catholic Church’s temporal power and legal sovereignty
(in the sense of Latin summi, i.e.,‘highest’) is explored by Robert Bel-
larmine in De Summo Pontifice where he subjects the Church to the
same sort of analysis that Aristotle subjected the Greek civitas. In ad-
dition to his theory of government, Hobbes’ rejection of ecclesiastical
temporal powers and their possession of sovereignty is rooted in his
Protestant theology (too radical at the time for the Anglican clergy at
Oxford). Hobbes views the Christian Church or ecclesia as not a con-
crete institution with a hierarchy of deacons, priests and bishops but
an assembly of freely associating members. [110, 189]
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As such, in delineating a nominalist ecclesiology, Hobbes reaffirms
his theory of government, which maintains the absolute sovereignty
of lay governmental authority. For if the Christian Church did mani-
fest physically with its head in the See of Rome, a claim to absolute
civil sovereignty as Hobbes proposes would be untenable without
positing an apostasy. It is therefore necessary to acknowledge the
role of the Protestant Revolution in liberating certain ideas that fa-
cilitate the conception of the modern state and that are also congenial
to the growing power and autonomy of the secular European king-
doms. It is in this historical context that Rousseau is able to rebuke
despotism by portraying civil authority as a corrupting influence on
man who is the beneficiary of natural virtues. With this assumption
Rousseau puts political power back on its heals as it were and leads
his readers to the proposition that political power must be limited
and designated according to a purely rationalistic basis. Rousseau,
with his Deist rationalism, become posthumously the prophet of the
French Revolution. This crucible of political and social change puts
a process in motion that leads to the supremacy of republican consti-
tutional values in much of Europe and the new world. In fact, this
may be better described as a three step program. From the English
Revolution of 1688 we receive a consensus about the separation of
legislative and executive power and limitations on monarchical pre-
rogatives. Central to the regime types paradigm is the doctrine of the
separation of powers, which has its first modern concatenation in the
political theory of John Locke writing at the time of the installation of
William II as King of England and in the historical tension between
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the House of Stewart and the English parliament. Something similar
to a separation of powers is alluded to by Aristotle in the Politics, but
in this work it comes to mean simply that it is often imprudent for a
seat in the deliberative assembly and executive office to be possessed
by the same person. [11, pp.165-9] Locke voices the concept of sepa-
ration of powers as a system of checks and balances. For law-making
to be a reflection of natural law and not simply political will, the men
who make laws ought not to be the men whose job it is to execute
the law. Law must be made by the men who are subject to the law.
Otherwise, they would have an incentive to legislate so as to make
themselves exception to the law. [145, p.364] Here, however, Locke is
referring to a separation of powers between the ruling monarch and
the legislative assembly. As the power of the British crown receded,
the British system has come to mean the opposite of separation of
powers - where the true executive power, the cabinet, is selected from
and accountable to, the legislative assembly. It was thus the Ameri-
can constitution that came to embody the notion of a separation of
powers qua Lockean political philosophy. The French Revolution of
1789 puts into place republican governments embodying Rousseau’s
concept of the ‘general will’, which becomes consolidated under the
career of Napoleon Bonaparte and his progeny. Finally, the American
Revolution manifests a republican government reflecting the political
philosophy of John Locke via the transmission belt of Thomas Paine’s
polemics.
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1.2 old institutionalists and the new institutionalism
The constitutional engineering paradigm of post-revolutionary France
departs from the answers offered by Plato on regime design and
constitutes a positivist turn in constitutional thought. According to
Plato’s lights, the problem with both democracy and oligarchy is the
corrupting influence of the appetite for power. Plato resolves the prob-
lem of power’s stewardship by proposing a society governed by a
class of men who have passed an apprenticeship intended to arrest
their disordered appetite for power so that they may direct against
the corruption of power in the hearts of the men they rule. The op-
timism with which Plato thought knowledge of the good through
philosophy could succeed at this task is largely forgotten by the con-
stitutional thinkers of the enlightenment. Rather they treat human na-
ture as a set of données, which not even the akademeia can change and
propose to build around these an architecture of procedural checks
and balances that can restrain men’s actions because their hearts can-
not be. [176] It must be born in mind however that Plato was writing
about the political organization of the Greek polis a political body con-
tained within one city. The modern age sees the growth of kingdoms
and city states into empires and centralized nation states. As such, the
constitution per se while still directing the actions of political leaders
operates over much vaster territories and as such there is not quite
the same connect between citizen and ruler as we see in the polis. In
fact, Aristotle’s Politics really only gains cadence again in Europe un-
til the rise of the Italian city-states’ economic and cultural dominance
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- a milieu wherein Aristotle’s constitutional ideas are bruted about
once again.
France produces two luminaries of constitutional thought in the
18th century: the Marquis de Condorcet and Jean-Charles de Borda,
known for their eponymous electoral methods. These thinkers un-
dertook to analyse the constitution as a set of concrete mechanisms
that can be expressed and explored scientifically. Their work, how-
ever, was largely forgotten by English language political scientists
until the emergence of collective choice and game theory in the early
1950s. As such voting theory is the fount of the positivist approach
to political institutions. In fact, McLean has discovered manuscripts
instantiating examples of positivist voting theory that go back to as
early as the 13th century. [155]
At the core of this thesis is the regime types paradigm that has
been at the centre of historical debates about constitutional design.
Perhaps one of the earliest examples of this controversy is Walter
Bagehot’s The English Constitution where he excoriates the American
presidential model while surveying with praise England’s unwritten
parliamentary constitution. Bagehot argues,
The American government calls itself a government of the
supreme people; but at a quick crisis, the time when a sovereign
power is most needed, you cannot find the supreme people. You
have got a Congress elected for one fixed period, and immovable
during that period: all the arrangements are for stated times.
There is no elastic element, everything is rigid, specified, dated.
Come what may, you can quicken nothing and retard nothing.
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You have bespoken your government in advance, and whether it
suits you or not, whether it works well or works ill, whether it
is what you want or not, by law you must keep it. In a country
of complex foreign relations it would mostly happen that the
first and most critical year of every war would be managed by
a peace premier, and the first and most critical year of peace by
a war premier. In each case the period of transition would be
irrevocably governed by a man selected not for what he was to
introduce, but what he was to change - for the policy he was to
abandon, not for the policy he was to administer.
[14, p.23] Bagehot’s point is that the separation of powers in the presi-
dential system leads to ineffective government because the incentives
of those whose job it is to pass law are not the same as the incentives
of the president who knows what exigencies must be met to resolve
the inevitable set of pressing, current crises.
In recent decades political science has witnessed a renewed inter-
est in constitutional analysis in the tradition of Bagehot, JS Mill and
The Federalist; a renewal which has been in large part driven by new
applications of economic theory to constitutional design problems -
a development since the 1980s described by Shugart and Carey as
the new institutionalism. [199, p.1] This bit of jargon means a turning
away from aspects of individual behaviour in politics to an exami-
nation of what causality can be attributed to political institutions at
some higher level. Hammond and Butler identify six objectives of the
New Institutionalism: comparison, explanation, excavation, delimit-
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ing, commendation and what political scientists would call ‘formal’
modelling. [101]
The comparative task is to compare and contrast policy making
processes in order to provide an anatomical account of political sys-
tems. Shugart and Carey’s Presidents and Assemblies is a work in this
vein. New Institutionalist scholarship also seeks to demonstrate the
determination of institutional differences with respect to the existence
of differences in public policy norms. An example of such an under-
taking is provided by Steinmo in analysing the differences in public
revenue systems in Sweden, Britain and the United States. [206] The
task of excavating the historical origins of public policy differences
with respect to systems has been labelled ‘historical institutionalism’.
For example, Skocpol’s Protecting Soldiers and Mothers traces social
policy in the United States as being determined by historical struc-
tural factors. [202] The literature also seeks to sketch the capabilities
of institutions to resolve policy problems. Weaver and Bert’s Do In-
stitutions Matter? is an example of this focus. [230] The advocacy of
certain institutional features is an important dimension of the new
institutionalism. Linz and Valenzuela make a case against presiden-
tialism in Latin America in The Failure of Presidential Democracy. [143]
And last the new institutionalism is concerned with presenting deduc-
tive models that describe how political systems work. Tsebelis’ work
on veto player theory has developed this area by representing spatial
voting models to illustrate how veto players in national institutions
affect policy stability. [222] These aspects of the New Institutionalism
will be discussed in greater detail in the chapter to follow.
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The constitutional design literature intersects the disciplines of eco-
nomics and political science in terms of the contributions from public
choice and comparative politics respectively. Overlapping themes in
these literatures are those of inclusiveness of political system mech-
anisms and the role of constitutional models in differentiating pol-
icy outcomes and political behaviour. I organize previous work on
the general topic of this thesis as efforts heralding from the political
economy (or public choice) literature in economics and the compar-
ative politics literature in political science. The latter has examined
the role of regime types with respect to democratization, civil con-
flict and governance. Additionally, Lijphart’s work on consensus and
consociational democratic institutions has been an important in im-
proving our understanding of the underlying structure of national
constitutions in ethnically divided societies and the post bellum conti-
nental European democracies whose institutions feature large in the
available data regarding the function of power-sharing constitutions.
The political economy literature in economics has in recent times ap-
peared to gain traction by forging creative and intelligent research de-
signs to tackle data limitations and by transporting the tools of game
theoretic modelling to analyses of strategic behaviour on topics such
as presidential veto usage, legislative bargaining under endogenous
institutional rules and, for example, the renovation of the bargaining
and auctioning theory developed by scholars such as Baron and Fer-
ejohn in the setting of government coalition formation. [18]
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1.3 this undertaking
The subject of this work is an examination of the efficacy of consti-
tutional engineering in modern times. By ‘constitutional engineering’
I mean here variation in the mechanisms underlying political sys-
tem forms. This variation has been understood from the perspective
of three different constitutional paradigms in political science: the
exclusive-inclusive dimension of political institutions, rational actor
frameworks and in terms of regime type differences. The exclusive-
inclusive dimension measures the extent to which the mechanism of
political recruitment is what I call ‘conciliar’ or exclusive. Conciliar in-
stitutions favour government coalitions and deliberative assemblies of
diverse interests. Along the exclusive-inclusive dimension, variations
in political systems will favour different degrees of conciliar politics.
The veto player framework analyses political institutions from a ratio-
nal choice approach in a way that posits, for example, a connection
between the amount of veto players in a political regime and the flex-
ibility of the system to change policy. The regime type framework
uses the classical concepts of parliamentarism and presidentialism to
categorize systems that are based on the separation of powers or leg-
islative confidence, and in terms of how they may be a mixture of
the two forms. I use the term ‘paradigm’ in this setting because al-
though some of their champions may call these different categories
theories, these are not really theories about constitutions that posit
contesting explanations but rather ways of, or typologies for, char-
acterizing constitutional design. In fact, it would be better to think
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of these paradigms as a subset in, or subsets of, Aristotle’s original
theory of constitutions in a way that comes at this problem from dif-
ferent angles using different language and concepts. Ultimately, con-
stitutions create a regime where the citizens are ruled, more or less,
by the one, the few or the many. The differences in these paradigms
is that veto player theory examines the effects of this difference in
multitude on policy stability, the exclusive-inclusive dimension looks
at the degree to which the rule of the many in a democracy involves
a horizontal or vertical allocation of power among leaders of differ-
ent interest groups and last, the regime type perspective categorizes
on basis of which model of checks and balances is used - whether
in terms of a separation of powers with separate mandates or on the
basis of office is contracted to an agent (government) from a principal
(parliament).
1.3.1 What makes a constitution good?
I have mentioned my intention to analyse to what extent variation in
constitutional design leads to better or worse government. But what
precisely does this mean? On what grounds can reasonable normative
assumptions be made here? In other words, what are the outcomes or
features that characterize the good constitution? On this question I de-
clare my partiality to Aristotelian tradition in that I view the ultimate
end of a state as being the promotion of virtue among the citizens it
rules. This is not at conflict with Hobbes’ first principle that the goal
of the constitution is security but it is not the same position. Virtue is
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the highest goal of the constitution. But stability is a necessary goal
in addition to this.
Evaluating the goodness of a constitution necessarily involves a
normative judgement. In order to make this normative judgement we
must at least tacitly give our ascent to a system of moral philosophy.
If, for example, we assess the effect of constitutions as a difference
of means on a democratization score, we regard democracy as some-
thing which is necessarily good the more of it you have. Typically
the desirability of democracy will be made by positing a set of self-
evident natural rights that only democracy can secure.
But we cannot take it for granted that democracy is good in and of
itself. Democracy has a well known habit of chewing on liberty. This
thesis has been voluptuously embraced by von Kuehnelt-Leddhin
who writes in Liberty or Equality,
[i]t is interesting to note that irresponsibility was the stan-
dard charge against the monarchs, who were considered to be re-
sponsible to “God only.” Yet the advent of democracy has hardly
increased the sense of responsibility, since the democratic com-
posite government has resulted in a division of responsibility
which makes it ubiquitous at the same time - through a process
of “atomization” - illusory. The electors who have dropped their
ballots in unmarked envelopes can deny their misdeeds with a
straight face, and the deputies who after their initial failure were
not re-elected can claim that the time of their tenure was too
short to permit the completion of their plans. There is also a
widespread tendency to restrict the tenure of the chief executives
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(“Power corrupts!”). As a result the amateur incumbents of this
high office not only are prevented from utilizing their meagre ex-
perience acquired at great cost, but the bar against re-election or
reappointment often puts them into a mood of frivolous indiffer-
ence. And since judges and censors of the politician’s actions are
(seemingly) not God but the lay electorate, whose opinion has
great “practical” but little ethical, historical or factual value,
the sense of true responsibility will be blunted. Maintaining
one’s popularity with King Demos has nothing whatsoever to
do with a sense of true responsibility which, in its finality, is
always directed towards God.
[227, pp.110-1]
Putting aside for one moment von Kuehnelt-Leddhin’s theologi-
cal utterances and those about the virtues democracy may or may
not promote, we can see that this author is on to something with re-
spect to the insight that democracy is frequently the modus operandi by
which societies become unfree. Or in other words, democracy cannot
be a modus vivendi for itself. Such an observation is congruous with
the experience of the Weimar Republic, or, one may argue, the French
Third Republic and the 20th century ante bellum Spanish parliamen-
tary republic. As such the extent to which we can normatively state
that a constitution is efficacious with respect to democratization is de-
pendent on the extent to which we can posit a causal vector streaming
from constitution A to outcome B; that democracy flourished because
of the constitution, not in spite of it. Moreover, for it not to be mis-
taken for the type of evil where demagogues manipulate a people
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to found a dictatorship, constitutional design must effect long-term
democratic improvements. This is the sense in which we may speak
of democratization on one hand and about democratic consolidation on
the other. Notice however from von Kuehnelt-Leddhin’s statement
that the normative value of democracy is not easily reconciled with
a virtue-centred axiology since democratic institutions are ostensibly
conveyors of a passing-the-buck phenomenon where leaders are not
to be held responsible for their actions in office because of limitations
on their power and because voters are not accountable for their be-
haviour in the voting booth due to their anonymity and the statistical
irrelevance of their actions.
Indeed, it is only because of the three triumphant blows of the En-
glish Revolution of 1688, the French Revolution of 1789 and the Amer-
ican Revolution of c.1765 that we come to think of liberal democracy
unquestionably as the telos of constitution making. In Homeric an-
tiquity, this was not the case. The good of the constitution would be
meaningless if referred to in any other sense than the agathos - the
property of being brave, kingly and successful in ruling over one’s
community. Alternatively, if we were alive at the time of the Grego-
rian Reformation of the Catholic Church, we would not be entitled
to say that communities have a right to liberal democracy since one
could only have a right to that which is inherently good, and the be-
lief that the popular consent of a community has an authority that is
independent of God and sovereign over his Church was a falsehood
that could jeopardize one’s salvation - error has no rights. Or alterna-
tively, if the author were party to a community of Stoics in the 3rd
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century AD Rome he would not countenance a constitution that pre-
cludes his ability to conduct himself in accordance with the life of the
gods and the prima naturae.
What is key is Aristotle’s claim that specific constitutional mecha-
nisms do not matter in terms of the stability of a regime in isolation.
What matters is whether the leaders holding office are virtuous in
the sense that they work toward the interest of the whole commu-
nity and not themselves. If a king rules virtuously he is not a tyrant
but a monarch. If the rich run a state with virtue the regime is not
an oligarchy but an aristocracy. If the poor have political power and
are led by demagogues the state is a democracy but if their lead-
ers are not demagogues but lead the masses with prudence then the
regime is a constitutional government or polity according to Aristo-
tle’s lights. The key factor here is whether the constitution creates a
state of affairs where leaders give their countenance to the interests
of the whole community or only a part of it - whether that be their
own household, clique or economic class. [11, p.99]
It is helpful to adopt an Aristotelean perspective in a more general
sense. We have observed that the degree of democratization is not
sufficient for evaluating the goodness of a constitutional regime for
the extent to which the state is ruled by the one, the few or the many
can be a good or evil state of affairs depending on the extent to which
there exists a Rechtsstaat - a state based on the rule of law. We can con-
ceive of the goodness of a constitution by reflecting on the essence of
a constitution. A constitution exists to coordinate collective action in
the capture, preservation and distribution of public goods - i.e., that
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which is essential to commodious and peaceful life within a commu-
nity. I might say that a my neighbour has ’a good watch’ because the
essence of a watch is to tell the time and my neighbour’s watch is
exceedingly successful at telling time. I make an illogical statement
when I say, ‘George’s new car is a good ham sandwich.’ Since, evi-
dently, a car has none of the essence of a ham sandwich, which is to
be a source of sustenance from a cured portion of pig leg between
bread, this sentence is unintelligible. Of course, the goodness of my
neighbour’s watch is not the same thing as the goodness of a con-
stitution. They are connected in only an analogous sense. In order to
know what the goodness of a constitution is we must identify to what
end are constitutions conceived.
Perhaps I can remark that a community has ’a good constitution’
because the constitution of this community has demonstrated an ex-
cellence in the essential function that makes it a constitution, i.e., the
coordination of collective action. This mode of thinking has become
unfashionable due to the influence of Hume’s argument that facts do
not posit moral values. The upshot of Hume’s claim about the neces-
sary decoupling of facts and values is the tendency to perceive moral
claims as merely a wilful expression of individual preference - the
phenomenon of emotivism. Under a ‘perfectionist’ or virtue- ethics,
outcomes themselves do not tell whether the constitution is good.
What tells us that it is good is whether the outcomes of the consti-
tution are indicative of greater virtue. The consequentialist weighs
up the merits of a policy on the basis of the outcomes. The virtue
or areteic approach is to assess the merits of the policy insofar as
1.3 this undertaking 27
the outcomes are indicative of greater virtue. Outcomes can only be
good insofar as they are instrumental to the realization of moral ex-
cellence. A good way of putting this is by an apocryphal statement
attributed to the social activist Dorothy Day, the best society is the soci-
ety that makes it easy to be good. Democracy is not a basic good since
democracy can only be good insofar as it is instrumental in prevent-
ing the prevalence of evil men ruling with absolute power. And there
are circumstances where democracy will not even be instrumentally
good since the moral character of society will determine whether the
median voter will support just policies.
It is therefore helpful to put democratization to one side for the
moment and focus on how well constitutions function with respect
to two elements which Bagehot calls the ‘dignified’ part and the ‘ef-
ficient’ part of the constitution. The former refers to the capacity of
the constitution to elicit obedience to the state. [14, p.7] In this di-
chotomy lies a paradox for the most useless part, the dignified, is the
most useful. Even though is seems the most ceremonial and removed
from quotidian governance, it’s role is to maintain the integrity of the
constitutional regime by maintaining a consensus by which citizens
submit themselves to the political authority of the state. The failure
of the constitution’s dignified function can destroy a political com-
munity in short order. The instability of the Latin American republics
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries speaks to this danger. Af-
ter Napoleon Bonaparte’s Promethean conquest of Western Europe
which toppled the Catholic Monarchy of Spain, the republican for-
mulas which ensued in the new world were never sufficient to com-
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mand the same level of civil obedience since the elected governments
did not speak to the whole people but merely partial interests. Or
rather, no republican concatenation could elicit the same degree of
obedience across the myriad of social divisions comprehending race,
economic class, profession, culture and religion.
A distinction needs to be made in terms of the two senses with
which we can speak of the efficiency of political institutions. On one
hand, we can speak of efficiency in general terms about a political
system in terms of the economical use of institutional resources by
political leaders and in terms of good decision-making. On the other
hand, there is the specific sense of electoral efficiency, which means the
extent to which the political system translates a winning preference
from the electorate into a government policy without there being any
muddying of the waters, as it were. This capacity is efficient in the
sense that it gives voters an informational efficiency with respect to
being able to judge a government’s performance in the voting booth.
This notion is closely related to the evaluative concept of identifiability,
which means the clarity of the lines of responsibility between gov-
ernment policies and government actors. The draw back of systems
engendering high levels of consensual politics or representativeness
is that they vitiate identifiability by creating to a state of distributed
responsibility. Electoral efficiency comes at the expense of representa-
tiveness. The more electorally efficient the system is, the less it will be
able to include a broad representation of citizens’ preferences. Gener-
ally, representativeness is higher in political systems that have high
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district magnitudes for assembly elections, i.e., the number of assem-
bly seats allocated to an electoral district.
This discussion drives home the point that democracy is not a sine
qua non of a good constitution since there are various circumstances
where a democracy would not entail the fulfilment of the consti-
tution’s essential purpose which is the preservation of basic goods
through collective action. Russian statesman Kerensky in 1917 and
German head of state von Hindenburg in 1933 did their citizens no
great service by seeing through the exercise of democracy in their po-
litical communities. This is not to say that democracy is inherently
bad. Indeed, under most normal circumstances it is probably desir-
able. Rather, the point I wish to make is that the evaluation of a con-
stitution’s value must be done as a matter of prudential reason. The
virtue of prudentia is the shrewd application of moral principles into
action. An action X may be moral but just because it is moral does not
mean that it may be prudentially reasonable to execute. As such, con-
stitutional merits ought to be viewed in terms of how structures in-
fluence items such as the political community’s ability to build coali-
tions, the continuity of a Rechtsstaat, the efficiency of the executive
and the protection of basic goods. As a question of prudential reason,
one way the evaluation might work is in terms of how structures and
outcomes have been associated according to the experiences of previ-
ous governments. Where we can see a strong connection between a
certain institutional configuration and a goodly harvest (or the oppo-
site) we may be entitled to make cautionary recommendations about
the desirability of such institutional designs on a prudential basis.
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1.4 four problems in the new institutionalism
The assumption of this thesis is that we can and must separate spe-
cific mechanisms of the constitution from the classical study of the
constitution that looks at it in the context of the customs of a people,
the religion, education system, military and social classes. We must
imagine this in experimental terms where we hold all other deciding
factors constant, in order to observe how variation in certain mech-
anisms may influence the probability of a regime failure or similar
outcome of interest. However, in acknowledgement of the normative
ambiguity of democratization measures, I elect to shift focus in this
thesis from how democratic the state is to how well leaders govern
under the constraints dictated to them by the constitution. As such,
the analysis progresses toward a study of fiscal management under
the aegis of leaders bound by different political system types and var-
ious measurements of social welfare and good governance. I separate
this undertaking into four main parts.
1.4.1 The endogeneity of constitutions
The premier problem of any inquiry into constitutional effects is the
direction of causality. Since the topic of central importance to this dis-
sertation is the effects of alloy regime types, there is a need to trace
the associated causes of alloy regime types in order that this problem
of causality may be addressed and to some extent dissolved through
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the subsequently adopted research design. Using historical analysis
and exploratory data analysis I trace the factors which determine ce-
teris paribus a polity’s identity as a semi-presidential regime.
1.4.2 Prospects for the viability of semi-presidential democracy
The semi-presidential constitutional model has not been as widely
studied as the parliamentary and presidential models and yet it fea-
tures largely in political communities with chequered pasts. As such
I evaluate the survival potential of semi-presidential democracy.
1.4.3 The presidential model and fiscal performance
The fitness of a constitutional order matters in large part with re-
spect to the extent to which it favours efficient policies and efficient
government. One important dimension of this is public finance. To
address this problem I look at the extent to which the parliamentary-
presidential dichotomy affects cyclical fiscal behaviour and the accre-
tion of sovereign debt.
1.4.4 The felicity of conciliar democracy
Another way in which constitutions matter is with regard to how
democratic competition embodies exclusive or inclusive allocations of
political power. In dialogue with the existing literature on this topic I
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investigate the effect the inclusiveness-exclusiveness axis has on out-
comes associated with the aggregate social welfare of society.
1.5 chapter plan
This thesis proceeds in two stages. The first presents the expository
material, theory and methodological discussion and then a survey
of the diffusion of the semi-presidential model, and the second pro-
vides the analysis of the relationship between constitutional design
and governance from a set of specific vantage points.
Chapter two introduces the literature and concepts. Chapter three
provides a walk-through of the methodology with some discussion.
Chapter four offers a descriptive account of the origins and trajec-
tory of the semi-presidential state among a representative example of
states. Chapter five examines the effects of alloy regime types on de-
mocratization, governance and stability. Chapter six examines regime
type effects on public finances. Chapter seven examines the effect of
conciliar institutions on quality of life outcomes. Chapter eight takes
stock of the main arguments and conclusions.
2
C O N C E P T U A L C O R N E R S T O N E S
I want the people to know that they still have two out of three branches of
the government working for them, and that ain’t bad.
- President Dale, Mars Attacks
The conceptual groundwork of this thesis requires an understand-
ing of the principles underlying and relationships between constitu-
tionalism, constitutional design, constitutional dynamics, democracy
and goodness in the context of the discharge of political office. We
must begin at bedrock - the logic of social cooperation. Men and
women exist in a civitas; a social community in which the prosper-
ity of their household depends on cooperation with their neighbours
in the city. In a large modern nation this means in addition to this,
the tacit cooperation of many strangers. But the principle is basically
the same. The constitution exists for the purpose of delimiting, divid-
ing and allocating the powers necessary for guardianship over this
community; the chief ends of this social organization being the pro-
curement of the security, riches and virtue of the citizens. This is ex-
ercised according to notions of distributive and commutative justice.
According to this thought experiment as it was expounded by Aristo-
tle, citizens receive benefits proportional to their contribution to the
community consistent with their equality before the law. Aristotle
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introduced the concept of distributive justice to mean anything per-
taining to the just allotment of goods held in common by society. [11,
pp.102-19]
The second sense in which collective action is guided by considera-
tions of the just is in terms of commutative justice - that is, anything
related to the redress of wrongs committed in the course of human ex-
change and interaction in a political community. [78, p.179] Collective
action is from the out-start motivated by the enforcement of natural
rights - that is to say, individuals wish to possess certain basic goods
which they believe their claim over has moral power. These natural
rights establish an expectation on behalf of the party claiming pos-
session of the right to some treatment in the form of a liberty, claim,
immunity or power. The goodness of basic goods is per se nota, i.e.,
self-evident (among all rational individuals). Their being truly good
precedes any act of intellection or argument because we can recognize
their goodness qua our very existence as reasonable persons. The pos-
session of these basic goods is integral to the essence of what it is to be
a person. Finnis delimits seven categories of basic goods: life, knowl-
edge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, practical reasonableness
and religion. [78, pp.86-9]
There are a multitude of different ways the constitution can be or-
ganized in democracies. The scope of this thesis is to examine how
specific mechanisms of democratic constitutions affect superior praxis
among office holders at the level of national government. The logical
way to go about this study is to first study how specific institutions
arise followed by an analysis of how they affect differences in the lev-
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els of observable outcomes that are of some importance to what truly
characterizes good government.
2.1 what are institutions? how do they come about?
What do we mean when we speak of ‘political institutions’? Institu-
tions in human affairs can be a physical system such as a university
campus but it can also invoke the more abstract sense of behavioural
norms. A hand shake is an institution. Birds’ nests are institutions.
But when we speak of political institutions what we are generally re-
ferring to is a set of accepted rules governing political action. In his
work on the historical institutional origins of the modern European
economy, Greif defines an institution as a system comprised of a rule,
an organization to enforce the rule, a belief or internalized norm justi-
fying the rule, and an implied regularity of behaviour that shapes the
belief. [98, p.38] The subject of excavating the origins of institutions is
important in any work that seeks to do explanations of institutional
effects because if institutions are endogenous to the model explaining
the outcome of interest the factors that cause the selection of the in-
stitution matter in order to disentangle the causal mechanism. How,
then, to explain institutional choice?
When states arrive at situations of constitutional transition they
face a number of decisions to make over the architecture of their
democratic institutions. Besides the choice of economic, electoral or
legal system they are required to adopt a legislative- executive frame-
work, whether parliamentary or presidential. However, the twenti-
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eth century has witnessed a growing number of states who did not
model themselves after the Washington or Westminster model, per
se, but after the semi-presidential model. Contained in this political
system type is a parliamentary and presidential executive, operating
in tandem and with separate mandates. This thesis attempts to ex-
plain why states have descended down this path. Of course, in many
circumstances particular features have become more diffuse than oth-
ers and certain features are more strongly correlated to other factors,
such as demographics or geography. For example, states with larger
populations tend to have larger legislatures and tend to be bicameral.
The closer you are to Washington, the more likely it is your polity will
be presidential. The closer you are to Prague, the more likely it is you
will vote using a proportional representation method. The challenge
of explaining institutional choice, change and diffusion matters to any
endeavour that seeks to measure correlations between constitutional
design and outcomes because such outcomes may be confounded by
the factors that brought about the institutions in the first place.
The problem of regime origins has much cadence in the compar-
ative politics subfield. Classic texts include Skocpol’s States and So-
cial Revolutions, and Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democ-
racy. [201, 164] Hanson and Kopstein speculate that the regime ori-
gins topic is helpful in encouraging studies that cross the division
between qualitative and quantitative research. [103] The new insti-
tutionalism literature in political science treats constitutional design
frequently as an explanatory variable but rarely as the dependent
variable. Moore’s thesis is about the causes of revolutionary regimes.
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In particular, how social and economic structure differentiates revo-
lutionary regimes into liberal democratic states and repressive tyran-
nical states. His argument is that the modernization of the economy
in states where revolution led to democratic states had proceeded to
a stage where the peasantry were not a consequential force in rev-
olutionary politics. Whereas in Russia and China, the retardation of
economic modernization led to a situation where the revolutions were
fundamentally peasant revolutions. Under circumstances of such so-
cial inequality, Moore argues that revolutionary regimes develop into
dictatorial systems. In other words, no bourgeoisie, no democracy.
The liberalism or repressiveness of the post-revolutionary state has a
lot to do with the development of commercial agriculture, industrial-
ization, the relationship of the bourgeois to the rulers and the peasant
class, and the aristocracy. This is what Moore gleans from a compara-
tive historical survey of England, France, the USA, China, Japan and
India. The path of ‘bourgeois revolution’ which traced a trajectory
in the histories of the United States, England and France depended,
pace Moore, on the growth of commercial agriculture, the absence of
a bourgeois-aristocratic coalition against the peasantry, a weakened
aristocracy, a revolutionary break with feudalism and a relatively
weakened monarch and aristocracy. Using the of England around
the time of the English Glorious Revolution, properly so called, of
the 17th century, Moore illustrates how the amenability of the landed
aristocracy to commercial agriculture and the systematic augmenta-
tion of enclosures from the Commons were critical in ensuring a more
pacific transition to modern democracy than that which was experi-
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enced in France. In this regard, the absolutist regime of Louis XIV re-
tarded the bourgeoisification of the peasantry through the inhibitions
it placed on the landed aristocracy becoming engaged in commercial
activity via, for example, its derogation laws. [164, pp.430-1]
Although a tantalizing study in its scope and ambition, Moore
omits sufficient emphasis on the theological origins of the legal re-
forms to contracts and inheritance that fostered this change in atti-
tudes to commerce. Luther’s revolution, one might say, led to the
sanctification of property and contract as long as it was congruous
with the individual’s conscience. This dignifying of individual con-
science of the Protestant Revolution permitted the future growth of
the legal mechanisms of property and contract to sustain the growth
of the bourgeoisie in Europe. [29, p.30] Recently Moore’s thesis has
been revisited from an economic perspective by Acemoglu and Robin-
son in The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy who present
economic models of the dynamics implicit in Moore’s thesis such as
the dependence of democratization on the costs of coups and inequal-
ity levels. [1, pp.43-6]
Another approach to institutional origins has focussed on the bar-
gaining aspect of institutional selection. Institutional choices are not
made. Compromises are brokered between players at the constitu-
tional table. How does this process work? Bawn essays a response
to this in a study of the emergence of West Germany’s electoral sys-
tem post-WWII. In order to understand outcomes in an institutional
bargain, we need to realise, according to Bawn, that this mode of bar-
gaining is structured by existing institutions, and that actors’ prefer-
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ences are shaped by their estimation of whether a future institutional
configuration will deliver their policy preferences. This approach can
explain changes in post WW-II West German electoral law, both the
adoption of proportional representation in 1949 and the switch back
to a two-vote ballot in 1953. [21] A similar argument voiced from the
rational choice theory paradigm has been developed by Tsebelis in
his work on what he calls nested games. Tsebelis posits that institu-
tional choice in politics can be viewed as the first stage of a two stage
game. Preferences in the first stage (institutional design) are shaped
by the perceived payoffs in stage two, the policy choice stage. [221]
Colomer argues that we can explain institutional change in post-
Communist states by accounting for the distribution of bargaining
power between elites and opposition groups and their respective fore-
casts on their electoral fortunes. He describes a two dimensional bar-
gaining model that explains institutional choice as an outcome of two
variables, the bargaining power of the ancien régime office holders and
their electoral prospects in the future. According to Colomer, this
model can help explain post-Communist institutional innovation in
Albania, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Poland and Romania. When bargaining
power is low and electoral prospects are high incumbents are confi-
dent of their electoral gains and will extend control over institutions
by opting for a majoritarian- plurality electoral law, unicameral par-
liamentarism and centralization. When such bargaining power is low
and electoral prospects are high the opposition has firm prospects
for electoral victory and incumbents are excluded from designing
new institutions. In this situation the opposition will opt for plural-
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ist formulas and divided powers. When electoral prospects are low
and bargaining power is high the incumbents can arbitrate new in-
stitutional configurations but they hold gloomy forecast of electoral
prospects meaning they will opt for conciliar institutions. And last,
when both electoral prospects are low and bargaining power is low
incumbents are precluded from unilaterally crafting new institutions
and will maximise opportunities for future electoral success by opting
for pluralist institutions and a division of powers: e.g., proportional
representation, a separately elected president and a two-chamber par-
liament. [53]
However, some scholars point out that the devil is in the detail
- the historical detail. You don’t need theory to explain patterns of
institutional choice. There is no single explanation for why certain
institutional configurations become diffuse. Institutions can serve dif-
ferent purposes depending on specific circumstances. For example
Bernhard’s critique of the theoretical literature on institutional choice
emerging in the 1990s draws attention to a series of factual errors
made by authors attempting to explain institutional choice in post-
Communist Europe. He shows that the authors Lijphart [137], Colomer
[53] and Geddes [88] make one or more of the following errors in
their arguments: the original intention of having a powerful, inde-
pendent presidency in post-1989 Poland was not to facilitate power
sharing, but the continuation of Communist power within an illib-
eral democracy; in Bulgaria, the innovation of a presidency carried
the opposite intention; the Polish roundtable talks were originally in-
tended to be a process of liberalization, not democratization, so that
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the Communists could maintain legitimacy; institutions can become
hijacked via leadership and charisma so that the outcomes reached
by the adoption of a given institution are actually divorced from its
founding context - for example, Solidarity’s control of the presidency
in Poland, despite Communist forecasts that they would have won
a presidential contest after the 1989 round table (hence, efforts to
frame the Polish presidency as an innovation of power sharing get
the chronology wrong.) [32]
Lutz writing on this subject maintain that ‘[u]nder certain condi-
tions of liberty, those who frame constitutions exhibit a set of pat-
terned choices that suggest constitutionalism has an underlying logic,
and perhaps an underlying rationality.’ [146, p.221] In other words,
we can think about the constitutional design process as common prob-
lems stimulating common reactions. But what is this set of ‘patterned
choices’? Lutz’s cross- country survey of constitutional democracies
identifies the following four patterns: the index of amendment diffi-
culty forms a hyperbolic curve when measured against amendment
rate; the size of legislatures is correlated to the cube root of popu-
lation size; separation of powers increases with increased popular
control; the increase in number of constitutional democracies is corre-
lated historically with the increase in the number of written constitu-
tions. This pattern of legislative assembly size has been also observed
by Taagepera and Recchia. [211, p.170] A pattern of emergent order is
being observed here that cannot be seen by studying the minutiae of
constituent assembly meetings. It is like having to stand back to ap-
preciate the beauty of Georgs-Pierre Seurat’s Un dimanche après-midi à
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l’Île de la Grande Jatte. Close up we see nothing but random coloured
dots. But a few feet back we have a beautiful image of life by the sea.
Another somewhat contrary perspective is to attribute institutional
choice as a conscious strategy to fix problems facing a society. Con-
stitutional framers make decisions that best accommodate the com-
plexities of their society. This hypothesis is sometimes advanced in
the context of assuaging ethnic cleavages. In the context of semi-
presidentialism, transplanting a presidency onto an existing parlia-
mentary democracy may happen because framers view the office of
presidency as playing an ‘Alexander the Great’ role in bringing to-
gether divided social groups as Horowitz argues. [111, p.263] In other
instances, the desire for a division of powers may be a strong motiva-
tion.
Not all these approaches will be useful here. For the purposes of
this thesis the literature that tries to explain institutional development
via theories such as endogenous self-enforcement, transaction costs
or evolution, is too general. A formal, deductive model will not be
used to explain institutional development. This thesis intends to trade
internal validity for external validity. This is motivated by the fact
that constitutional variation can only be observed practically through
cross-national comparisons.
2.2 regime types
In this setting I put particular emphasis on the alloys of these two op-
posing regime types of parliamentarism and presidentialism due to
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the fact that hybrid regime types have become increasingly more com-
mon in the second half the twentieth century. The alloy constitution
I am particularly interested in this study is what has been frequently
referred to as semi-presidentialism. The lion’s share of the semi- pres-
identialism literature is focussed on how the system operates and
its impacts on a variety of issues, e.g., democratic consolidation, ac-
countability, governance, or the policy process. Work on why states
become semi-presidential has been cursory and mainly undertaken
in the context of country-specific studies. As such, there is an oppor-
tunity to undertake original research on this problem.
For the purposes of this thesis a trichotomous typology will be
used classifying legislative-executive models in democracies into the
following categories: parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential.
The problems associated with forming a standardized definition of
different regime types stem from the reality that judging when a hy-
brid state is ‘semi enough’ is largely subjective. More fundamentally,
however, it reflects the difficulty in moving between the historical
minutiae and the formal objects of scientific investigation. With the
emergence of many new semi-presidential regimes in the 1990s there
is a temptation to go out into the world to refine the definition. This
approach is problematic because it blurs the line between typology,
which is an organizing principle for conceptual development, and
taxonomy, which is a way of classifying things by their observable
characteristics.
The solution proposed in this thesis is a regime typology that de-
fines the ‘semi’ not as a guess of what is the right balance of presiden-
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tial and parliamentary characteristics, but one based on the combi-
nation of institutional features that are jointly sufficient for a regime
to be semi-presidential, that is, formally and substantively distinct
from parliamentary and presidential democracy in terms of the pat-
terns of delegation and accountability. To this end, a semi-presidential
regime is defined as a polity featuring a triangular authority pattern
where there exists: (i) a popularly elected presidential head of state;
(ii) a prime minister and cabinet government formed from legislative
elections; and (iii) a prime minister and cabinet government responsi-
ble to parliament and the presidency. This definition gives us logical
traction. This typological decision aligns this thesis with the view of
Cheibub on what constitutes a semi-presidential state. [48]
The parliamentary model is defined by the hierarchical pattern of
delegation and accountability. Voters delegate to an elected legisla-
ture, which delegates to cabinet government the business of govern-
ing. Responsibility flows in the other direction. Authority patterns in
presidential regimes operate in a transactional manner. Due to the
separation of powers, the legislature and the executive check each
other in a series of strategic interactions involving vetoes and counter-
vetoes. This dynamic is created out of the tension of the presidency
not being accountable to the coalitions of electors who voted for the
legislature and the legislature not being accountable to the coalitions
of voters who elected the president. Cabinet government is account-
able to the president and not to the legislature. Semi-presidentialism
involves a triangular authority pattern between the legislature, the
parliamentary executive and the presidency. The legislature delegates
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authority to the parliamentary executive whose recruitment is deter-
mined jointly by the president. The parliamentary executive remains
accountable to the presidency and parliament. The presidency has
the power to dissolve the legislature, while the legislature has the
power to impeach the president. There is a sense in which even in
presidential systems, the assembly has some control over the selec-
tion of portfolios. Typically congress will have some power to review
candidates for certain important positions and it may be possible for
the person’s candidature to be blocked by a vote of censure. How-
ever, this is a strictly negative power. Congress, in the United States,
for example, does not have the authority to propose candidates, a
positive power over the formation of government. Negative appoint-
ment powers can play a role as necessary conditions in this typology,
but they are not sufficient for regime classifications according to this
framework.
One flaw in the definition used here is that it excludes a number
of mixed regimes that possess a combination of presidential and par-
liamentary features, but that do not contain a strictly triangular au-
thority pattern. In order to remain cognizant of these states, a table
of cases comprehending the following definition is given (Table 3):
‘Mixed’ states are defined by possessing both, (i) a popularly elected
presidential head of state, and, (ii) a prime minister and cabinet re-
cruited from legislative elections and responsible to parliament. By
implementing the ‘mixed’ regime definition alongside the definition
of ‘semi- presidential’ it is hoped that this investigation can enjoy the
best of both worlds, in terms of retaining the meaningfulness of the
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kind of typology offered by Duverger, while at the same time main-
taining the strength of Elgie’s definition in terms of avoiding type-
II errors, that is, the error of excluding true cases. The trichotomous
typology adopted here produces the categorization of states listed in
Table 3. 1
I will now briefly survey the disagreements in the literature over
regime type classification. Sartori claims that attempts to define semi-
presidentialism and then categorize states accordingly have encoun-
tered a problem of circularity. Because there is no common agree-
ment on what the common features of semi-presidentialism are, au-
thors have encountered difficulties in identifying from the interna-
tional system the true subpopulation of semi-presidential states. This
difficulty tempts scholars to group polities into a semi-presidential
category that has been defined a priori. Sartori claims that the most
prudent strategy is to base the definition on an archetypal case, in this
case, the French Fifth Republic. From this, Sartori posits the most par-
simonious definition of semi-presidentialism yet encountered. [192,
pp.132-3]
A better way of thinking about the problem raised by Sartori is
whether our definition of semi-presidentialism is an organizing prin-
1 In the case of Switzerland there may be some confusion as to its classification as
presidential since it lacks a popularly elected president. The Swiss case presents a
unique situation where there is a rotating presidency selected from cabinet which is
independent of the assembly. Shugart and Carey classify this case as an ‘assembly-
independent’ regime. [199, p.26] The essential classifying factor pace Cheibub (2007)
is the independence of cabinet from the legislative assembly, which is why it is
considered to instantiate a presidential regime.
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ciple for a regime typology or a regime taxonomy. Typologies classify
for the purpose of heuristics, conceptual development or theory. Tax-
onomies classify purely based on empirical characteristics. [15, p.890]
If Sartori is claiming that a taxonomical approach is superior, he is ob-
viously mistaken in thinking that a definition based on a single case
has the kind of external validity demanded by a thorough-going tax-
onomy. However, it makes more sense to treat semi-presidentialism
as a regime type as opposed to a regime taxon. Afterall, regime types
are concepts that cannot posit speciation. They are ideas that help
us think about the way democracy is organized. Another reason for
avoiding such an approach is simply pragmatics. Existing indexes of
presidential power fail to account for de facto powers and use inad-
equate codification. For example, the scoring system used in McGre-
gor [154] awards the Semi-presidential states according to author’s
opinions.
Yet, drastic discrepancies exist in different authors’ views of the
size of the population of semi-presidential states due differences over
whether presidential power and specific authority patterns need to
be included in the definition. Table 2 illustrates these differences. Re-
searchers need to be aware that imprudent conceptual decisions may
lead to a moving of the goal posts when typology is applied to the
empirical world.
Duverger’s 1980 paper claims that a semi-presidential state con-
tains the following elements: (i) A president elected by universal suf-
frage. (ii) A president possessing quite considerable powers. (iii) A
prime minister and cabinet also possessing governmental powers and
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Table 2: Semi-presidential States According to Author
Duverger [70] Carey and Shugart [199] Sartori [192] Elgie [75]
Austria Austria Finland Algeria Poland
Finland Finland France Angola Portugal
France France Portugal Armenia Romania
Iceland Iceland Sri Lanka Austria Russia
Ireland Portugal Weimar Germany Azerbaijan Rwanda
Portugal Belarus Sao Tome e Principe
Weimar Germany Bulgaria Senegal
Burkina Faso Singapore
Cameroon Slovakia
Cape Verde Slovenia
Central African Republic South Korea
Chad Sri Lanka
Croatia Taiwan
Egypt Tajikistan
Finland Tanzania
France Timor-Leste
Gabon Togo
Georgia Tunisia
Guinea-Bissau Ukraine
Haiti Uzbekistan
Iceland Yemen
Ireland
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Lithuania
Macedonia
Mali
Mauritania
Mongolia
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Peru
50 conceptual cornerstones
responsible to parliament. [70] The logic shaping Duverger’s defini-
tion was that for a state to be semi-presidential it had to possess
characteristics that designated it as a substantive mixture of presiden-
tial and parliamentary modes of recruitment, delegation and account-
ability. The criterion of a president elected by universal suffrage was
deemed essential because for a presidential head of state to play a
formative role in politics she must have the legitimacy of fully demo-
cratic recruitment. Naturally, such a president had to be able to ex-
ercise quite considerable powers to play this active role also. Addi-
tionally, the model had to be parliamentary enough to make it only
semi-presidential. This explains the insertion of the last criterion. Of
course, Duverger’s typology raised more problems than it solved. For
instance, can the president merely be indirectly elected for a regime to
still be semi- presidential? Does the president need to be powerful or
does she merely have to stand between the parliamentary executive
and the legislature? Also, do cabinet government and prime minister
have to be responsible to the president as well? These ambiguities
have led a number of authors to deviate from Duverger’s definition,
offering their own concepts of semi-presidentialism.
Later definitions agree over the need to relax the presidential re-
cruitment criterion. ‘Popularly’ elected may not mean a national bal-
lot carried out with universal suffrage, but it may still suffice to invest
in the president some legitimacy, such as via the recruitment method
used in France from 1958 to 1962 where 80,000 distinguished electors
voted in the presidential ballot. [125] Sartori maintains that the parlia-
mentary executive must maintain some degree of autonomy from the
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presidency in order for the semi-presidential system to oscillate be-
tween presidential and parliamentary modes depending on electoral
majorities in the legislature. [192] This is not deemed to be a suffi-
cient condition for a state to be semi-presidential because the semi-
presidential model is treated here as a unique regime type due to its
triangular authority structure and not simply a chameleon that ex-
presses itself periodically under presidential or parliamentary guises
- a position that has found vindication in research performed on the
French Fifth Republic and Weimar Germany by Skach. [200] Nonethe-
less, it does not appear to be strictly necessary for the parliamentary
executive to practice autonomy under normal circumstances for the
system to revert to a parliamentary manner under a cohabitant prime
minister because the exigency of passing supply would force even
an authoritative president’s hand in recruiting an opposition prime
minister into the parliamentary executive in a system with real leg-
islative power. The latest definitions offered by Skach and Elgie of-
fer an even more relaxed definition, whereby states with a popularly
elected president and a parliamentary executive responsible to the
legislature are deemed semi-presidential. The problem with this def-
inition is that it may commit the so called type-I error of including
false cases, whereby states may be de jure semi-presidential, but de
facto parliamentary or presidential.
These difficulties have led some authors to doubt the accuracy
and usefulness of the regime type of semi-presidentialism. For ex-
ample, Lijphart argues that semi- presidentialism is a non-category
because it is simply a vessel for Frankenstein constitutions that fall
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somewhere between the traditional regime types of presidentialism
and parliamentarism. He claims that semi-presidential states do not
possess unique characteristics but simply alternate periodically be-
tween parliamentary and presidential modes. [138] One way of re-
sponding to such skepticism is to draw attention to the uniqueness
of the semi-presidential model in promoting institutionalized infra-
executive power sharing, competition and transaction. Semi-presidentialism
contains a bicephalous executive where two heads are recruited from
mutually exclusive elections (presidential and parliamentary). As such,
semi-presidential states have the potential for executive power to
be shared between non-coalition parties, that is, between an opposi-
tion prime minister and president. Known as cohabitation, this form
of divided government is substantively different from divided gov-
ernment in parliamentary and presidential states. In parliamentary
regimes it occurs when the parliamentary executive has lost its sup-
port coalition in the legislature. In other words, minority government
and divided government are much the same thing in parliamentary
democracy. In presidential systems this occurs when one party con-
trols the legislature and another the executive. [130, p.269] Presiden-
tial divided government is still within the spirit of the separation
of powers. However, divided minority government runs through the
executive itself in semi-presidential systems. In other words, where
division can occur between infra-party factions in cabinet and presi-
dential government, in semi-presidential systems this division is hard-
wired in a way that is qualitatively different to parliamentary or pres-
idential systems.
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More controversy has been stimulated by the uncertain place of
presidential powers in the definition of semi-presidentialism. Authors
such as Sartori maintain that the semi- presidency needs to maintain
some substantial powers for it not merely to be a crypto governor-
generalship under republican colours. [192] The question of a crite-
rion of presidential powers is significant because it determines like no
other factor the number of semi-presidential regimes in the world. For
example, Duverger posited the existence of seven semi-presidential
polities as a result of his insertion of a criterion of a president with
‘quite considerable powers’. After relaxing this criterion, Elgie asserts
the existence of fifty-five such regimes. [75]
In table 3 I relax the ‘democracy criterion’. By this I mean that the
sample is formed by including states that have de jure semi-presidential
structures regardless of their status on the Freedom House index.
There is a second sense in which they are de jure semi-presidential
regimes - they do not cohere strictly to the definition of semi-presidentialism
adumbrated by Cheibub based on accountability flows (more on this
soon) and for this reason I prefer to label them ‘mixed regimes’. This
sample of countries is based on that given by Elgie [75] and it is de-
rived from his definition of semi-presidentialism with its focus on
potency. I extend Elgie’s sample somewhat via my reading of some
primary source constitutional data. 2
2 Specifically, from the resources contained in Blaustein and Flanz [35] and in Reynt-
jens [180].
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Table 3: Mixed regimes (relaxing the democracy criterion)
Algeria (1963-)* NF**, Moldova (1996-) PF, Angola (1992-) NF, Mongolia (1992-) F, Armenia (1995-) PF,
Mozambique (1990-) PF, Austria (1929-) F, Namibia (1990-) F, Azerbaijan (1995-) NF, Niger (1993-) PF,
Belarus (1994-) NF, Pakistan (1972-) NF, Brazil (1961-1962) F, Peru (1993-) F, Bulgaria (1990-) F,
Poland (1989-) F, Burkina Faso (1991-) PF, Portugal (1976-) F, Cameroon (1972-) NF, Romania (1990-) F,
Cape Verde (1991-) F, Russia (1991-) NF, Central African Republic (1993-) PF, Rwanda (2003-) NF,
Chad (1996-) NF, Sao Tome e Principe (1991-) F, Comoros (1990-) PF, Senegal (2000-) F,
Republic of Congo (1992-) NF, Singapore (1959-) PF, Croatia (1991-) F, Slovak Republic (1993-) F,
Egypt (1971-) NF, Slovenia (1991-) F, Finland (1919-1999) F, South Korea (1988-) F, France (1958-) F,
Sri Lanka (1978-) PF, Gabon (1991-) PF, Taiwan (1996-) F, Guinea-Bissau (1991-) PF, Tajikistan (1994-) NF,
Haiti (1994-) PF, Tanzania (1984-) PF, Iceland (1946-) F, Timor- Leste (2002-) PF, Ireland (1937-) F,
Togo (1992-) PF, Kazakhstan (1995-) NF, Tunisia (1959-) NF, Kyrgyzstan (1993-) PF, Ukraine (1991-) F,
Lithuania (1991-) F, Uzbekistan (1992-) NF, Macedonia (1991-) PF, Weimar Germany (1919-1932),
Madagascar (1993-) PF, Yemen (1991-) PF, Mali (1992-) F, Mauritania (1991-) PF.
*Dates indicate year of promulgation of last constitution or major amendment.
‘F’ indicates 2008 Freedom House score of ‘free’ - ‘PF’, ‘partly free’, and ‘NF’, ‘not free’.
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So, should presidential power matter in a definition of this politi-
cal system model? The somewhat heterodox position of ‘no’ is being
adopted in this thesis. Semi-presidential states are not unique from
presidential states because the presidency in semi-presidential states
has less power than in the ‘pure’ presidential system. Furthermore,
semi- presidentialism does not stand out from parliamentary democ-
racy because the semi- presidential presidency exercises more power
than a constitutional monarch. Semi- presidentialism is a distinct
regime type because there is something different about legislative-
executive relations. This something is interdependency, in form and
magnitude. A sufficient condition for semi-presidential regimes is
that they contain a government accountable to a presidential head
of state and the legislative assembly (and they are an electoral democ-
racy). This classification has more leverage than definitions that in-
clude presidential power because it can account for a great deal more
hybrid states than the latter. Definitions that do make use of a power
criterion either leave a plethora of hybrid states in limbo or presump-
tuously file them under presidential or parliamentary systems.
2.2.1 The regime type debate
A number of authors claim that presidential democracy contains insti-
tutional tendencies that amplify divisiveness and diminish coopera-
tion. [142, 223, 170] The facts seem to support these claims. In the last
half of the twentieth century presidential republics were both on aver-
age less democratic than the constitutional alternatives but also much
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Table 4: Nominal Regime Type Categorization of World States
Semi-presidential Parliamentary Presidential
Armenia (1995-) Albania (1992-) Lebanon (1946-1974) Argentina (1946-1954; 1958-1961; 1963-1965; 1973- 1975; 1983-) Philippines (1946-1965; 1986-)
Austria (1929-) Andorra (1993-) Lesotho (1993-) Armenia (1991-1994) San Marino (1992-)
Brazil (1961-1962) Antigua (1981-) Liechtenstein (1990-) Benin (1991-) Sierra Leone (1996; 1998-)
Bulgaria (1990-) Australia (1901-) Luxembourg (1946-) Bolivia (1979; 1982-) South Korea (1988-)
Cape Verde (1991-) Bahamas (1973-) Malta (1964-) Brazil (1946-1960; 1963; 1979-) Sri Lanka (1989-)
Central African Republic (1993-) Bangladesh (1991-) Marshall Islands (1991-) Burundi (1993-1995) Suriname (1988-1989; 1991-)
Comoros (1990-1994) Barbados (1966-) Mauritius (1968-) Chile (1946-1972; 1990-) Switzerland (1946-)*
Republic of Congo (1992- 1996) Belgium (1948-) Myanmar (1948-1957; 1960-1961) Colombia (1946-1948; 1958-) Uganda (1980-1984)
Croatia (1991-) Belize (1981-) Nauru (1968-) Costa Rica (1946-1947; 1949-) United States (1946-)
Finland (1919-1999) Canada (1918-) Nepal (1991-2001) Cuba (1946-1951) Uruguay (1946-1972; 1985-)
France (1958-) Czechoslovakia (1990-1992) Netherlands (1946-) Cyprus (1983-) Venezuela (1946-1947; 1959-)
Haiti (1994-) Czech Republic (1993-) New Zealand (1893-) Dominican Republic (1966-) Zambia (1991-)
Iceland (1946-) Denmark (1915-) Nigeria (1960-1965) Ecuador (1948-1962; 1979-1999)
Lithuania (1991-) Dominica (1978-) Norway (1946-) El Salvador (1984-)
Macedonia (1991-) Estonia (1991-) Pakistan (1947-1955; 1988-1998) Ghana (1979-1980; 1993-)
Madagascar (1993-) Finland (2000-) Papua New Guinea (1975-) Guatemala (1946-1953; 1958-1962;1966-1981; 1986-)
Mali (1992-) France (1946-1957) St. Kitts and Nevis (1983-) Guinea-Bissau (2000-)
Moldova (1996-) Germany (1949-) St. Lucia (1979-) Guyana (1992-)
Mongolia (1992-) Ghana (1969-1971) St. Vincent (1979-) Honduras (1957-1962; 1971; 1982-)
Niger (1993-1995; 2000-) Greece (1946-1966; 1974-) Sierra Leone (1961-1966) Indonesia (1999-)
Pakistan (1972-1976) Grenada (1974-1978; 1984-) Slovak Republic (1993-) Ivory Coast (2000-)
Poland (1989-) Hungary (1990-) Solomon Islands (1978-) Kenya (1998-)
Portugal (1976-) India (1947-) Somalia (1960-1968) Malawi (1994-)
Romania (1990-) Ireland (1937-) South Africa (1994-) Mexico (2000-)
Russia (1991-) Israel (1948-) South Korea (1960) Micronesia (1991-)
Sao Tome e Principe (1991-) Italy (1947-) Spain (1977-) Namibia (1990-)
Senegal (2000-) Jamaica (1962-) Sudan (1956-1957; 1965-1968; 1986-1988) Nicaragua (1984-)
Slovenia (1991-) Japan (1947-) Suriname (1975-1979) Nigeria (1979-1982; 1999-)
Taiwan (1996-) Kiribati (1979-) Sweden (1946-) Palau (1994-)
Ukraine (1991-) Laos (1954-1958) Thailand (1975; 1983-1990; 1992-) Panama (1949-1950; 1952-1967; 1989-)
Weimar Germany (1919-1932) Latvia (1991-2002) Trinidad and Tobago (1962-) Peru (1946-1947; 1956-1961; 1963-1967; 1980-1990; 2001-)
Turkey (1961-1979; 1983-)
United Kingdom (1946-)
Vanuatu (1980-)
*Data from Cheibub (2007)
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more unstable. Presidential states actually demonstrated higher lev-
els of state fragility as an index of several factors including security,
governance, economics and social development. [150]
The regime type debate was born out of the controversy surround-
ing the relative flaws and merits of parliamentary and presidential
democracy. A superior regime type had to promote the following
characteristics: stability in uncertain transitional phases and robustly
democratic practices. It is inviting to think of the capacity of a state
to withstand policy deadlock as a type of tensile strength that can
be weakened or strengthened by the constitutional design that struc-
tures political action. Arguments for or against presidentialism were
either couched in theoretical terms or with reference to historical or
statistical analysis. The former corresponds to argument by reference
to the situations and tendencies constitutional texts may manufacture
by virtue of their particular institutional logic. The latter represents
efforts to see how the different models performed in relation to be-
ing associated with stable democracies or with institutionally unsta-
ble polities with irregular, absent or inconsistent practices of mass
participation. The focus of the debate was whether presidentialism
was guilty of contributing to democratic breakdown. The reason why
presidentialism, in particular, was questioned as a desirable political
system was because selective case study analysis, particularly in Latin
America, suggested that there was an inherent performance gap be-
tween parliamentary regimes and presidential regimes. [141]
The alleged divisive tendencies of presidentialism may lead to leg-
islative deadlock. If this occurs frequently and for prolonged peri-
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ods this may lower the cost of a military intervention and subse-
quent democratic demise. Stepan and Skach offer a statistical anal-
ysis of democratic survivability of ‘pure’ presidential and parliamen-
tary regimes that is consonant with the views of the previous authors.
Their findings seem to offer support to the hypothesis that parliamen-
tarism performs better than presidentialism because of the former’s
greater capacity to render majority government, cope with multiparty
systems, its greater propensity to offer constitutional mechanisms to
remove executive heads who have over-extended themselves and its
related property of recruiting executive heads who adhere to constitu-
tional precepts. [207, p.22] However, the problem remains unresolved.
Cheibub’s 2007 book supports the null hypothesis that presidential-
ism does not affect democratic survival, suggesting that differences
in democratic survival can be better explained by military legacies.
His work on the regime type problem offers some of the most robust
research on this problem and makes a significant contribution to the
typological problem of semi-presidentialism. [48, pp.32–42] However,
this thesis will not simply be a replication of Cheibub’s work because
the findings presented in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democ-
racy are still tightly focused within a presidential context. For most
other authors the question of semi- presidentialism’s role in all of this
has either been largely ignored or subsumed under the traditional
two variants of regime types.
One exception to this is Moestrup who offers a regression analysis
of Freedom House scores in the international system categorized by
regime types. Her findings are that semi- presidential states are, in the
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aggregate, correlated to worse average Freedom House scores than
presidential and parliamentary states. However, she finds a great deal
of heterogeneity when broken down at the regional level: ‘We have
seen that there are important regional differences between the demo-
cratic performance of semi-presidential and other young democra-
cies. Thus, while semi- presidential regimes have performed better in
terms of average Freedom House scores than parliamentary regimes
in Eastern Europe, they have performed worse than other systems in
Latin America and Asia and just as poorly as presidential systems in
the former Soviet Union and Africa.’ [163, p.43]
It is difficult to determine the significance of these findings because
this thesis departs from Moestrup’s analysis in terms of its use of a
typology that is deemed to retain a tighter conceptual understanding
of regime type differences. Under the typology adopted previously,
Moestrup’s definition of semi-presidentialism would actually be con-
tained under the definition of ‘mixed’ regime. Moestrup’s analysis
is important in being one of the first extensive cross-polity analyses
of semi-presidentialism’s impact on democratic performance and the
negative correlation she identifies invites researchers to search for
a mechanism to explain the poor performance of semi-presidential
states in much the same way as authors have been inspired by the po-
litical history of Latin America to provide an account of the ostensible
defects of presidential democracy.
A more fundamental reservation that needs to be assuaged is whether
the premise of the research problem makes sense, i.e., do regime types
actually matter? Tsebelis posits the existence of other independent in-
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stitutional variables that render the parliamentary- presidential dis-
tinction redundant under certain circumstances. Tsebelis argues con-
vincingly that the number of partisan and institutional veto players
has more leverage in determining policy stability than traditional ar-
guments based on legislative-executive models or party systems. For
example, Italy is a parliamentary republic with a multiparty system
and the US a presidential one with a two party system. However, both
states are comparable in terms of their high levels of policy stability
because they both contain a large number of veto players. [222, pp.4-
5] Yet, to say that veto player theory proves that typologies based
on regime types are redundant is inaccurate because this proposition
is only arguable if the dependent variable under analysis is policy
stability. Veto player theory is not a counter-argument to a study of
regime type choice, nor to a study of democratic survival. The influ-
ence of veto players may even help to explain outcomes at the con-
stitutional table. For instance, we may rephrase the desire to become
semi-presidential out of a motive of power sharing as a desire for an
increased number of veto players.
The factors that constitute veto players actually vindicate the impor-
tance of legislative- executive models. Veto players can be either ‘par-
tisan’, which is determined by party systems or ‘institutional’ which
is determined by regime types. So in other words, regime types still
comprise half the story in Tsebelis’s rational choice analysis of policy
stability.
To reiterate, the focus on semi-presidentialism is justified by the
following reasons: some mystery still surrounds how the model func-
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tions in a variety of contexts and the adoption of the model has usu-
ally taken place in non-consolidated democracies. On the question
of whether there is enough hindsight to investigate the democratic
performance of semi-presidential states, it is worth noting that in Li-
jphart’s cross-polity analysis of democracies he posits a minimum of
nineteen years of democracy for a state to be included in his case sam-
ple. [139, p.54] A similar time-span sits between the present and the
surge in new (semi-presidential) democracies in 1991. Benchmarks
dictating the length of time that must pass before a state can be con-
sidered a consolidated democracy or a valid case will usually appear
to be conceived arbitrarily and adjusted for the convenience of the
researcher devising them. For example, Lijphart’s adjustment of the
minimum of nineteen years from twenty was due to his desire to in-
clude the states of India, Papua New Guinea and Spain in the case
sample. [139, p.53] One non- arbitrary way of offering a benchmark
is to determine whether there are sufficient data. Moestrup’s analysis
illustrates there is in a test of association between semi- presidential-
ism and democratic performance.
2.3 conciliar democracy
In a very general sense consensus democracy is a set of institutions,
coalitions and behaviours from which political power is decentral-
ized and political action negotiated. Operationalizing the concept of
consensus democracy, therefore, involves identifying aspects of polit-
ical systems that exhibit these characteristics. Lijphart offers a frame-
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work of 10 political variables that can be conveniently represented as
two significant principal components, one measuring aspects of elec-
toral/executive power-sharing and inclusiveness and another mea-
suring institutional decentralization. These principal components are
shown to have measurable OLS coefficients when regressed against
a set of governance variables in bivariate models. The effect signs of
these models suggest that consensus democracies have better quality
governance than majoritarian democracies, where political power is
institutionally concentrated and governments are formed on a winner
takes all basis.
Lijphart’s consociational theory is an attempt to provide a new in-
stitutionalist explanation of what causes stable democracy in some di-
vided societies and stillborn democracy in other divided societies. Li-
jphart’s conjecture has been that elite political cooperation can achieve
stable democracy in such societies. By acting as an elite cartel, it is
claimed, political leaders can bypass insoluble social divisions and
create stable governing bodies in societies where there exist multiple
and protuberant social cleavages. What has made Lijphart’s contri-
bution significant is the proposition that there exist institutional ar-
chitectures that will promote this cooperative cartel behaviour. [136,
p.223]
These are institutions that promote the inclusive representation of
diverse societal interests, which can be contrasted against institutions
that promote majority winners and competitive political behaviour. In
the conceptual groundwork of consociational theory there is a neces-
sary distinction between consociational democracy on the one hand,
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and consensus democracy on the other. In the former, ethnic political
groups have veto power and/or segmental autonomy, while in the lat-
ter they do not. [140] This distinction recognizes the important differ-
ence between societies where social distinctions are intersecting and
as such, political institutions are integrative (consensus democracy),
and societies where social differences are bisecting, which warrants
a need for political institutions to be accommodating (consociational
democracy). Inclusive democratic institutions work by enforcing rules
on political actors so that elite rivals are compelled to become co-
operative partners. Under consociational democracy this comprises
four institutional pillars: segmental autonomy, proportionality, grand
coalition, and minority veto. Grand coalition involves policy making
at the national level through negotiation involving leaders represent-
ing the full span of social divisions. Related to this is the concept of
minority veto, where policy making occurs in an environment where
the smallest coalition members have the authority to torpedo propos-
als they do not consent to. Segmental autonomy comprehends the de-
centralization of political institutions, for example in terms of adopt-
ing a federal constitutional structure or the granting of self-governing
authority to spatially isolated minorities. And last, proportionality is
identified in situations where the dispensation of political offices fol-
lowing a ballot accurately represents the distribution of preferences
among the electorate. [136, p.25] In Patterns of Democracy (PD), this
array of accommodating consociationalist features is extended across
a wider range of integrative institutional features spanning the judi-
ciary, party system, special interests, and monetary and federal insti-
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tutions. [8, p.513] While it isn’t obvious why consensus democracy
would improve the quality of public policy, there is some intuition
behind why consociational democracy might induce institutional sta-
bility in consociational democracies. If we assumed that sectarian po-
litical elites trade policy preferences for power then grand coalitions
would incentivise cartel behaviour within some region of tolerance
before they lose the the support of their selectorate who don’t want
to compromise on party policy.
2.4 democracy : meanings and measurement
Societies in democratic transition are faced with the problem of how
to choose modes of constitutional democracy that will make demo-
cratic innovations buoyant in the long term. So how do political insti-
tutions fit into the picture we have of how democratization works? To
begin with, democratization is taken to be a time derivative of demo-
cratic performance. The operational definition of democratic perfor-
mance is the extent to which national political recruitment and deci-
sion making is exercised by a majority of the electorate. This is why
we are entitled to say that the France of 1962 was more democratic
than the France of 1958 because electoral reforms altered the elec-
torate responsible for recruiting the president from a college of elders
to the national electorate of citizens eligible to vote. This definition
is strictly procedural, which means that democracy in this sense is
not a synonym for social justice, or related normative goods. There
is some confusion between the political-economy notion of political
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institutions and the comparative political science notion of political in-
stitutions. The former is a much broader notion of institutions, which
may encompass things such as transparency, accountability, rule of
law or democracy. [2]
In this sense, it would make little sense to ask what the democratic
effects of constitutions are because constitutions qua constitutionalism
and democracy are inseparable. However, in the comparative poli-
tics literatuwre constitutions are meant to designate specific types of
constitutional democracy, in terms of different systems of rules in
which decision making is made in democracies. The assumption be-
hind work on determining the democratic effects of constitutions is
that different decision making rules will the affect the trajectory of
democracy in different ways because the pathway of democracy is
dependent on the satisfaction or tolerance of political institutions by
the actors whose consent to the institutional status quo is necessary
for the survival of the status quo.
According to Przeworksi, et al.,’s lights, for a state to be democratic
it must not infringe upon the following four rules: (i) The chief exec-
utive must be elected; (ii) the legislature must be elected; (iii) there
must be more than one effective party; (iv) there must be alterna-
tions of power consonant with the previous rules. Thus, a democratic
regime is one where political offices are recruited by contestable elec-
tions. The four rules listed above were deduced by Przeworski, et
al., from the following three principles: contestability involves ex ante
uncertainty - that is, the result of an election is unknown prior to
the ballot; contestability involves ex post irreversibility - the winner
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of the ballot must be the one who gains office; and contestability
comprises repeatability - contestable elections in the sense mentioned
previously must be held at regular intervals. [179] Hence, rules (i)-
(ii) hold that democracies must contain an executive and legislature
that is recruited from free and fair elections. Rule (iii) affirms the
assumption of contestability - that meaningful elections require the
participation of more than one political party, and that institutions
are not unconstitutionally manipulated to give an unfair advantage
to one particular party. Rule (iv) is in place to exclude cases where
elections are held but are not contestable because incumbents know
they have no chance of losing them. This rule presents the problem of
excluding true cases where incumbents are continually re-elected due
to simple over-whelming popularity. However, this rule needs to re-
main in place in order to filter out cases where the ex ante uncertainty
assumption is not met. [48, p.30]
It needs to be justified why Przeworski’s operational definition of
democracy is being used here as opposed to the obvious alternative
of Dahl’s eight point definition outlined in Polyarchy and deployed in
Lijphart’s Patterns of Democracy. [61] Dahl asserts that a democratic
regime must ensure the following principles are practised: the right
to vote, the right to be elected, the right of political leaders to com-
pete for votes and support, free and fair elections, freedom of asso-
ciation, freedom of expression, availability of alternative sources of
information, and institutions for assessing policies by votes or other
expressions of preference. [139, pp.48-9] The reason for adopting Prze-
worski’s framework as opposed to Dahl’s is in the interest of trac-
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tion. Przeworski’s definition is based only on observable events and
so will ensure reproducibility in any research work using the defi-
nition. Meanwhile, Dahl’s definition includes various elements that
are difficult to assess without making intuitive or subjective judge-
ments about the absence of a right to seek support from electors or,
for example, on what constitutes free and fair elections. Obviously,
the accuracy of the definition developed by Przeworski is dependent
on the context in which it is being used. Democracy, a compound of
the ancient Greek kratos (‘rule’) and demos (‘people’), can be said to
involve, without too much controversy, the selection or dismissal of
political leaders and policies through open and contestable polls. In
this sense, the definition used here is sound. If we were to conceive
of democracy as an ideal involving certain rights and liberties than it
would become clear that Przeworski’s definition is empty of meaning.
However, for the purpose for which this definition is being used, i.e.,
a reproducible classificatory tool, the definition must be based solely
on observable events and not on the existence of an entitlement to
any general or specific political and civil liberties. The consequences
of adopting this research design strategy can be gauged by comparing
the variance in the population of cases produced by Freedom House
scores, which uses a Dalhesque emphasis on political and civil rights,
and that produced by Przeworski, et al.,’s framework.
Strictly speaking, a state is not considered semi-presidential or ‘mixed’
if it is not democratic. By ‘regime type’ we mean that semi-presidentialism
is a type of democracy. Moreover, the criterion of a popularly elected
president certainly does not extend to presidents elected via fake bal-
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lots. However, there are heuristic reasons to include states that are
semi-presidential or mixed by letter but that are not democratic, or
even partly so. First, if we are interested in the diffusion of the semi-
presidential constitution qua text then we would want to account for
states that are only semi-presidential in a hypothetical sense. In other
words, if our unit of analysis is constitutional-drafting then we must
acknowledge that this occurs even in places where democracy is not
practised. Second, if we are interested in the semi-presidential consti-
tution qua text, we would want to examine the extent to which the
model is associated with robust democratic performance. It would
create circularity in such an investigation if we weeded out quasi- or
non-democracies from the case sample.
The Polity IV framework is compatible with the typology offered
by Przeworski because both place an emphasis on electoral contest
and openness. The role of Przeworski’s definition in this thesis is
to provide a system of nominal categorization, whereas the Polity
IV data offers more of a report card for each country-year, i.e., an
interval value that can indicate progress or failure within and outside
constitutional democracies.
Some more discussion is in order to justify my use of the Polity IV
dataset to measure democratization. Although the Polity IV dataset
is not a resource without certain constraints, there are good reasons
to prefer it over the alternative measurements of democracy across
the world. Munck and Verkuilen’s study of alternative democratiza-
tion indices provides a useful anchor for this discussion. They frame
their criticism of existing measurements of democracy in terms of
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three stages in the production of a democratization index: concep-
tualization, measurement and aggregation. Conceptualization entails
the various aspects of the proper meaning of the term ‘democracy’
or ‘democratization’ that are used and how well they are reflected in
the data. Measurement is about how these concepts or attributes of
a parent concept are instantiated as observations. And the aggrega-
tion problem is about how a set of hierarchically organised attributes
of a parent concept are collected into a single variable of the parent
concept - in this case, ‘democratization’. For example, we may collect
data across several indicators that instantiate attributes of lower-level
concepts of the parent concept ‘democracy’. The problem is how do
we repackage this data back into a univariate measurement of democ-
ratization. [167]
Of course, the concept ‘democracy’ is not univocal according to our
modern idioms. There is a plethora of different species of democracy
and these are employed in the political theory literature under var-
ious names such as ‘direct democracy’, ‘indirect democracy’, ‘repre-
sentative democracy’, ‘republicanism’, ‘constitutional monarchy’, ‘de-
liberative democracy’, ‘social democracy’, ‘capitalist democracy’, ‘con-
sensus democracy’, and so on. Moreover, the term ’democracy’ is
used colloquially in the media and by leaders in a way that is so
opaque sometimes that we might just as well assume it to mean nice
things. As such, we need to be careful not to be snagged on semantic
barbs at the conceptualization stage.
Tilly’s Democracy offers a framework that may help us here. He clas-
sifies definitions of democracy according to four basic types: constitu-
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tional, substantive, procedural and process-oriented. Constitutional
definitions of democracy gauge democratization according to legal
structures in place. This approach places a greater emphasis on insti-
tutional designs, such as whether a country is presidential, republi-
can or some type of monarchy. Substantive definitions of democracy,
according to Tilly, are an approach focusing on declaring a political
entity a democracy on the basis of quality of life outcomes such as
the rule of law, social welfare, equality, individual freedom and so
on. Procedural definitions measure democratization according to a
specific set of observable government practices, usually those related
to elections and the election cycle. The process-oriented approach is
that which Tilly identifies with Dahl’s work and which determines a
national government’s democratic status on the basis of the existence
of a set of processes and indications of these processes’ perpetuity.
Whether we should call these “processes” is debatable. We may wish
instead to think of them as conditions which the government must
guarantee for all citizens. These include ‘effective participation’, ‘vot-
ing equality’, ‘enlightened understanding’, ‘control of the agenda’,
and ‘inclusion of adults’. Each of these conditions guarantees for all
citizens very specific basic conditions for politics to be considered
democratic. In this setting Dahl is actually arguing by analogy by
way of what would constitute a democratic mode of collective choice
in any voluntary association, which should allay concerns that his
criteria are too unrealistic. [215, pp.7-9] [61]
On closer examination, the substantive approach to defining democ-
racy lacks overall coherence since various aspects of social welfare
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can be actualised in states which are not particularly democratic. Sin-
gapore is not a very democratic nation and yet it maintains a high
quality of life for its citizens, for example, in terms of economic pros-
perity, personal safety and low pollution. Moreover, the substantive
approach conflates potential effects of democracy with the proper-
ties that inhere in the concept democracy. If in democracies there
is greater social welfare or civil rights, we may forward the claim
that democracy has a power to bring forth greater liberties and more
rights under certain conditions but we cannot conclude that such
goods are a constituent part of democracy since we can imagine pos-
sible worlds where the rule of a majority extinguishes civil rights and
vitiates the social welfare through poor governance.
Circumspection is also warranted with respect to the constitutional
approach to defining democracy. If we define democracy solely in
terms of legal frameworks such as monarchy versus republicanism,
or presidentialism versus parliamentarism, we may commit the error
of mistaking accidental differences about democracy for substantial
differences about democracy. My computer is still a computer regard-
less of whether it is painted black or white. The colour of my com-
puter corresponds to an accidental difference, i.e., the identity of this
object qua computer does not depend on its colour. On the other hand,
the power to solve linear systems of equations and the possession of
transistors and a circuit board could be called substantial factors in
the identity of this object as a computer. By analogy, certain forms of
constitutional monarchy may be more democratic than forms of re-
publicanism and vice versa, and as such, these constitutional factors
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may be merely accidentals and not substantial properties we can use
in classifying a state as democratic.
Tilly’s definition of democracy, following the process-oriented ap-
proach he associates with Dahl, posits that
...a regime is democratic to the degree that political re-
lations between the state and its citizens feature broad,
equal, protected and mutually binding consultation.
[215, pp.13-4] Perhaps the difficulty with this process-oriented ap-
proach is that it becomes easy to go from an objective description of
a mode of collective choice (‘democracy’) to the situation where we
begin talking about a kind of Enlightenment-humanist wish-list. For
example, to ensure that a condition such as guaranteeing citizens ef-
fective participation in perpetuity would actually require us to limit
democracy in some way (democracy qua the will of the majority). Just
as we cannot actualise and enhance social equality without diminish-
ing certain liberties, we cannot maintain protected consultation be-
tween citizens and the state without restricting democracy in some
way - that is to say, without limiting the power of citizens to make
choices concerning their government. Therefore, process-oriented def-
initions of democracy, as Tilly has enunciated, can lead ultimately to
conceptions of democracy that are contradictory the more we load the
criteria with rights-claims and guarantees of institutional longevity.
For this reason I favour the use of the Polity IV dataset to mea-
sure democracy because it implements what Tilly would identify as
a ‘procedural’ approach to conceptualizing democracy. The procedu-
ral approach lacks the conceptual plenitude of the process-oriented
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approach, but it is more practical in empirical analysis and it avoids
the aporia of the process-oriented approach, which I have briefly men-
tioned.
Munck and Verkuilen are less sanguine about the Polity IV data.
Their criticism of the database is that it is deficient in its inclusion
of participation as an aspect of democracy. This follows from Dahl’s
conceptual division of democracy into competition, or contestation,
on the one hand, and participation on the other. [61] It is reason-
able and convenient to make this division of the concept ’democracy’.
Under the aspect of competition we can measure democratization in
terms of how competitive this process is; to what extent is there no un-
equal advantage given to one party or candidate in elections. Under
the aspect of participation we can scale democratization according to
the quantity of citizens who may participate in the electoral competi-
tion, perhaps as voters or as candidates. Moreover, we can conceive of
participation in a vertical sense as well. Participation also pertains to
the degree to which each citizen can participate in the determination
of policies. In this sense, we may say Switzerland, a country which
frequently exploits referenda to decide government policy is more
democratic than Canada, which resorts to this instrument less often.
Munck and Verkuilen also criticise the aggregation strategy used for
the Polity IV database in particular for the lack of justification pro-
vided for the weighting scheme of the low-level components and also
for the conceptual ambiguities inherent in the adding of the indica-
tors to come to the scores of democracy and autocracy. [167, p.26]
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While these problems ought to be kept in mind, I think on bal-
ance Polity IV is the most tractable democratization index for this
undertaking. Polity IV has certain strengths that put it ahead of other
democracy indicators such as the Freedom House database. For ex-
ample, the Polity IV dataset showcases very clear coding rules, ex-
tensive empirical coverage, inter-coder reliability checks and the pro-
vision of disaggregation of the parent concept into more specific at-
tributes such as the degree of regulation and competition in electoral
contests. For example, contained in the Polity IV database’s Regime
Trends dataset is the ‘flag’ variable, which provides an indication of
the reliability of each observation (‘0’ represents a confident record;
‘1’, a tentative entry; and ‘2’, one that is tenuous). This provision of-
fers a level of transparency for each observation so that questionable
records can be excluded at the researcher’s own discretion. [151]
The democracy dataset produced by Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi
and Przeworski [6] is a close second to Polity IV, but it does not of-
fer a finer grain than a binary classification of regimes, which means
the democratization variable will not contain much more information
than is already present in Cheibub’s de facto constitutional classifica-
tion of regime types. Overall I conclude that the Polity IV dataset
is most suitable for this undertaking due to its breadth of coverage
and its provision of a well-documented codification of a procedural
conceptual approach to democracy.
How does this discussion of democracy dovetail with constitutional
models? Legislative deadlock is the missing piece in the constitutional
politics-democratization puzzle. The design of the constitution will
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matter in terms of how difficult it makes the altering of a policy
status quo. Some political scientists have modelled this process in
terms of an inverse relationship between the number of veto players
in the legislative cycle and the probability of a government initiative
becoming law. This means that the ease of changing a policy status
quo is downward sloped with respect to the number of veto players
in the political system. Systems with high numbers of veto players
will have a higher predisposition toward democratic instability if the
entrenched policy status quo is inconsistent with the preferences of
the elites wielding de facto power. The regime type debate was born
out of the controversy surrounding the relative flaws and merits of
parliamentary and presidential democracy. The focus of the debate
was whether presidentialism was guilty of contributing to democratic
breakdown. In the nineties the question of whether parliamentarism
or presidentialism had better, worse, or any democratic effects was
motivated out of the perceived failure of presidential democracy in
Latin America. [141]
The breakdown of democracy in semi-presidential regimes may be
related to the failure of the safety valve of government dissolution.
The refusal of the head of government to cooperate in this situation
may be explained due to the original principle of the regime as a
model of power sharing between non-coalition political groups. This
fact would make it difficult for adherence to emerge over clearly out-
lined prerogatives between executive heads, leading to the situation
where prime minister and president act in competition for command
of the military in order to restore their position once the power of
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dissolution has failed, or that the military elite spontaneously inter-
vene in executive politics to crush the stand-off. In short, democratic
breakdown may occur when infra-executive competition without en-
trenched constitutionalism leads executive heads or the military elite
to attempt to reign rather than rule.
Ostensibly, parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies have
such a safety mechanism through the power of the chief executive
to dissolve government and call for new legislative elections. Such
a response was made in two historical examples, but with unfortu-
nate consequences. In 1963, Senegalese President Senghor attempted
to dissolve parliament following his insoluble policy differences with
Prime Minister Dia, who responded by attempting to oust the presi-
dent in a military coup. In Congo-Leopoldville, 1960, President Kasavubu
dismissed Prime Minister Lumumba who reacted by declaring him-
self head of state. Both situations ended in military intervention where
the heads of government were arrested (and the ominous disappear-
ance of Patrice Lumumba). In Senegal it led to a presidentialization
of the constitution in March 1963. In Congo- Leopoldville, it led to
the dismantling of the semi-presidential regime and the creation of a
military dictatorship under Mobutu on 26 October 1966. [54]
2.5 veto player theory in the new institutionalism
The growth in the New Institutionalist literature in the early 1990s
was directly related to developments in the public choice subfield
which posited models of government formation and policy choice
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in response to aspects of how parliamentary democracies worked in
practice that did not make sense. These developments were stimu-
lated by empirical research by Strom which identified what is often
referred to in academia as a ‘puzzle’. Strom’s discovery was that mi-
nority governments are surprisingly resilient in parliamentary democ-
racies, which invites the question, ‘why doesn’t the assembly just get
rid of them, tout de suite?’ [208] Laver and Shepsle answered this ques-
tion by demonstrating how institutional features can lead to enduring
minority governments. The principle they adumbrated was that port-
folio holders in cabinets have agenda setting powers, an institutional
feature, which ensures a core in the collective choice mechanism de-
ciding government policy or the winning allocation of portfolios. 3
Institutional mechanisms provided the missing piece of the puzzle.
In this sense, the institutional mechanism was the element of sequen-
tiality that offices such as committees and portfolios can introduce
over the collective choice mechanism that the assembly uses in its
deliberations. Laver and Shepsle termed the institutional cause of mi-
nority government resilience they had identified a structure induced
equilibrium. [129]
Tsebelis’ contribution to the literature has been to adapt the Struc-
ture Induced Equilibrium model developed by Laver and Shepsle in
order to account for the stability of policy agendas across a hetero-
geneous set of constitutional models. He does this by generalizing
the players in a spatial voting game to all the actors in a political
system that have veto power over adopted policy. This generalization
3 Core - the area in the spatial voting model containing winning positions.
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extends to those with informal veto power (lobbysts, party leaders,
median voter independent/minority lawmakers), and those with for-
mal veto power (presidents, prime ministers, house speakers, judges,
etc). In the model policy preferences are placed on a scale in an m-
dimensional issue space. In this space are points that mark a veto
player’s ideal point, their utility maximising preference. Within a fi-
nite distance from the ideal point, there is a boundary marking the
region enclosing the ideal point where veto players are willing to re-
lax from their ideal point, which called the indifference region. With
a simple majority decision rule, the set of policies which can be en-
acted are those lying in the union of the majority of the indifference
surfaces (which may vary depending on the collection choice mecha-
nism) of the veto players called the winset.
The significant implication of this model is that winsets will always
become smaller as more veto players are added to a political system
and preferences are held constant. This means that changing existing
policies through collective choice mechanisms in a given political sys-
tem is harder with more veto players because the set of feasible policy
alternatives is smaller. The long-term consequence of a system with
large numbers of veto players is therefore the difficulty with which
such a political system would respond to needs for policy innovation
or change that would satisfy citizens and the leadership class. [222]
This spirit of this idea is captured in the popular adage a camel is a
horse designed by committee.
Veto player theory makes sense of something the traditional ap-
proach to positive institutional theory could not: why is policy sta-
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bility so high among political systems that are so different across
the traditional categories of institutional design, i.e., party system
size, regime type or electoral system? Veto player accounts for this
by suggesting that this anomaly is caused by these political systems
having similar veto player system sizes. So far it has been proposed
that consociational theory does not make sense in its account for im-
proved public policy in consensus democracy, and the parts of it that
explain how cartel elite behaviour is incentivized in consociational
democracies should be absorbed by game theoretic approaches.
However, the arguments for how constitutional models affect de-
mocratization and democratic consolidation are related to veto player
theory in a more subtle way. Veto player theory would absorb the
failure-of-presidential-democracy arguments that rely on assumptions
about the lower incentives for coalition formation and party disci-
pline in presidential democracies. Lower party discipline in presiden-
tial republics would mean that there could simply be more veto play-
ers within a given party, and more fragmented coalition constellations
equates to more veto players. This observation can be extended to any
of the arguments that posit the problem of presidential democracy as
being located within the absence of incentives for coalition formation
and stability.
But there are difficulties with how veto player theory links legisla-
tive deadlock with the failure of democratic regimes. It is intuitive
to assume that strong elites will use illegal force to institute new in-
stitutions they prefer if legislative deadlock gives them the oppor-
tunity to do so. Veto player theory is a good explanation of policy
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stability in democratic systems, but its implications with respect to
the survival of democratic regimes is in need of greater illumina-
tion. Valenzuela’s argument is that presidential democracies have a
greater propensity for chief executives to respond to legislative grid-
lock with expansions of emergency powers and decrees. Presidential-
ism is therefore not a determinant of sluggish policy traffic, but an
independent factor in terms of how polities respond to high policy
stability. [223, 170] Cheibub has posited a historical explanation for
the democratic gap of presidentialism that lies independently of veto
player theory. He proposes that leadership norms in military hier-
archies favour the presidential structure of government to collegial
party politics of parliamentary democracy. Therefore, the selection
of countries into presidential constitutional structures is endogenous.
Military dictatorships, on average, opt for presidential styles of gov-
ernment. If we assume that wresting civilian control of government
from military dictatorships is harder than religious or royalist dic-
tators, we would be led to believe that presidentialism’s on average
lower democratic performance is being caused by the long-run effect
of military dictatorships. [48]
2.6 the jump to non-cooperative models of government
formation
The problem with the Structure Induced Equilibrium model was that
there were various circumstances whereby portfolio agenda setting
power does not determine the existence of a core. Diermeier illus-
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trates that this is simply a limitation of expressing coalition building
models in terms of a collective choice mechanism. When these dy-
namics are translated into a non-cooperative game of coalition bar-
gaining, the existence of an equilibrium is certain. [66, p.168] The
canonical model of sequential government coalition bargaining was
put forward in a 1989 paper by Baron and Ferejohn. [18] In this model
an equilibrium coalition exists even when the core is empty. Merlo
and Wilson subsequently elaborated on the Baron-Ferejohn model to
demonstrate the existence of subgame perfect and stochastic subgame per-
fect equilibria under a set of specific conditions such as fixed discount
factors and the ‘separation principle’ (these terms will be explained
later). 4 [158] A model that combines both coalition bargaining and
policy voting features has also been put forward by Baron and Dier-
meier. [17]
In this section I wish to elaborate at greater length on how the
dynamics contained in a non-cooperative coalition bargaining model
can interact with constitutional design. Simply put, some constitu-
tions make coalition building more prolonged and coalitions short-
lived when coalition bargaining is in equilibrium. Elaborating on ear-
lier work done by Diermeier, Eraslan and Merlo (DEM), I show how
regime type rules have the potential to change coalition making dy-
namics in bargaining models of government formation. [67]Institutional
effects ought to be defined in terms of different incentives for coali-
tion formation that constitutional rules cause because this is a well
defined mechanism of action from constitutions to institutional insta-
4 These equilibria are variations on the Nash Equilibrium for dynamic games.
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bility. Motivated by this concern, I turn to an analysis of regime effects
based on discrete choice models of coalition bargaining. The struc-
tural provides provides greater internal validity and avoids the en-
dogeneity issues outlined in the previous section. Regime differences
find translation into coalition formation games by focussing on two
comparisons: presidential and semi-presidential constitutional rules
in a game where the president has to trade portfolios for legislative
support, and parliamentary and semi-presidential constitutional con-
straints where a formateur has to trade portfolios to maximize a pay-
off in terms of tenure length. Because parliamentary coalition forma-
tion models are better understood and researched I engage with the
latter comparison. This is a profitable undertaking in the context of
the regime types problem because modelling the way governments
form gives information about how governments terminate. Govern-
ment formation models then ultimately give insights over trends of
government formation and termination. In this sense government for-
mation models are government stability models characterized by a
set of institutional rules laid down by the extent regime type.
The stochastic bargaining framework elaborated here is derivative
of Rubinstein’s early work on equilibrium behaviour in bargaining
games. [188] Rules about formateur selection, institutional rules and
the random environment can be used to express novel semi-presidential
dynamics. Variation in these rules can potentially change game out-
comes documented by previous authors. [157] [158] The model is an
extensive form, stochastic bargaining game where a newly selected
formateur proposes candidate coalitions to other political parties in
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Figure 1: Coalition Bargaining in Extensive Form
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order to form governments that maximize her tenure. The model em-
pirics have also been conveniently sketched in Diemeier, Eraslan and
Merlo, which permits the theory to be reconciled with existing data
on government survival. [67] Notably, this class of bargaining game
is useful because the provision of a stochastic environment can ac-
count for observed delays in government formation, whereas earlier
models that did not accommodate a stochastic effect were at odds
with empirical data on extended stopping times in government for-
mation negotiations. [156, p.102] 5 This reflects the reality that leaders
sometimes wish to drag out negotiation periods in order to reconcile
uncertainties that have the potential to affect what they view as the
best offers and responses.
The brief overview of the game is as follows: (1) the current of-
fice holders lose power and a new formateur is selected with a given
probability => (2) this new formateur convenes with the parties she
is willing to bargain with over cabinet portfolios => (3) the forma-
5 Empirical surveys of such delays can be found in Strom (1990) [208] and in Dier-
meier and van Roozendaal (1998). [68]
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teur can decide to propose a distribution of portfolios to this proto-
coalition or holdout until the next time period => (4) the other parties
in the proto-coalition individually decide to accept or reject the pro-
posal (only unanimous agreement among the proto-coalition can lead
to the implementation of a proposal) => (5) in the event that the for-
mateur declines to make an offer or the proposal is rejected, a new
formateur is selected with a given probability. The game repeats until
an offer is unanimously accepted or a new election happens.
This approach is unlike some existing frameworks on government
coalition dynamics. Riker’s conjecture about parties being averse to
sharing payoffs to the extent that they will form the smallest nec-
essary coalition to govern has found relatively consistent empirical
support for example in works by Schofield and Sened. [182, 194, 196]
The rationale for minimum winning coalitions has on the other hand
been demonstrated to be weak in light of the predicted instability
they imply. [81, see] As such, coalition models driven by cake size
maximization appear to be inherently anti-Rikerist in the sense that
they prescribe behaviour that it is longitudinally risk-averse with, as
it were, a low marginal propensity to consume - parties in this con-
text will not monopolize government portfolios today if it implies
they will not be in power tomorrow.
The government formation model takes the form of a canonical ex-
tensive form bargaining game with a finite horizon, a ‘nature’ player
who is governed by a Markov chain process, complete information,
transferable utilities and a common discount factor among the play-
ers. The parliament containsN parties in possession of seats in the leg-
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islative assembly. Each party has von Neumann-Morgenstern prefer-
ences over every possible government coalition and preferences over
what share of portfolios they are entitled to. As such, there is a utility
function, Ui(.), describing the payoff to each party for every poten-
tial outcome in the game. In the first stage, the current government
capsizes and the head of state must recruit a new formateur from
the legislative assembly. This choice is influenced by factors such as
incumbency advantage (the identity of the previous formateur) and
whether the head of state plays a ceremonial role or not. In the semi-
presidential setting, the head of state is partisan and will select with
bias the next formateur depending to a varying degree on his party’s
seat share and the level of executive entrenchment in the system. This
assumption is supported in Kang’s extensive empirical analysis of Eu-
ropean parliamentary government formation in the presence of semi-
presidents. [121]
Defining ΓF as the set of all possible subsets of N containing the
newly chosen formateur, let CF denote the formateur’s choice of
proto-coalition from ΓF. If the formateur decides to make an offer in
the current time period this offer is characterized by a vector of portfo-
lio shares, xC, describing each member of the proto- coalition’s stake
in the future government. Each member of CF decides on whether to
accept a proposal if it anticipates an optimally lengthy spell in power.
Let TC denote the actual duration of government. The rewards of ac-
cepting a given proposal (referred to heuristically in the literature as
the ‘cake’ equation [156]) are measured in terms of the expected shelf-
life of the government, yC(.) = E[TC|...].. This projection is guided by
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information on election deadlines, T¯ , institutional constraints, Q, the
size or mandate of the coalition, Si∀i ∈ CF, and the stochastically
changing environment, ε. The last term introduces the stochastic dy-
namics of the model. Conceptually, ε can be any Markov Chain pro-
cess, the values of which, have the ability to exogenously alter expec-
tations about payoffs. For example, it could indicate circumstances
causing the occurrence of a bi- election the results of which encour-
age a coalition member to reject an offer because this turn of events
improves her chances of being the next formateur.
Bargaining behaviour is in equilibrium only when offers are ac-
cepted or rejected on the basis of whether anticipated payoffs are
greater than tomorrow’s expected cake size, weighted over the conse-
quences of potential changes in the stochastic environment, indicated
by ε ′. Formally, this means the stationary subgame perfect payoff
(SSP) for each proto-coalition member is to sanction the formateur’s
proposal xC if it entails a yC(ε, T¯ ,Q, sC) > y∗. Defining δ ∈ [0, 1] as a
discount factor for the cost of delaying government formation,
y∗(C, T¯ ,Q, sC) ≡ δ
∫
maxyC(ε ′, T¯ ,Q, sC),y∗(C, T¯ ,Q, sC)df(ε ′). (1)
6 For this result to hold it is necessary to assume that all members of
the protocoalition have the same discount factor because by definition
y∗ must stochastically dominate y but y∗ − y 6 1δ . Taking τ to indi-
cate the game’s stopping time, the total von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility a coalition member will receive from a run through the game is
Vi(.) = E[TC|δ, τC, xC, T¯ ,C,Q, sC] + σi∈C.The last term encompasses
utility from a given coalition given a party’s (dis)tastes in regard to
6 For proofs of this see Merlo and Wilson [158, pp.50-2]
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its political rivals. Hence, using DEM’s simplification, the payoffs to
each protocoalition member can be worked out as:
Vi(C, T¯ , sC,pii,σi) =
1− δ(1− pii)
δ
y∗(C, T¯ , sC) + σi (2)
For nonproto-coalition parties the payoff is just σj. DEM find it
intuitive to assume that parties are power hungry to the extent that
σi > σj - meaning that despite partisan attitudes parties would rather
be in the government than not, all other things being equal. [67, pp.30-
4] Finally, the actual government duration, TC, is simulated with a
Beta distribution over the support [0, T¯ ] that depends on expected
government duration, institutional rules, the legislative election hori-
zon and the coalition size. The game is repeated until T¯ = 0.
How may we express constitutional differences in such a coalition
bargaining model? I offer the following tentative multinomial model
as one possible option. Keep in mind that this is just a crude sketch
and there may be other ways to identify constitutional differences in
a Baron-Ferejohn-type model of coalition formation. The key route
we can take to deposit regime type features inside a coalition bargain-
ing model is by altering the dynamics of formateur selection. The
variable, F−1, encodes incumbency advantage if the last formateur
belonged to the ith party. P = 1 indicates that the semi-president is
partisan. H = 0 states that the semi-president is a non-aligned head
of state. IP is a dummy indicating whether the head of state is the
(semi-)president who comes from the same party. The magnitude of
presidential bias in formateur selection yields as other parties’ seat
shares become larger and the speed at which it does is controlled
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by the parameter ρ, which is fixed within a given political system,
allowing cross-sectional differences in executive dominance to be ar-
ticulated. In addition, a term for heads of state that are not aligned to
specific parties, is added to account for the bias such a leader brings
about in terms of favouring candidates closest in ideological distance,
Di ∈ [0, 1]. Such a formateur selection process can be expressed as
the following multinomial model:
piit0 =

1 If si > 0.5,
exp
(
γ1si+γ2Fi−1+Pρ
−1 γ3Ii
P(0,1)(
exp[max(sj)]
) (1+P)Hρ−1 (1+Di)/γ4(
exp[max(sj)]
))
∑
j∈N exp
(
γ5sj+γ6Fj−1+Pρ−1
γ7Ij
P
exp(max[si 6=j])+(1+P)Hρ
−1
(1+Dj)/γ8
exp(max[si 6=j])
) If sj < 0.5,∀j ∈ N,
0 If ∀j 6= i : sj > 0.5,
If a formateur in the first period decides not to propose a coalition
or her proposal fails, the probability of being the next formateur is
given as (note this is a reduced version of the selection equation at
t = 0 because in this instance selection is restricted to parties inside
the protocoalition):
piit+1 =

1 If si > 0.5,
exp
(
γ9sit+1+Pρ
−1
γ10I
P
it+1
exp(max[sjt+1])
+(1+P)Hρ−1
(1+Dit+1)/γ11
exp(max[sjt+1])
)
∑
j∈C exp
(
γ12sjt+1+Pρ−1
γ13I
P
jt+1
exp(max[si 6=jt+1])+(1+P)Hρ
−1
(1+Djt+1)/γ14
exp(max[si 6=jt+1])
) If sj < 0.5, ∀j ∈ C,
0 If ∃j 6= i : sj > 0.5.
In addition, the formation model makes provisions for the assem-
bly of constitutional rules directing coalition formation and survival.
For example, information is introduced about the existence of fixed
elections, whether presidential and assembly elections are synchro-
nized, the vote of investiture, presidential term length, the vote of no
confidence and the constructive vote of no confidence.
These factors basically rule out certain proposal coalitions from be-
ing viable. For example, if there is a requirement of an absolute major-
ity vote of investiture, coalitions with
∑
i∈C si < 0.5 will have y
C = 0.
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Similarly, a constructive vote of confidence as opposed to a vote of
confidence will give minority coalition governments more viability.
An important dynamic to capture is the tendency for prolonged mi-
nority governments to draw on emergency powers to govern, which
ultimately makes them unsustainable in a democratic system. In this
application the variable pi stands in as a viable proxy for the num-
bered life of minority government since it depends on the coalition
size
∑
i∈C si.
The parliamentary counterfactual is introduced by setting the terms
P and H in the formateur selection equation to zero. There are few ex-
isting predictions in the comparative politics literature about what
this difference will entail. However, an empirical study by Schleiter
and Morgan-Jones speculates that the semi-presidential system should
augment the diversity of party system influence on government for-
mation due to the more complex principal-agent relationship inher-
ent under semi- presidentialism. [193, p.688] Coalition game theory is
informative about what institutional effects can manifest if these are
expressed via formateur selection rules. In games where payoffs are
transferable, regime effects as differences in formateur selection can
affect government durations and negotiation delays, but not payoffs.
When payoffs are nontransferable such a priori limits on constitutional
effects are mute.
Merlo’s analysis of hypothetical formateur selection protocols in
the Italian political system offers the most promising insight into po-
tential semi-presidential effects because in this study he examines
what happens when the Italian president is given greater discretion
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over formateur choice. He concludes that manipulation of the forma-
teur selection protocol cannot affect payoffs due to the ‘separation
principle’. [156, p.126] Basically, this means that the identity of a pro-
poser cannot affect a protocoalition member’s response to a proposal,
only the proposal’s content. The separation principle holds only in
stochastic bargaining games characterized by transferable utility, i.e.,
the payoffs can be shared without loss. If the bargaining game in-
volves nontransferable utility then the identity of the proposer will
affect a coalition member’s responses. The upshot is that only un-
der nontransferable utility can manipulation of formateur selection
protocols affect the distribution of payoffs. The benefit of assuming
transferable utility is that formateur advantages are better defined
and the solution concepts are neater and more general - transferable
utility unveils unique subperfect and stationary subperfect payoffs.
More significantly, because the separability principle implies that se-
lection protocols cannot affect payoffs, this also means that constitu-
tional engineering via manipulation of formateur recruitment cannot
affect the game solutions (specifically SP and SSP equilibria). 7
7 Computing game outcomes and subperfect Nash solutions in a setting such as this
frequently comes up against daunting computational problems that require efficient
algorithmic shortcuts. For example, solving this extensive form game using the con-
ventional method of backwards induction is ruled out by the simple enormity of
the task. The computation load grows exponentially with the number of players. For
example, the action profile of one formataur in the historical case of the Weimar
Republic’s legislative assembly from September 1930 contains well over 16,000 po-
tential coalition proposals. Given that backwards induction requires sorting through
a Cartesian product of this set over every history of the game, alternative approxi-
mations are the only way forward.
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In the bargaining game the formateur is selected randomly accord-
ing to a single draw from the multinomial distribution of size one
where the rate parameter of each categorical outcome is given by
pi. Once chosen the formateur decides to propose or not propose a
coalition. Given a formateur is picked, the potential coalitions with
other parties that can be proposed comprise an (N-1)-simplex. In this
application it is important to model the effect ideological hangups
have in terms of deviations from the equilibrium prescribed coali-
tion offer. This is made easier because the ideological constraint term
enters the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ex post and ad-
ditively. In order to model ideological noise, for example, one could
base the term σi on a student t- model with degrees of freedom equal
to (P − PN) + (b − r) where b is the number of seats held by bour-
geois political parties, r is the number of seats from revolutionary
parties, and P is the total number of assembly seats. In this sense,
the t-model glides closer toward a heavy tailed Cauchy distribution,
implying less ideological cohesion, when the parliament is more rad-
icalized and when parties are more populous in relative terms to the
chamber size. Guidelines for model identification under varying data
limitations has been outlined in Merlo and Tang [159].
In providing a tentative exploration of how regime-type constitu-
tional factors may be couched within the dynamics of the coalition
bargaining models, I have illustrated that ultimately the effects that
hybrid constitutions will have on coalition bargaining dynamics will
be communicated via variation in the rules about the selection of the
proto-coalition and the formateur’s veto powers over the coalition
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negotiation process. The consequences of variation in constitutional
models in such a context may manifest in differences in equilibrium
delaying times of the proto-coalition members and in terms of overall
longevity of government coalitions. As such, regime type differences
have the potential to bring about important effects on the size, life-
span and formation costs of government coalitions.
2.7 summary
In this chapter we have taken stock of the conceptual building blocks
of constitutional design and political behaviour with a specific inter-
est in outcomes such as institutional stability, regime transition and
democratization. What I have wished to emphasize in doing so is
the extent to which different theories of constitutional design are not
so much competing explanations of political behaviour but different
languages for emphasizing different aspects of institutional design
and political behaviour. Saying something in Latin or in English does
not change the truth content of the statement, but Latin may add
a certain elegance and brevity to the statement, and English may
add colourful idioms that Latin cannot. In addition, I have shown
how the adopted constitutional typology works and arguments as
to why such a typology makes more sense than alternative typolo-
gies suggested by other authors. This typology, which is based on
the chain of accountability of government will be bind us throughout
this dissertation and the sample such a classification produces has
been illustrated. I have shown how two different ‘formal models’ of
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constitutional design work and I have shown how they are translate
to a regime type framework. Little more can be employed from veto
player theory since this framework is not amenable to rigorous em-
pirical testing. The coalition bargaining framework has been useful
in delimiting a behavioural foundation to institutional constraints on
political behaviour. From here onward I hold to analysis of constitu-
tional engineering using the language of regime types and inclusive-
versus-exclusive institutional design.

3
M E T H O D O L O G Y
This work analyses constitutional dynamics through the periscope of
quantitative social science. This means the fruits of probability theory,
statistics and economic theory are accepted as offering some purchase
on the study constitutional engineering. Unfortunately, this entails
some preliminary exposition of terminology in order to inform the
reader.
Comparativists are frequently faced with the problem of whether
to go ‘broad and shallow’ or ‘deep and narrow’ with regard to the
size of the case sample. This thesis has chosen to err on the side of
broad and shallow. The first reason for this is because there simply
is no major consolidated theory on regime types work in a sense
removed from country-specific idiosyncrasies. This has been the case
because there is so little consensus, for example, over what constitutes
a semi-presidential state. Typology remains a sometimes insuperable
obstacle to the progress of constitutional engineering research. With
this in mind, a research project constructed as a probe into what is
‘out there’ is the obvious and prudent alternative. Another reason
for a quantitative approach is the diversity of the domain of cases.
The semi-presidential constitutional model, for example, has travelled
over ninety one years and four continents, meaning it is easy for a
95
96 methodology
comparative case study on, say, the semi-presidential states of Portu-
gal, Poland and the French Fifth Republic, to become less a study of
semi-presidentialism as such and more a study on the development
of constitutionalism in post-WWII Europe. For the problematic to re-
main apropos of semi-presidentialism it is necessary to control for the
diverse contexts in which this model has been adopted. These include:
the inter-war period in Europe, 1919-1939; the post-WWII period in
Europe, 1944-1960; decolonization in Africa, 1960-; democratization
in Southern Europe, 1976-; democratization in Eastern Europe, 1989-,
democratization in East Asia, 1989-; and liberalization in the former-
Soviet bloc and Eurasia, 1991-. Hence, the best perspective for this
research project is one that requires a great deal of altitude, as it were.
Lastly, the most important reason for analysing a global cross-section
of countries comes down to the immutable logic that you will only see
variation in constitutions (as is true of all of the most important politi-
cal and economic institutional questions) by observing cross-national
differences.
3.1 the probability approach
The genealogy of my adopted methodology traces back to Haavelmo’s
pioneering work at the Cowles Commission of the 1940s. Writing in
1944 prior to the discovery of many of the statistical methods in use
today, Haavelmo argued that much of the circumspection over em-
pirical modelling in economics during his time was based on com-
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mon misunderstandings of the true application of statistical analysis.
Haavelmo maintains,
[t]he reluctance among economists to accept probability
models as a basis for economic research has, it seems,
been founded upon a very narrow concept of probabil-
ity and random variables. Probability schemes, it is held,
apply only to such phenomena as lottery drawings, or, at
best, to those series of observations where each observa-
tion may be considered as an independent drawing from
one and the same “population”. From this point of view
it has been argued, e.g., that most economic time series
do not conform well to any probability model, “because
the successive observations are not independent”. But it is
not necessary that the observations should be independent
and that they should all follow the same one-dimensional
probability law. It is sufficient to assume that the whole
set of, say n, observations may be considered as one ob-
servation of n variables (or a “sample point”) following
an n−dimensional joint probability law, the “existence” of
which may be purely hypothetical. Then, one can test hy-
potheses regarding this joint probability law, and draw in-
ference as to its possible form, by means of one sample
point (in n dimensions).
[99, p.iii] In theory at least, there are virtually no constraints on the
application of statistical methods outside its traditional domain of the
natural sciences.
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If we are to make licit arguments on the basis of logical infer-
ence we must to some degree posit a model delimiting quantitative
causal relationships between objects that can be sufficiently measured.
Haavelmo’s emphasis on the importance of stochastic modelling was
based on his impression that without statistical theory, the evaluating
of models can only proceed from ad hoc, qualitative assessments of
‘good’ or ‘bad’ or, for example, in terms of how well a model fits the
data ‘more or less’. Indeed, the scientific harvest from drawing on
probability theory manifested in a renewed analyticity; that is to say,
it permits us to evaluate models in a such a way that is consistent
with the laws of logic.
By virtue of its nature, statistical methods used in this work require
technical concepts that are defined to a high degree of concreteness
and that lose meaning quickly when taken out of context. Such con-
cepts are required to rigorously assess how good statistical estimates
are and to understand why estimates behave the way they do. We are
all familiar with the adage, ‘correlation is not causation’, but gauging
the strength of association between two random variables is actually
more subtle than this. Association comes in different flavours. Uncor-
relatedness, mean independence, strict exogeneity and independence
are different types of association with different implications. They
also differ in terms of their informational strength, i.e., knowing one
of these can make it possible to demonstrate that the other property
holds afortiori. Uncorrelatedness is the weakest because with knowl-
edge of this alone, it is not possible to determine whether there is
strict exogeneity or independence. Take two random variables, A and
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B. Uncorrelatedness states that E[A,B] = 0. Mean independence is
the property of being able to condition on another variable without
affecting the value of the mean: E[A|B] = E[A]. A non-degenerate re-
gression model is an omnipresent example of a mean that is not inde-
pendent. Strict exogeneity states that a probability weighted average
is zero after conditioning: E[A|B] = 0. Strict exogeneity is sufficient for
proving uncorrelatedness. Finally, independence, the strongest condi-
tion, states that two functions of A and B are covered by the product
rule, i.e., fAB(A,B) = fA(A)fB(B). Knowing that A and B are inde-
pendent allows one to demonstrate strict exogeneity and uncorrelat-
edness as corollaries.
If the events A and B from a random variable(s) are independent
then it follows that their joint probability is the product of their in-
dividual probabilities: Pr(A,B) = Pr(A)Pr(B). What if we want to
know this joint probability but we cannot assume they are indepen-
dent? A way forward is to identify an event C that is independent
of B. If this is the case, then the conditional probability of A given
C is independent of B and hence the joint probability can be com-
puted as: Pr(A|C)Pr(B) = Pr(A,B). This is the concept of conditional
independence, which will become relevant later.
Generally speaking, the statistics used here are from the Frequen-
tist school, meaning that estimates are a finite sample approximation
of some unknown population parameter. Perhaps the most impor-
tant concept in this setting is the notion of consistency. Given some
function βˆ that computes an estimate of the unknown parameter (the
‘estimator’) consistency means that the errors of the estimator (β− βˆ)
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of some unknown population parameter β has definable limiting be-
haviour when the sample grows infinitely large (i.e., what values the
errors fall toward as N → ∞.) If this limiting behaviour is character-
ized by errors that converge to zero then the estimator is said to be
N-consistent. If the limiting behaviour states that the errors adopt a
Gaussian distribution with mean zero then the estimator is said to be
root-N consistent. Root-N consistency is arguably a necessary condi-
tion of a useful estimator because without it standard errors cannot be
computed to measure the statistical precision of the estimate, which
then precludes hypothesis testing altogether.
Root-N consistency is based on whether it is possible to invoke
the Central Limit Theorem on the estimator’s large sample errors. In
the case of linear regression, consistency depends on the identifying
assumptions, e.g., the exclusion restriction is crucial in allowing one
to demonstrate root-N consistency in the case of the ‘vanilla’ linear
regression estimator: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). A ‘good’ estima-
tor is also one without bias. Bias means a distance by which the point
at which the large sample errors converge is off-set from the target
destination implied by the true population parameter. Unbiased esti-
mators are good, however, because inconsistent estimators are unde-
sirable in qualitative terms while biasedness is relative to magnitude,
even if the estimator is biased, a consistent, biased estimator is in
most settings superior to an unbiased, inconsistent estimator.
Lastly, an important performance criterion is efficiency. Efficiency
tells us about how precisely a quantity can be measured by a given
estimator. An estimator that is most efficient is the estimator that
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returns the smallest asymptotic standard errors. This means that mis-
takes in hypothesis testing can be made if the researcher is not cog-
nizant of the efficiency of the estimator. For example, she may not be
using the most efficient equally valid estimator, which could lead to
the false rejection of certain models from this error in specification
because inefficiency will lead to gratuitously large standard errors.
These properties are generally gauged using mathematical proofs
and in the context of finite sample properties, Monte Carlo analy-
sis. Understanding the arguments contained in these proofs is impor-
tant for knowing what conditions to check. For example, assessing
whether the variance of OLS is scalar-valued or vector-valued will
tell us things about its efficiency because of the Gauss-Markov theo-
rem, which identifies the conditions for the linear estimator to be a
‘BLUE’ (best linear unbiased estimator). 1
3.1.1 Causality and identification ‘in the wild’
Modern econometrics amounts to one of the most formidable intellec-
tual achievements in the methodology of the social sciences and for
this reason alone it is an alluring methodological toolkit. In a prac-
tical sense, econometric approaches are valuable because they offer
a logically rigorous framework of concepts and statistical theory for
identifying causal relationships within the social scientist’s quotidian
constraint of only having non-experimental data, i.e., things that are
observed ‘in the wild’, not in the lab where variables can be held
1 For a reliable reference see Wooldridge (2002) [235]
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constant. This observational setting is a limitation that characterizes
the situation the constitutional design problem presents to us. For
obvious ethical and logistical reasons, political scientists cannot ran-
domly expose nations to different constitutional models in a way that
ensures the observation of unconfounded causal outcomes. Instead
we must make do with the observational data collected by govern-
ments, NGOs and scholars. How can we best exploit observational
data given this constraint?
Two essential frameworks for related to understanding causality
in the non-experimental setting are Koopman’s idea of identification
and the Neyman-Rubin potential outcomes conceptualization of treat-
ment effects. An intuitive way to define causality is in terms of coun-
terfactuals. Assuming unconfoundedness, an outcome Y is said to be
caused by X if after observing the values of Y conditional on X, we
travel backwards in time, change the values of X while holding all
other things constant and subsequently we observe that the values of
Y change. This is the intuition behind the Neyman-Rubin potential
outcomes framework (NRPOF). NRPOF implies that causal identifi-
cation is a missing data problem. We do not a priori have the ability to
observe a counterfactual. Therefore, success in evaluating causality is
determined by how accurately we can approximate counterfactuals
with valid cross-sectional comparisons. This idea germinated with
Fisher and Neyman’s early work on the blocking design of experi-
ments and has been expanded and reinvigorated by Rubin’s work
from the 1970s on statistical methods for selection bias. [205, 187]
NRPOF leads to the conclusion that there is more than one type of
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causal effect. If we only approximate the counterfactual where expo-
sure to a treatment regime is counterfactually reversed what we are
trying to estimate is an average treatment effect on the treated (ATT).
If the converse is true we are measuring the average treatment on the
non-treated (ATNT). If we are estimating the waited average of both
counterfacuals we are pursuing the overall average treatment effect
(ATE).
Having a clear understanding of what causality looks like is, how-
ever, not enough. Practically and philosophically, causal identification
requires an understanding of model building that beyond counterfac-
tuals and the truism ‘correlation is not causation’. Let us take a com-
plete set of relevant causal processes implied by a theoretical model to
form what is called a ‘system’. Things in this system that are caused
are endogenous terms whose values are determined by one of the
given equations in the system. Things that cause things in the system
make up the right handside variables in the equations. In the social
sciences, researchers begin with a theoretical model, which may be
a system or part of a system, of how behaviour and institutions are
translated into parameters, which they must then transport to an em-
pirical analysis that uses stochastic parameters to factor in mistakes
and uncertainties that are the result of the inevitable incompleteness
of the available data (observing things in the wild means not just miss-
ing information and not being able to hold certain things constant,
but an incomplete information set due to the subjects of the study
- I find it helpful to imagine that human beings are automated by a
‘black-box’ complex system with billions, perhaps trillions, of degrees
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of freedom - unobservable system components that must therefore be
assumed to be free to take on any values).
Econometric identification is a related framework to this problem
that leads to the prescription of protocols for overcoming such diffi-
culties by building on the principle of the so-called well-posed scien-
tific problem. Problems that are well-posed are ones that contain a
solution that exists, is unique and is stable - i.e., does not vary with
changes in the initial conditions. Koopman’s early work provides a
useful characterization of the problem of deriving well-posed solu-
tions for the problem of how to assign the functional stochastic form
for empirical analysis of a theoretical model. Moreover, the leap from
quantitative theory to quantitative empirics, involves a hiving off of
the features of a structural model so that a subset of the system or
reduced form model can be implemented. Identification in reduced
form reflects the need for model simplification in light of the finite
availability of data. Although I can construct an elaborate structural
model that expresses theoretical relationships by assigning an equa-
tion to every endogenous term in the system being studied, existing
empirical data will rarely provide sufficient information for the esti-
mation of every unknown parameter in the system.
A well-posed solution in terms of an allocation of a functional
stochastic form for the reduced form of a theoretical model begins
with the concept of observational equivalence. First, we must observe
that there is an M dimensional stochastic model corresponding to a
system of equations that describes the data generating process of a set
of latent variables X composing the system. The term ‘structure’ here
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refers to a coupling of such a distributional form and X. Two struc-
tures, S and S*, are said to be observationally equivalent, S ∼ S∗, if
they both give identical conditional distributions of the endogenous
components of X given the exogenous components (implied by the
stochastic forms) for all possible values of the exogenous variables. If
two observationally equivalent structures of a model are homogenous
(i.e., the underlying theoretical system does not permit two different
but observationally equivalent structures) then the structure is identi-
fiable for the model in question. Alternatively, if the intersection of the
sets of all possible conditional distributions from two heterogenous
and observationally equivalent structures is empty, then the structure
is identifiable in the given model. If this holds for all the parameters
contained in the structural form of the model, then the entire system
is identifiable. [126]
Given that an identifiable system will be hard to come by, condi-
tions for an identifiable reduced form are in demand. One such a con-
dition is called the rank condition. If we exclude the non-identifiable
structural parameters from the system, parameters in the remaining
equations are identifiable if we can impose K linear restrictions on a
reduced form possessing a determinant equal to the number of equa-
tions in the whole system minus one, |K| = M− 1. A more general
treatment of the identification problem for linear regression is given
in Bartels [20].
Arguments about identifiability are then based on the identifying
assumptions needed to permit the conditional distributions from ob-
servationally equivalent structures to be tested (the rank condition
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being one example) so that identification can be demonstrated. In
the conventional case of a linear regression model, a key identify-
ing assumption is the exclusion restriction: this states that the model
errors from the reduced form equation are uncorrelated to the exoge-
nous variables that form the regressors. Translated into causal terms,
this means that the values of the regressors are not caused by com-
ponents of the error term. This has intuitive causal implications be-
cause if the exclusion restriction were not true we could express the
regressors as reverse caused by the dependent variable, or for exam-
ple as something confounded by an omitted variable. That is, given
the independent variable x is reversed caused by Y and Y = βx+ ε,
E[x, ε] 6= 0 =⇒ x ∝ (Y − βx), which follows from the equivalence
of Y with the previous regression. As such, all causal dynamics can
be subsumed by the language of structural modelling. Interestingly,
econometric identification suggests that no matter how complex hu-
man behaviour is in terms of the size of the system necessary to de-
scribe it, as long as this size is finite so that a rank condition is per-
mitted, incremental quantitative social science would still succeed as
long as there are well grounded identifying assumptions that make
it possible to hive-off smaller, tractable reduced form pieces from the
system at large.
Recalling probability theory, the property of conditional indepen-
dence amounts to one such useful identifying assumption in the con-
text of estimating a partial effect via linear regression. There may be
some motivation to believe that, in the bivariate case, the regressor is
not independent of the error term. If we can find a variable Z that sat-
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isfies an exclusion restriction with the same r term, then conditional
independence (in the sense of the endogenous regressor x given Z)
implies that x is conditionally uncorrelated to the error term of the
reduced form regression: E[x|z, ε] = 0. Therefore, provided such a Z
exists, the regression model can be causally identified in the under-
lying model by invoking conditional independence. In applied terms,
this is the technique of instrumental variables regression.
3.2 a menu of conditions for tractable data analysis
In what proceeds I provide definitions of the assumptions required to
make the statistical models used in this work make sense. I mean this
in terms of attaining results that lead to unambiguous interpretations
about an explicit hypothesis that has the optimal properties contained
in an answer to the archetypal well-posed scientific problem. I begin
under the strongest assumptions (‘strong’ in the sense of how pre-
sumptuous the abstractions they commit us to are), and then go on
to discuss fixes that can be employed when various combination of
these are not maintained.
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The baseline scenario: data are a randomly sampled cross-section
Identifying Assumption 1: The data, indexed i = {1, ...,N}, are indepen-
dently and identically distributed (IID)
IID data are a requisite for allowing us to compute probability weighted
averages of a sample as a measure of the observed frequencies of the
events such that the weighted average of all events sums to one. If
different events realized in this space were giving information about
the probability of other non-identical events happening, then additive
frequencies would be an incorrect way to work out the probabilities
(this is where conditioning becomes important later). Assuming inde-
pendence allows us to exploit the product rule, giving us a formula
for working out the probabilities of events happening jointly (to avoid
confusion note that in probability theory ‘independence’ is meant to
signify informational independence; not the idea of events being in-
dependent in some literal, mechanical sense). This is the first ‘I’. The
second ‘I’ in IID is an assumption that the data are realizations of one
unique stochastic process - without this it would not follow that the
solution can be provided by one model possessing a unique set of
parameters.
IA2: Linear in parameters (LP)
The dependence of y at the mean on the regressors X is expressed
linearly, i.e., as angular coefficients: (E[y|X]) ∝ X+ ε, where epsilon is
the model errors.
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IA3: Additive separability (AS)
Let’s assume that the errors of the conditional mean of the dependent
variable y, i.e., whatever the estimated parameters have not explained
due to randomness and information absent in the sample, aggregate
additively (e.g., not multiplicatively). This means that for all the K
independent variables predicting y, there is a joint function of these
terms, fAS(), such that, fAS(
∑∞
i=1 Xik) = fAS
(∑∞
i=1 xi1
)
+, ...,+fAS
(∑∞
i=1 xiK
)
.
This gives the reduced form model as a sum of partial effects y=βX+
ε. Stated thus, the statistical fit can be estimated from the family of
linear estimators.
IA4: Rank Condition (RC)
This means that no single row of data in the matrix of regressors X
is equal to a linear function of the rows in X, and no column in X
is a linear function of some combination of the columns in X. RC
establishes that the underlying probability model is not degenerate,
i.e., the model does not permit events happening that have a proba-
bility equal to one. If the converse true (and provided more than one
event can occur in the model) it would be present a logical contradic-
tion since by definition the sum of all events in the stochastic process
must sum to one.
IA5: Order Condition (OC)
When an independent variable, z, is said to be excludable from a
single equation regression model, y = βX + ε, the variable z satis-
fies an uncorrelatedness condition with the error term: E[z, ε] = 0.
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Take G to indicate the number of equations in a structural model -
the model giving a complete statement of endogenous terms in the
data generating process and how these are determined by the inde-
pendent variables in the system. Taking the statistical model being
implemented to be a reduced form, i.e., subset of this system, the
reduced form satisfies an order condition of restrictions if the num-
ber of satisfied exclusion restrictions, R, in each jth reduced form
equation is no smaller than the total number of structural equations
minus one: Rj > G− 1. Stating the exogeneity constraint in this more
elaborate sense gives the intuition behind how exogeneity conditions
are generalized to multiple equation models, and hence the logic be-
hind instrumental variables solutions to identification problems of
this sort. This is the one identifying assumption stated here that is
arguably both necessary and sufficient for identification in a broad
class of linear simultaneous and single equation models.
IA6: Homoskedasticity (HO)
Assume that the variance of the reduced form model errors are char-
acterized by a scalar, σ2 := E[ε2], implying it is invariant,
E[ε2,X,XT ] = σ2E[X,XT ].
Allowances for data in two dimensions
In order to reap the benefits of panel data we must first not pretend
that they are going to behave like a cross-section due to the presence
of an additional time dimension. Errors germane to the unique panel
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data structure are called ‘structural error components’ because they
are unobserved errors that stand out from the white-noise error term
(ε ∼ N(0,Var[ε)]) and are a potential source of model misspecification
because they may make the essential IID and ER assumptions related
to independence unlikely.
IA7: Strict Exogeneity (SE)
Given an index for the cross-section, i = 1, ...,N, and the time series
t = 1, ..., T ,
E[εit|
K∑
k=1
(xik1, ..., xikT )] = 0.
In other words, this is an exclusion restriction assumption ratcheted
up in strength to a condition of mean independence. This is necessary
for accommodating the extra data dimension the time-series provides.
It is possible to demonstrate it holds if it can be established that the
errors of the population parameters are consistent (if E[εit] = 0 it
follows that E[εit|Xit] = 0.)
IA8: Serial Independence (SI)
E[εitεis 6=t|
K∑
k=1
(xik1, ..., xikT )] = 0.
SI is an assumption that past states do not contain information about
any subsequent states of the random variables. This allows depen-
dence in the time-series to be differentiated from cross-sectional vari-
ation (the data may be IID in i but this condition may fail in t unless
we can maitain SI).
Conditions one through eight are the bedrock for the applied data
analysis to come because so many estimation challenges can be solved
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by modifying or amending these basic ingredients. For example, in
models where the most recent realization in time of a regressand
gives information about its future state the SI assumption is too strong.
However, by conditioning on the values of the regressand lagged by
one time period it is feasible to wash out this unwanted dependence.
Take another example, where the OC condition is untenable. The
property of conditional independence produces a useful identifying
assumption in this context where we are not entitled to assume OC is
true because we have reason to believe one or more of the regressors
is not exogenous. If we can find a variable Z that satisfies an exclusion
restriction with the same error term, then conditional independence
(in the sense of the endogenous regressor x given Z) implies that x
is conditionally uncorrelated to the error term of the reduced form
regression: E[{x|z,Z}, ε] = 0. Therefore, provided such a Z exists, the
regression model can be causally identified in the underlying model
by invoking conditional independence. In applied terms, this is the
technique of instrumental variables regression.
3.3 challenges in learning from cross-national com-
parisons
A common concern is the existence of some form of aggregation bias
in analysing data at the national level. National aggregates may jet-
tison useful information at the micro-level. Alternatively, the prob-
lem may be put in terms of aggregation denuding the model of the
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necessary behavioural microfoundations needed to make meaningful
conclusions from the empirical results.
The release of seminal datasets (particularly from the World Bank),
and a rise in the popularity of statistical software packages for desk-
top computing around the late nineties sparked a boom in country-
level panel data analysis (data featuring parallel cross-sectional units
tracked over time). Some scholars have been circumspect about the
overall value of such undertakings. A rather polemically titled exam-
ple of such criticism is an article appearing in the journal International
Sociology by Kittel (‘A crazy methodology? On the limits of macro-
quantitative social science research’). [123] Kittel offers a replication
study demonstrating that published results from seminal panel data
analyses by political scientists are not robust to arbitrary changes in
the specification of the estimator. Kittel argues that these shortcom-
ings are an indictment of the idleness of panel data econometrics
for macro-level data as they have been applied in the political sci-
ence profession (he remains sensibly supportive of the progress it has
made in economic research). I am in general agreement with Kittel’s
observations with one qualification: I am not so sanguine about the
responsibility of aggregation in the scientific failings of panel data
analysis in political science.
But why then are the results targeted by Kittel ostensibly so lacking
in robustness? Let’s list the suspects then. The poor performance can
be due to either an absence of identifiability, hapless random chance
inherent in the stochastic nature of the panel models or mistakes in
Kittel’s replication study. My first reflex is for me to question whether
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the models giving rise to the data analysis in these papers are well-
posed. After all, Koopman’s identification problem demonstrates that
the existence of unique, stable solutions to statistical specification are
never given a priori and in fact the burden of proof is on the researcher
to demonstrate that there is an identifiable structure corresponding
to the underlying causal system sketched by theoretical intuitions. In
other words, the results Kittel criticized may reflect a problem of ill-
posed scientific conditions in these analyses. If this is the case then the
level of aggregation would appear to be a red-herring. This problem
could occur in any empirical application and the remedy is invariant
to the level of aggregation: revising the specification by generating
new and smarter identifying assumptions.
More specifically, the model replicated by Kittel is a conditional
mean of government expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The panel
data setup is estimating the partial effect of leftwing and Christian
Democratic cabinet members on this outcome. Five different estima-
tors are run, the pooled OLS, 2-way fixed effects, 2-way fixed ef-
fects with a Prais-Winsten transformation, a first order autoregres-
sive model with 2-way fixed effects, and a first order autoregressive
model with time and unit fixed effects. Across these specifications
Kittel reports instability in signage, magnitude and standard error
width of the ideological effects on public spending. [123, p.650] This
variation is significant to the point of deciding rejection of the null
hypothesis at at the one percent level of significance. The size of the
cycling in empirical fits suggests that these results are not just from
random error from the stochastic nature of the models, e.g., an ‘un-
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lucky’ sample giving an empty confidence interval that is nonethe-
less fairly precise. Moreover, I see no reason to fault Kittel’s analysis.
Hence, the problem probably has something to do with unidentifiable
structures, or even if there is an identifiable structure the identifying
assumptions could be incorrect. The latter possibility seems plausible
since portfolio composition is unlikely to satisfy the exclusion restric-
tion despite controlling for cross-sectional heterogeneity with fixed
effects and conditioning out time dependency with an AR-1 term
(i.e., serial correlation is characterized linearly by information from
the most recent past time period alone) and time intercepts. Assum-
ing that gifts of rents to voters and macro-economic outcomes have
plausible influence over the survival of governments it seems a pri-
ori questionable that cabinet composition is exogenous. For example,
the existence of political business cycles (PBC) where spending on
government programs is ratcheted up before elections to curry elec-
toral support could mean that variation in the dependent variable has
causal information on variation in government composition - after all
wouldn’t leftwing governments have higher political business cycles
spikes while the level of PBC pork-barrelling could also be informa-
tive about a party’s re-election chances? Because PBCs are dynamic
they would also slip through the net of the fixed effects terms. It
therefore seems that the results are not robust because the model is
not identified - there is no order condition because the underlying
structural model (in particular, its size) is unknown.
The take-home message is therefore that the case against macro-
analysis is mute, but that identifying assumptions previous studies
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have based the specification on have been insufficient and unrealistic.
In other words, the lesson I take away from Kittel’s study is that there
is a need for political scientists to apply econometrics (and statistics
in general) with greater thoughtfulness and fidelity to its theoretical
foundations (i.e., don’t fudge identification). In addition, it is often
not true that the units of analysis are incommensurable because of the
use of national-level data involving aggregation. In many instances
there is no aggregation since the data measures directly the behaviour
of leaders in the national assembly or in government or some other
institutional features.
Perhaps some wisdom can be gained from reflecting on the expe-
riences of a research program that plumbed deep the challenge of
extracting internally/externally valid and scientifically rigorous evi-
dence from country-level panel data modelling: the empirical analysis
of the convergence hypothesis of economic growth predicted in the
Solow-Swan model. Barro’s 1991 paper began the stimulus in testing
Solow and Swan’s neoclassical growth model that predicted national
economic growth rates to grow in inverse proportion to income levels
- the major implication being that lower income countries can grow
at a faster rate than higher income countries because labour in these
countries is in much greater abundance to existing capital stocks (in
terms of per captia ratio), which means that their intake of new tech-
nologies is more efficient than that in higher income countries with
relatively larger existing captial stocks and comparatively smaller
labour stocks. [19, 203, 210] The accumulated knowledge from the
growth regressions is far from being as pessimistic as the sensitiv-
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ity analysis done by Kittel. Barro’s 1991 paper discovered supporting
evidence for the inverse income-captial relationship in his estimates.
This was followed by a critical meta-analysis by Levine and Renelt
casting doubt over the robustness of Barro’s findings. [132] This was
then contradicted by another meta-analysis by Sala-I-Martin [190],
which was later supported again (although in less strong terms) by
a prodigous Bayesian Model Averaging study by Ley and Steel that
averaged results from over two trillion growth regressions. [133]
Recalling the discussion of identification earlier the problem in
these sorts of results is in terms of the instability characterizing the
ill-posed problem: results tend to vary wildly with small arbitrary
changes in inputs. Finding a remedy for this type of problem is
known in statistics as ‘regularization’. The growth regressions’ peri-
patetic pathway to knowledge has been dissected by econometrician
Maddala who diagnosed the lack of stability as a symptom of unre-
liable data passed into the aggregate production functions and the
potential for the panel-specific errors to be dynamically correlated
in a way that evades conventional structural error components mod-
els. [147] Maddala makes a suggestion consistent with Lee and Steel’s
meta-analysis: the instability inherent in this class of models should
be managed by sensitivity analysis techniques that can convey uncer-
tainty flowing from the non-unqueness and instability in the model
solution. Bayesian model averaging as done for example in Ley and
Steel is one way to derive information about this source of ambigu-
ity. [134] Alternatively shrinkage estimators for panel data are pre-
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sented by Maddala and Wu - these are estimators that are more re-
sourceful in fitting small samples to large models. [148]
A common belief is that Bayesian methods circumvent the obstacles
created by unlikely Frequentist assumptions of random finite samples
from infinitely large populations. The reality is more subtle. Bayesian
estimation can also be reliant on imagining a population parameter
from an infinitely large population. If this were not the case there
would be no notion of bias in Bayesian model fitting - a key criterion
in Bayesian data analysis. Classical Bayesianism preserves much of
the importance given to asymptotic theory. Statistical theory has al-
ready extensively mapped out Bayesian translations of large sample
statistical properties omnipresent in Frequentist analysis - for exam-
ple, the consistency of posterior distrubtion estimates is covered in
work by Walker [228], Walker and Hjort [229], and in Diaconis and
Freedman [65].
There are some real conveniences in the Bayesian perspective. For
example, interval estimation avoids the awkward Frequentist pecu-
liarity of creating a confidence interval that contains the true popu-
lation parameter only in random samples within a given rate. There
is always the chance that the confidence interval is empty, which is
in a way defeating the purpose of computing coverage probability.
In contrast, Bayesian credible intervals reflect coverage proabability
straightforwardly. Another benefit is that Bayesian analysis can often
allow for more complex statistical models as a result of the break-
throughs in numerical integration algorithms that were necessary to
approximate solutions to Bayes’ equation in the absence of conjugate
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priors (this is common in high dimensional models and models with
nesting). Bayesian analysis often projects an image of having more
generality and cohesion because it has a unified mathematical foun-
dation in Bayes’ Theorem. Frequentist statistics on the other hand is
more like a bag of tricks (such as the method of moments, maximum
likelihood, M-estimation, generalized estimating equations, general-
ized method of moments and empirical likelihood - Hansen’s formu-
lation of the generalized method of moments (GMM) is one of the
few offered ways of capturing a unifyied perspective on Frequentist
analysis [102]).
I do not support a philosophical advocacy of Bayesian data analy-
sis as panacea. My views on are based on pragmatism. If I am com-
pelled to work with models that have complicated level designs, the
numerical integration toolkit attending the Bayesian approach will be
exploited. Otherwise, I am content to rummage the Frequentist’s lost
and found. In other words, comparative advantage rules. There are
things that Bayesian analysis can do more efficiently that Frequen-
tist analysis cannot, and vice versa. This strategy is reflected in ad-
vice from Bayarri and Berger’s survey of the overlaps and remaining
divides between Bayesian and Frequentist statistics [22]. Moreover,
cross-national regressions have a tendency to feature instability in so-
lutions, which means the Bayesian meta-analysis tools are of great
use when it is necessary to factor in this source of uncertainty.
Finally, question remain over the coherence of sampling theory in
models of national aggregates where the idea of working with ran-
dom samples of an infinitely large population do not make sense.
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How can an assumption of iid data be a coherent sampling scheme
for national aggregates when certain aspects of the data generating
process are fixed? E.g., the size of the cross-section cannot be infinitely
large. The divide between Bayesians and Frequentists over the impli-
cations of samples from finite populations is currently unresolved.
And yet here we see that global samples of national aggregates are
candidates for being treated as realizations from finite populations.
What sort of problems could this raise?
First, let’s recognize that the purpose of assuming random sam-
pling is to ensure that the sample approximates the population with-
out bias. In the case where the sample is at close proximity to the
population, for example, when the sample are national governments
across the globe, then at first glance it seems that we are less depen-
dent on this random sampling assumption - where the sample is the
population we would not have to depend at all on an assumption of
random sampling. However, in this setting what remains important
is the mechanism by which the sample falls just short of the popula-
tion, i.e., the mechanism by which data is missing from the sample. If
missingness in the data happens completely randomly, then there the
sampling scheme will not be biased. However, when the missingness
mechanism is not random and depends somehow on the underlying
data generating process being modelled, then the sampling scheme
will generate bias, which may lead to spurious inferences.
Pragmatically then we can allay doubts by characterizing the prob-
lem in terms of the mechanism of sample attrition. Some statisticians
have gone further in developing the concept of a ‘superpopulation’
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to conceptualize sampling when the the number of individuals in the
sample is finite. The idea of a superpopulation is the creation of a
synthetic infinite population from which a first stage of sampling is
performed, which is then used as a means to randomly sample from
the finite population. [104, see]
To recapitulate this methodological discussion, the logical founda-
tion of the statistical models used in this study have been described in
terms of the parameter identification problem and the causal frame-
work of potential outcomes. In particular, canonical identifying as-
sumptions were enumerated that will be relevant throughout this
work. The question of the commensurability of national aggregates
has been addressed in dialogue with the more circumspect literature,
such as the paper by Kittel. I maintain that the current toolkit, in
econometrics in particular, provides a set of reasonable solutions to
the challenges associated with this problem of incommensurability.

4
C O N S T I T U T I O N A L S E L E C T I O N A N D
S E M I - P R E S I D E N T I A L I S M
The ancient lawgiver was a benevolent myth;
the modern lawgiver is a terrifying reality.
- Bertrand Russell
4.1 accretion of semi-presidential systems
In this chapter I examine semi-presidential republics as a case study
in constitutional selection because of the noticeable growth of these
republics during the 20th century. By 2006, 22 percent of democra-
cies were semi-presidential - an increase from the 1946 figure of nine
percent of [49] all theoretically available republican models. Here,
Cheibub’s framework for classifying semi-presidential constitutions
is adopted. [48] Semi-presidential status is based on the isometric ar-
rangement of offices in terms of principal-agent relationships. Semi-
presidential systems are ones where there is a twin accountability
system making cabinet government an agent to the principals of both
president and a legislative majority. ‘Hybrid’ or ‘mixed’ systems have
the same parts as these but not the same bonds. While alternative def-
initions have been pursued based on how equally balanced power is
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between prime-minister and president, this framework is more conve-
nient because it avoids the sorites paradox of having to decide when
either office is “powerful enough” in order to have a de facto constitu-
tional reality.
What accounts for the phenomenon of semi-presidential selection?
I illustrate that the obvious themes of crisis, power-sharing and in-
heritance have generality but not sufficiency. Providing an ultimate
explanation(s) for semi-presidential adoption is, I argue, an insoluble
undertaking. Nevertheless, a finite number of persuasive proximate
explanations exist. The overarching narrative begins with a constella-
tion of partisan institutional preferences that allow for an initial wave
of semi-presidential republics in Europe c.1919. The nature of path
dependence is quite different subsequently. The effects of colonial
heritage are weak and serially heterogeneous when historical con-
stitutions from francophone Africa are analysed during periods of
major regional change (post-WWII decolonization and the Paristroika
upheaval of the early 1990s). Exogenous historical circumstances play
a more decisive role in the context of newly minted republics (e.g.,
WWII and Iceland; fall of Berlin Wall and Eastern bloc). Finally, re-
gional differences feature largely in later constitutional transitions;
in sub-Saharan Africa, semi-presidential transition has a 19th cen-
tury flavour of deliberative forums and tâtonnement, while in Eastern
Europe semi-presidential systems emerge as a power-sharing frame-
work. Path dependence envelops a lot of cases in the sense of semi-
presidential innovations representing a path of least resistance from
old regime to new. For example, in former Communist states, the
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semi-presidential framework can viewed as a way of maintaining con-
stitutional bonds extant under communism while switching out the
old parts. Finally, I provide some exploratory data analysis to isolate
variables which have cadence in a Bayesian model of regime selection.
The focus of this chapter reflects a natural reaction in the comparative
politics and political economy literature from asking what institutions
cause to what causes institutions. The payoff of understanding the dy-
namics of constitutional endogeneity is the basis for better founded
identifying assumptions of the causal effects of constitutions.
4.1.1 Why are certain constitutional features chosen over others?
A generalized theory of semi-presidential selection is a lacunae in
comparative politics research. Such a theory must therefore be cob-
bled from theoretical institutional selection work crafted to account
for other aspects of the constitution. Research on the selection of semi-
presidentialism is mainly contained in descriptive case study analyses
within the semi-presidentialism studies subfield that has been dili-
gently spearheaded by Elgie. [74] These case studies are used here as
supporting secondary source material for the historical outlines pre-
sented. Empirical studies of national constitutional selection that have
global generality have been done by Hayo and Voigt. Their findings
are that probability weighted rates describing regime transitions be-
tween parliamentarism and presidentialism appear to depend more
on variables related to politics and conflict than socio-economic vari-
ables. [107] These results are supported in an earlier work by the
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same authors. [106] The main ramification of such results is that the
explanations for institutional changes in the terms outlined in mod-
ernization theory and related democratization work on social inequal-
ity do not transport well to the within-democratic regimes perspec-
tive, which seems intuitive because democratic regime differences in
governance ought to be significantly narrower than the sort of gover-
nance differences the democratization process implies. This finding
is congenial to the tighter focus of the constitutional selection prob-
lem - here, treating constitutions endogenously is about accounting
for the installation of specific contractual mechanisms, not the exis-
tence of contractual constitutionalism per se. What can be taken as a
given is that institutional adoption is an output of the amalgamation
of preferences held by the constitution building selectorate. Theories
of institutional selection are therefore about what determines these
preferences and the effect the collective choice mechanism driving
their aggregation has on which preferences are dominant.
The first theoretical framework I unveil is one where institution
building behaviour is directed by preferences over policies. Bawn’s
analysis of electoral law formulation in postbellum West Germany is
a seminal effort along these lines. [21] The spirit of the argument is
that an institutional configuration is preferred when its operation will
create an environment suitable to some desired policy outcomes. An
intuitive way to understand this is to consider the rationale of ma-
jor parties choosing recruitment mechanisms that preserve a policy
status quo by excluding radical minor parties from gaining represen-
tation in the legislative assembly (for example, by raising minimum
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threshold vote shares for gaining assembly seats). Formalizations of
this idea have been developed in Tsebelis [221], and in Shepsle and
Weingast [198].
Preferences can also be plausibly formed according to which insti-
tutional configurations maximize a leader’s electoral strength. Benoit
and Schiemann implement such a model in analysing the construc-
tion of the Hungarian electoral system in 1989. [26] In this setting
what matters is expectations, not outcomes. Here party’s endorse
mechanisms that will capture them the largest share of electoral sup-
port and thus the most political power.
A theoretical perspective that is harmonious with Buchanan’s work
in the public choice literature is to view institutional preferences as
a function of leaders’ and citizens’ desire to capture rents. Rents are
payoffs from a transaction in excess of its real value after discounting
the opportunity cost. Politics then is an arena prolific in rent extrac-
tion because politicians can generate this excess simply by introduc-
ing laws that regulate the type of transaction the rent-seeker is target-
ing. [41] Robinson and Torvik have adopted this framework and in
doing so have also developed one of the first efforts I am aware of that
posits a rational choice model of the constitution selection process in
terms of regime type preferences for presidentialism or parliamen-
tarism (they do not consider semi-presidentialism in the model). Rent
is therefore a more subtle idea of payoffs than simple vote maximiza-
tion because given a set of two configurations that both maximize
vote shares, there may be something in the institutional preferences
that are not explained because one of these options makes a politi-
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cian’s rents larger. Robinson and Torvik show a set of conditions and
assumptions whereby preferences for presidentialism are induced be-
cause the model implies that office holders’ rents (not voters’ rents)
are larger under presidentialism than those from a parliamentary sys-
tem. [183, p.34]
In describing these different models I see no reason to view them as
contesting explanations. Rather they are emphasizing different partial
effects on institutional choice that are equally relevant in qualitative
terms. As such, my view is that a semi-presidential selection model
would be plugging a hole in a parliamentary-presidential preferences
model in order to account for circumstances where preferences would
be split between the two options. This is a hedging principle where
I anticipate such a thing to happen when there is sufficient uncer-
tainty about payoffs implied by parliamentarism and presidentialism.
Additionally, the preference for parliamentarism with a transplanted
semi-presidency can be caused when institutional selection is nested
in foreign policy: the presidential office is a strategic choice in order
to steel sovereignty in newly independent republics. This perception
perhaps follows from the diplomatic stealth implied by the cohesion
and autonomy of the presidential office.
4.2 semi-presidential adoptions in historical perspec-
tive
The size of cross-national differences within the semi-presidential
population warrants a subtle and comprehensive illustration of the
4.2 semi-presidential adoptions in historical perspective 129
important historical contexts related to key regime transitions. This
measure strengthens the factual basis of the assessments of selection
theories made subsequently.
Regime transitions can act as a focal point for strategic interactions
between rival political groups who realize they have an interest in
founding institutions that play to their advantage. The constitutitonal
rules that are chosen in these transitions can also be thought of as
commitments as to how dispersed political power is to be under a
given regime by demarcating the allocation of veto power among ac-
tors in the political system. The outcome of these transitional pro-
cesses is basically determined by the set of individuals whose sup-
port is necessary for the continuation of the constitutional regime.
The purpose of this paper is to address the question of why, from
this process, countries select semi-presidentialism. In order to ad-
dress this question it is necessary to examine the major pathways
of constitution-making in the modern period that encompasses devel-
opments since the late eighteenth century. Modern constitutionalism
in the sense of a single written text began with two historical consti-
tutions, the French one of 1791 and the US constitution of 1787. The
French text set out restrictions on regal power by clearly outlining the
legal domain of monarchical power. These restrictions were situated
alongside a popularly elected legislative body, the Assemblée Nationale.
Four years previously the constitution of the United States was pro-
mulgated; a document establishing a republic model where executive
power was recruited via popular means and the state was organized
according to a schema of the separation of powers. The French 1791
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constitution was actually the world’s third modern written constitu-
tion. The Polish constitution of 3 May 1791 was the second, which was
actually strongly influenced by British constitutionalism in describ-
ing a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament of Sejm,
but which experienced a very transient existence, terminating a year
after its adoption (excluded from this discussion is the British par-
liamentary model, for the reason that this tradition did not explain
the diffusion of written constitutions until the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century when domain status was granted to a series
of British colonies). [34, pp.15-7] Constitutional scholars have recog-
nized that the European constitutional monarchies of the nineteenth
century were following a path stemming from the French 1791 frame-
work and not the British model. Aspects of the French model were
adopted by Sweden (1909), Spain (1812), Norway (1814), Portugal
(1822), Brazil (1824), Belgium (1831), the Piedmontese State (1848),
Austria (1867), and Germany (1871). [128, pp.64-5] It was the Amer-
ican model, however, which made the greatest impact of republican
institutions in the nineteenth century. The US model was adopted
across large parts of Latin America following the breakdown of the
Spanish empire (c.1820) - a process conducted with increased vigour
during the advent of American imperialism in the early twentieth
century in this region. Brazil, however, deferred the American model
in favour of constitutional model styled under the French 1791 model
until 1891.
Although not adopted by the United States, various different com-
binations of executive recruitment were debated at the Philadelphia
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Constitutional Convention of 1787. Edmund Randolph, the governor
of Virginia, proposed a three member collegial executive, believing
that a individual chief executive would be predisposed toward tyran-
nical rule. The delegate from Connecticut, Roger Sherman argued
that the executive branch should be dependent on the support of
Congress in order to ensure the supremacy of legislative power. [51,
pp.219-222] The outcome of the convention became the presidential
system of government we are now familiar with. The Western repub-
lican innovations of the nineteenth and early twentieth century un-
doubtedly involved a degree of experimentation. We may associate
the presidential regime type with the government of those plutocratic
Freemasons in Philadelphia. But at the time, presidentialism in the
sense that we understand it today was no sure thing. Prior to the first
World War, republican government was the exception not the rule.
The experimental aspect of constitution-making is
exemplified in the elaborate Swiss constitution of 1848 where mem-
bers of the Swiss cabinet are elected by parliament, but the govern-
ment, headed by a rotating presidency, is not accountable to parlia-
ment during the duration of its fixed term. [139, p.35] Using a simple
schema of the number of executive heads and the mode of recruit-
ment for the executive, it can be shown that the number of possi-
ble variations in legislative-executive design can be limited to a finite
range of models. Here in Table 5 the Swiss 1848 constitution would
be contained within the hybrid-10 model - a parliament elected execu-
tive, but whose fixed term removes interim dependence on legislative
confidence with the Swiss Presidium being itself a collegial execu-
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tive like parliamentary cabinet government. In the semi-presidential
model the criteria of hybrid-3 and hybrid-9 are both fulfilled: execu-
tive government is recruited both from voters (the semi-presidency),
and from parliament (cabinet and prime minister). In the weak sense,
hybrids 2 and 8 could be considered semi-presidential. However, a
stricter definition would describe these as premier-presidential, which
means a system with a head parliamentary executive responsible ex-
clusively to the president. The emergence of semi-presidential sys-
tems in the early twentieth century, therefore, appears inevitable given
the generality mixed models have over the set of possible republican
architectures. The first modern mixed regime was that of the Third
French Republic (1871-1940) - a product of one of the most prolific
constitutional laboratories in Europe. French constitution-makers ar-
rived at this destination via a long and circuitous route. Since the
demise of the 1791 constitution in the excesses of revolutionary terror,
French institution builders experimented with a number of collegial
executive models that eventually became tapered to a unitary (and
often tyrannical) form either under republican or monarchical guises.
The Girondin constitutional proposal of 15 and 16 February 1793 pro-
posed a seven minister executive with a rotating presidency. The Ja-
cobin model of 24 June 1793 went further in suggesting a 24 member
executive. [105, p.38] The second and fully republican constitution
to take effect since the revolution, that of the 22 August 1795, held
that executive power was to be invested in a five member Directoire
nominated by the legislature. On 13 December, 1799, the executive
became reconstructed as the personal possession of Napoleon Bona-
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parte, presiding as head and first consul of a three member directory.
Following the Napoleonic wars monarchy was reinstated and once
again torpedoed by social upheaval. This event constituted the last
bourgeois revolution in France and led to the creation of the Second
French Republic (1848-1852) - a presidential regime. However, on 2
December 1851 President Louis-Napoleon conducted a populist coup
and dissolved the National Assembly, ostensibly to restore popular
male suffrage, which the Assembly had recently abrogated. Follow-
ing a plebiscite conducted 21 and 22 December, 1851, a new constitu-
tion was promulgated on 14 January 1852. The constitution appointed
Louis-Napoleon, Napoleon III, Emperor of the French. However, this
new empire was almost as short lived as the Second Republic. Mili-
tary defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (19 July 1870 - 10 May 1871)
led to the capture and exile of the emperor and the creation of a provi-
sional assembly, organized to negotiate peace terms with Prussia. On
17 February, 1871, Adoplhe Thiers was appointed its chief executive
(without the title of President of the Republic). [39, pp.77-105]
The Third French Republic was not so much founded as it was
cobbled through the promulgation of series of laws spanning the pe-
riod 1871 to 1940, despite remaining the most stable regime in post-
revolutionary France. The most formative of these institution build-
ing legislations were the three of 1875: on the Organization of Pub-
lic Powers (February 25), the Organization of the Senate (February
24) and the Relations between the Public Powers (July 16). [69] The
regime was mixed in the sense that a presidential chief executive
was elected by both houses of parliament who possessed consider-
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able executive powers, was only responsible to the legislature in acts
of high treason and who appointed a prime minister (President of
the Council of Ministers) and cabinet who were responsible to parlia-
ment. The creation of such a system was due to the resurfacing of the
monarchy question, stimulated by a re-emergence in the assembly of
factions sympathetic to a restoration of the French throne following
Napoleon III’s fall from power. The form of government developed
into and remained a mixed regime for the same reason that a single
written constitution did not emerge in this period because the monar-
chy versus republicanism question remained unsolved, and deputies
reluctant to solve it as time drew on. Power in this regime was perma-
nently skewed, however, toward parliament and the president gradu-
ally became a background figure in the political life of the nation. [105,
pp.269-283]
The constitution of the Third French Republic is important also
for providing the blueprint for the Portuguese constitution of 1911,
which is arguably the second modern mixed dual-executive consti-
tution. This regime was created in the year following Portugal’s re-
publican revolution of 1910. Deputies at the Portuguese Constituent
Assembly of 1911 were recruited from a list composed by the Direc-
torate of the Portuguese Republican Party a movement heavily in-
fluenced by French republicanism of the nineteenth century and its
formative leaders such as Léon Gambetta (Prime Minister, 1881-2).
The prevailing preference at the Constituent Assembly was to have
a weak executive modelled after the Third French Republic that was
subordinate to a bicameral legislature. In fact, the creation of the Por-
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tuguese Constitution of 1911 would have amounted to a French im-
port largely without modification if it were not for a constitutional
amendment to give the Portuguese President dissolution powers be-
ing struck-down in the Senate. [231, pp.72-7] In its proper context,
this constitutional event represents the first transfer of the mixed con-
stitution as a consequence the diffusion effect of nineteenth century
French-styled republican institution building.
4.2.1 Convergence of partisan and institutional preferences: Weimar Ger-
many, Finland and Austria
Before WWI there were only three European republics, all of which
were hybrids, Portugal, France and Switzerland. After WWI there
were an additional three semi-presidential republics in continental
Europe, Weimar Germany, Finland and Austria. In Weimar Germany,
Finland (1919) and Austria (1929), semi-presidentialism succeeded be-
cause of the particular alignment of partisan and institutional prefer-
ences. In these states a combination of civil conflict, interstate war
and social revolution preceded the creation of a semi-presidential re-
public. Republicanism became forced upon the defeated central pow-
ers through the discrediting of monarchs embroiled in failed mili-
tary campaigns and their subsequent ousting by revolution as was
the case in Germany, Austria, Hungary and Turkey. [213] Met with
this turn of events were social conditions amenable to mixed politi-
cal systems. Society in the immediate post-WWI period was highly
divided along left-republican and right-clerical/monarchist factions.
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Along this cleavage institutional preferences were structured by a
social democratic desire for assembly-style parliamentary decision-
making and the Catholic royalist desire for patriarchal institutions.
[89]
In Finland contingent external circumstances were more deciding.
As a consequence of the geopolitics of Bolshevik revolution and the
war in Europe, a civil war in Finland took place from 27 January to
15 May, 1918, between the white faction of pro-Berlin monarchists
and the red faction of left-leaning, pro-Moscow republicans. Emerg-
ing victorious, the Whites decided to realign Finland with Germany,
leading to the election of German Prince Karl Friederich of Hesse as
Head of State by the Finnish Eduskunta on 9 October 1918. The defeat
of the central powers in 1918, then, effectively removed a monarchist
alternative from an independent post-war Finland.
In Austria the dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire following
military defeat led to the replacement of the monarchy with the Staat-
srat in 1918, a collegial council of state operating as head of state.
[166] Military defeat in Germany led to the abdication of the Em-
peror, a civil war and a social revolution led by spontaneous upris-
ings of workers’ and soldiers’ councils. [213] The right in Finland,
Austria and Germany were partial to strong, unitary executive power.
Presidentialism in this sense amounted to a kind of republican dop-
pelgänger of the style of unitary, personalized-executive power found
in the old regimes. From these social and ideological tensions the
semi-presidential republic appears to have emerged as a compromise
model through its synthesis of these divergent interests.
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Table 6: Institutional Preferences by Political Party in post-WWI Austria, Fin-
land and Germany
Political Party Ideological Orientation Constitutional Preference
Weimar Germany (1919)
Social Democrats left-secular pro-parliamentary
Democrats liberal centrists-secular pro-parliamentary
German People’s Party liberal centrist/right-secular divided
Centre Party centrist-religious divided
German National People’s Party right anti-parliamentary
Finland (1919)
Social Democrats left-secular pro-parliamentary
Agrarian Union centrist-agrarian pro-parliamentary
Liberals centrists-secular pro-parliamentary
National Coalition right anti-pariliamentary
Swedish People’s Party centrist-regional anti-parliamentary
Austria (1929)
Social Democrats left-secular pro-parliamentary
Christian Socials centrist-religious anti-parliamentary
German Nationals right anti-parliamentary
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(Sources: [57] Weimar Germany data: [28, 40, 10, 195, 209] Finland:
[120, 13, 204, 218] Austria: [89, 166].)
4.2.2 The path of least resistance: Ireland and Iceland
In both Ireland and Iceland the establishment of the office of presi-
dency recruited from the national electorate was a strategic choice to
consolidate independence and sovereignty via presidential prestige
and popular legitimacy. The semi-presidency was installed in Ireland
in 1937 with the implementation of the new constitution by referen-
dum in July. In Iceland this occurred with the passing of the 1944
constitution. Ireland and Iceland present two examples where the
adoption of a semi-presidential model was a transition made without
major restructuring; the only major innovation being the introduction
of direct presidential elections. Both states had put themselves on a
course to becoming independent republics prior. In Ireland this oc-
curred with the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in December 1921
that set the terms of Irish independence. In Iceland this occurred in
1918 with the Union Treaty establishing Icelandic sovereignty.
In Ireland independence was the culmination of a military cam-
paign fought in 1919. The Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921 that
established a two-state solution was signed in a diplomatic environ-
ment seen to favour British interests. Icelandic independence, on the
other hand, was prosecuted with far less rancour and realized in for-
tuitous circumstances. It was Heraclitus who said war is the father of
all things. This pronouncement certainly generalizes to the Icelandic
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case at least. Iceland had been occupied by an Allied invasion force as
the island presented a strategically indispensable airbase in the North
Atlantic Theatre of WWII - effectively leading to the severing of resid-
ual ties between Iceland and Nazi-occupied Denmark. In these two
cases it is necessary to keep in mind the ceremonial nature of the
semi-presidency not only for classificatory purposes but also for how
we can account for the model’s adoption. Replacing colonial gover-
nors of low authority with presidents of low power was a far eas-
ier choice to make than an overhaul of the parliamentary traditions
that had developed over these states’ many years as dependencies.
This explains in Iceland the strictly ceremonial role of the president.
Since the granting of home rule in 1904, Iceland had always played
a strictly parliamentary hand where political power resides within
the Althing. [127] In Ireland there were political pressures operating
against the construction of a powerful presidency. Leader of Fianna
Fail, Eamon de Valera, Ireland’s first prime minister, decided against
a powerful president as a move to placate their opposition, Fine Gael,
who were fearful due to the perceived possibility of a potentate in the
presidential office. This also explains the candidacy of Douglas Hyde,
Ireland’s first president, who was viewed as a non-political actor, and
who set the tone of the Irish semi-presidency for years to come. [83]
4.2.3 National memory: Portugal and France
The contemporary constitutions of Portugal and France were made
possible by different crises (democratization and cabinet instability,
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respectively). However, a common logic of adoption is echoed in both
these cases by invoking the fact that semi-presidentialism emerged as
a response to past constitutional tâtonnement in the 19th and early
20th century. In this sense, constitutional adoption in these cases can
be said to be path dependent but carried in tandem with the instru-
mental logic of a system intended to correct the mistakes of the past.
4.2.3.1 Gaullism
More than any other case, historical narratives suggest that the semi-
presidential Fifth French Republic was the product of leadership, specif-
ically, de Gaulle’s. [79] De Gaulle’s success in implementing it owes
much to the failures of the Fourth Republic. As head of the provi-
sional government, Charles de Gaulle issued a referendum, 21 Octo-
ber, 1945, on the question of whether to elect a constituent assembly
to thrash-out the details of a new constitution. The successful pass-
ing of the referendum meant that a constituent assembly was elected
with six months to draft a new constitution. However, the members
of the constituent assembly were elected by a method of proportional
representation at the departmental level. According to Jean Foyer, the
drafter of the 1958 constitution, this led to the ‘rule of the parties’
where the Socialists and Communists held the majority of votes. The
design of the French Fourth Republic was therefore one where ulti-
mate power and authority resided in a unicameral legislature. A dual
executive did exist, but the president was merely a ceremonial figure.
Although de Gaulle had failed to impose his vision for France
on the constitutional framework of 1946, a series of policy failures,
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namely inflation and decolonization, coupled with the fickleness of
cabinet government in the Fourth Republic offered de Gaulle a win-
dow of opportunity to refashion French political institutions. Escalat-
ing tension between the military and the government of Pierre Pflim-
lin over the Algerian crisis led to President René Coty’s decision to
invite de Gaulle to form a new government on 29 May, 1958. [79, p.
11] De Gaulle’s first objective once in power was to exact cooperation
from the military in Algeria, which had been in open rebellion since
1956. To achieve this he intended to reinvigorate the authority of the
state, by creating institutions that circumvented (or at least ‘rational-
ized’) the ostensibly impetuous and ineffectual party politics of the
National Assembly. In this sense his proposal for the constitution of
a new republic can be construed as a synthesis of the unitary execu-
tive authority of the Second Republic and the assembly-style decision
making processes of the Third. The drama of 1956-58 was thus also
an opportune occasion for de Gaulle to impose a vision for France
that had hardly changed since he elucidated it at his June 16, 1946
speech at Bayeux, which specified a new state with a presidential
head figuratively standing above parties and parliament. [62]
This episode is typical of the World War I wave of semi-presidential
republics in the sense that we see the ironical transformation of Catholic
royalist interest groups into pro-presidency political parties. There is,
as it were, a human tendency to support a solution at the centre point
not because it is free of contradiction but merely because one can
imagine the central position just as one can interpolate in the abstract
the middle point between two ends of a line. It seems like a foreign
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sensibility now but in continental Europe in the middle of the twen-
tieth century there was still much distrust of popular democracy and
secular authority. For example, although there was some mollification
in the Vatican’s position on this subject under Pope Pius XII, we can
observe a reminder of the dogma, which bound Catholics controlling
most positions of power on the European continent, in Pope Pius IX’s
1864 encyclical Quanta Cura - that Christian Orthodoxy repudiates
the notion that the will of the people is an authority that is supreme
and that can take precedence before the authority of the supernatu-
ral. For example, Pius IX concludes the appendix to Quanta Cura, the
‘Syllabus of Errors’ with an unambiguous repudiation of liberalism
by declaring the following an erroneous tenet:
‘80.The Roman Pontiff may and ought to reconcile him-
self to, and agree with progress, liberalism, and modern
civilization.’ [63, p.188]
In short, dogma bound Christians of the Sanctam Ecclesiam Catholicam
to the view that a republican separation of Church and State, and
the liberal notions of freedom of conscience and speech attending it
in this respect, is indeed a heresy that will lead one to damnation.
This cultural context helps us understand the mentality behind the
European right with regard to its views on political system design.
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4.2.4 Democratizing Portugal
Semi-presidentialism emerged in Portugal shortly after the 23 April
1974 officers’ coup against the Estado Novo regime and its leader,
Marcelo Caetano, who ruled following António de Oliveira Salazar’s
death in 1970. Since 1934, Prime Minister Salazar had led an author-
itarian, corporatist right-wing regime that ruled Portugal for forty
years. Portugal’s democratic transition is unique for the reason that,
as the putative catalyst of the third wave, the transition had no obvi-
ous analogy with which to compare or guide it, and that the transi-
tion was led by a military movement and not a civilian one, which
exercised considerable political authority in the late 1970s through
its control of the Council of the Revolution, a powerful and indepen-
dent branch of government in the transitional regime with veto pow-
ers over constitutional law. [142, p. 123] In light of the challenges
posed for democratic consolidation in Portugal in the mid-70s, of
making the transition from a spontaneous military uprising to a con-
solidated democracy where the selection of civilian political lead-
ers was regulated and non-violent, the decision to impose a semi-
presidential framework was one made with relative ease. The work
of drafting a new constitution was undertaken by the Constituent
Assembly, elected in April 1975. The major players at the assembly,
the Socialist Party, the Popular Democratic Party, and the Democratic
and Social Centre Party, reached a consensus on the implementation
of a semi-presidential framework as a prudent measure to avoid the
errors of the past, of a rigid, authoritarian state (as in the case of Es-
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tado Novo) and a state governed by unstable parliamentary factions
(as witnessed in the First Portuguese Republic). [152, p. 157-8]
Moreover, the pathways to the semi-presidential constitution had
been laid down long in advance. The Portuguese social revolution
of October 1910 established the First Portuguese Republic (1911-1926)
that adopted a mixed institutional framework modelled on the French
Third Republic. This basic institutional exoskeleton continued through-
out the three republics and the Estado Novo regime. The question
of whether, at any point in this timeframe, Portuguese institutions
were more parliamentary or presidential in nature is largely irrele-
vant because from 1926 to 1974 shifting power balances in the exec-
utive was the result of extra-constitutional practices and events hap-
pening within the upper echelons of the Portuguese fascist cadre -
one such example of this is the ascension of Salazar to the prime min-
istership in 1932, which effectively made him far more powerful than
the extant president António Óscar Carmona. [178]
4.2.5 Waning patromonial influences after decolonization
Despite seeming intuitive, colonial influences on semi-presidential
adoption are empirically weak. Comparisons of constitutional data
after the conclusion of African decolonization promote the view that
post-independence systems were incongruous with the Parisian archetype.
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4.2.5.1 Historical constitutional data
The predominant feature of Table 7 is that there appears to be lit-
tle diffusion of the French semi-presidential model to francophone
Africa during the immediate phase of decolonization. (Sources: [173,
35, 180].) The trend in the early sixties was for independent African
states to implement presidential constitutions. This pattern reflected
the movement of these states toward dominant party regimes that
usually became consolidated by the vanguard party of the indepen-
dence movement, while during this development executive power
became monopolized and personalized. [36, p. 63] There are, how-
ever, two instances where the French model was implemented with-
out extensive modification, Senegal and Congo (Leopoldville/Kin-
shasa). Although, the historical evidence seems to suggest that the
adoption of the model had more to do with the exigencies of power-
sharing in domestic politics than an inheritance from the Patrie. Ac-
cording to Conac, the adoption of a dual executive in Senegal and
Congo-Leopoldville was the product of compromise made in order
to accommodate a bifurcated domestic political landscape. In Senegal
there were two leading political figures: the poet Leopold Sedar Sen-
ghor and the economist Mamadou Dia. Senghor was given the post
of President (indirectly elected and with less powers than his coun-
terpart in France) and Dia would assume the role of Prime Minister.
Likewise in Congo-Leopoldville the implementation of a dual execu-
tive was a bargain to allow the two major nationalist parties to gov-
ern in tandem. This placed Joseph Kasavubu (Alliance du Bas Congo)
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in the presidency and Patrice Lumumba (Mouvement National Congo-
lais) in the prime-ministership. [54, pp.82-3] This course of events be-
gan with independence roundtable conference of January-February,
1960 in Brussels. At the conference the date of independence was
set at 30 June, 1960, one month after legislative elections were to be
held. Until then, a transitional government was formed headed by
Belgian minister Ganshof van der Meersch and an Executive College
of six Congolese leaders. The question of selecting a head of state
was going to be left to a vote by a joint sitting of the Congolese parlia-
ment before 30 June, 1960, over whether to elect a civilian, Congolese
head of state, or King Baudouin. Following the legislative elections of
1960 Lumumba’s MNC held the highest share of seats in the Cham-
ber of Deputies, however, no single party held a majority. He was
thus obliged to form a coalition government. On the question of his
nomination of a head of state, Lumumba was reluctant to appoint
Kasavubu who would compromise his plans for a unitary Congo.
However, after consultations with van der Meersch and the represen-
tative of Ghana, Andrew Djin, Lumumba was persuaded to nominate
Kasavubu out of fear of instability in the lower Congo and of creating
an opportunity for renewed Belgian intervention. [112, 97]
4.2.6 Regional differences during the bursts of the 1990s
Despite major institutional and historical differences, African and
post-Soviet states contemporaneously adopted similar semi-presidential
frameworks amid political democratization and liberalization. These
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Table 7: Constitutional Developments in Francophone Africa after Decolo-
nization
State Independence First Constitution Hybrid?
Algeria 1962 1963 N(Presidential)
Benin (Dahomey) 1960 1959-60-64* N(Presidential)
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) 1960 1960 N(Presidential)
Burundi 1962 (from Belgium) 1962 N(Constitutional Monarchy)
Cameroon 1960 1960-61 N(Presidential)
Central African Republic 1960 1959/60/62** N(Presidential
Comoros 1975 1977 Y(Semi-presidential)
Congo, Republic of 1960 1961 N(Presidential)
Congo, DR (-Léopoldville) 1960 (from Belgium) 1959/64 Y(Semi-presidential)
Côte d’Ivoire 1960 1960/63 N(Presidential)
Djibouti 1977 1992 N(Presidential)
Gabon 1960 1961 N(Presidential)
Guinea 1958 1958 N(Presidential)
Madagascar 1960 1959/60/62 N(Presidential)
Mali 1960 1960/61 N(Presidential)
Mauritania 1960 1961 N(Presidential)
Morocco 1956 1962 N(Constitutional Monarchy)
Niger 1960 1959-60 N(Presidential)
Rwanda 1962 (from Belgium) 1962 N(Presidential)
Senegal 1960 1959-60-63 Y(Semi-presidential)
Togo 1960 1960-61-63 N(Presidential)
Tunisia 1956 1959 N(Presidential)
Dates following a hyphen indicate promulgation of new constitution;
dates following stroke indicate major constitutional amendment or revision
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events amount to the largest growth in the number of stable semi-
presidential democracies since the creation of the French Fifth Repub-
lic. Here, I trace the rationales for adoption and see how they fit into
the candidate explanations of compromise and path dependence.
4.2.6.1 Post-communist states
In Poland the emergence of a semi-presidential regime took the form
of an incremental process of constitutional negotiation with the phase
of liberalization that took place at the Roundtable talks of 1989, where
the creation of a presidency was agreed to by the emergent opposition
and the Communists. The institution of the presidency was originally
intended as a power-sharing model to offer the Polish Communists
a foothold on power while the opposition groups made gains in the
legislative assembly. The first Polish president appointed by the Sejm
was Wojciech Jaruzelski, 1989-1990, of the Polish United Workers’
Party (PZPR - Communists). [224] However, this original intention
of a semi-presidency constructed alongside the Sejm was subverted
when Solidarity won the presidency after the instalment of direct
presidential elections - a result that the Communists (PZPR) failed
to predict. [32] While the original intention of semi-presidentialism in
Poland was as a power sharing arrangement between the new opposi-
tion and the elites of the old regime, in Bulgaria it carried the opposite
rationale. The semi-presidential constitution in Bulgaria intended to
skew powers toward the parliament (via the creation of a weak pres-
idency) due to the opposition’s concern that a semi-presidency may
establish a continuation of dictatorial Communist control, as it had
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done through the offices of the Chairman of the Presidium and the
Party General-Secretary. [85] The process of institutional change was
different to that in Poland because the Bulgarian Communists were
highly resistant to the making of concessions to the democratic op-
position. While the creation of a semi-presidential state in Poland
was intended by the Communists to be a form of liberal authoritar-
ianism, in Bulgaria it was the outcome of an arduous struggle with
the Communists where victory was won with the agreement at the
Roundtable talks of January 1990 to elect a Grand National Assembly
to draft a new constitution. [32, pp.333-4]
The movement towards a post-Soviet Russian semi-presidential state
was the largely influenced by General-Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
in a fashion similar to de Gaulle’s modus operandi. We can interpret
a public reasoning and a private reasoning behind Gorbachev’s mo-
tivation for a semi-presidential state. The private reasoning was that
Gorbachev viewed the creation of a semi-presidency as a position
he could occupy endowing him with more independence and power
than his role under the pre-1989 parliamentary Soviet framework.
Moreover, the executive separation of labour, of a Prime Minister
concerned with domestic, quotidian affairs and a President direct-
ing foreign and defence policy, appealed to Gorbachev’s distaste of
budgets and his passion for high politics. [115] In terms of the public
debate, the semi-presidential state was seen as a democratic, republi-
can model that the Russians could adopt without having to overhaul
completely the tradition of Soviet, assembly-style decision making
with an American-style separation of powers. The semi-presidential
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constitution contained a certain degree of adaptability with the So-
viet framework. In the Soviet parliament, the USSR Supreme Soviet,
there was a Chairman of the Council of Ministers - a role not unlike
that of Prime Minister. Additionally, the Chairman of the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet was similar to an indirectly elected presiden-
tial head of state, especially in the sense that the Chairman of the
Presidium (and its constituent members) exercised largely pseudo-
executive powers. [162] By 1977, it became quite common for journal-
ists to refer to Brezhnev as ‘President Brezhnev’ as he had managed
to consolidate under his control the two roles of General-Secretary
and Chairman. For most of the history of the USSR the true chief ex-
ecutive was the general-secretary of the Communist Party (e.g., Stalin,
Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko and Gorbachev), while
the heads of government and state performed merely administrative
or symbolic roles. [232]
The installation of a semi-presidency occurred with the passing
of Gorbachev’s 1991 constitution. The major adaptations that had to
follow Gorbachev’s 1991 constitution for the Russian Federation to
become semi-presidential was the introduction of direct elections for
the presidential head of state - accomplished in 1993 with Yeltsin’s
successful new constitution - and for the Communist Party to be de-
institutionalized as a de facto branch of governmental power - a pro-
cess consolidated with Gorbachev’s disbandment of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, following the attempted coup d’état in Au-
gust 1991, led by high-ranking government ministers and public ser-
vants in the Politburo. [197, p.14] The semi-presidency was thus also
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a vehicle for Gorbachev and Yeltsin to circumvent the party machine
and its collectivist, party-rule framework established by Brezhnev’s
1977 constitution. By implementing a directly elected presidency in
1993, Yeltsin consolidated his power through plebiscitary means.
The idea of exchangeable parts explains to some extent the dif-
fusion of the mixed model to Soviet-bloc states. However, there are
other rationales. In the more compliant republics (e.g., those in Cen-
tral Asia) the adoption of the model could be seen as a simple import
of the 1991/3 Russian constitutional model. It could also be argued
that similar regimes facing similar challenges responded with similar
solutions. The shaky confederalism of the twilight years of the USSR
also led the satellite states to think strategically about what institu-
tional selection meant for the strength of their national independence.
For example, in Ukraine, the Washington model was too alien to So-
viet traditions to be adopted. However, deputies in the Ukrainian So-
viet converged on the need for a presidential head of state as a bastion
against renewed Russian intervention in Ukrainian affairs. [234] The
innovation of the semi-presidency was thus also an instrument for as-
serting the interests of the republics (and leaders sympathetic to this
cause, such as Boris Yeltsin) over old Soviet institutions that favoured
interests partial to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or what
became of it after Gorbachev’s dissolution of this body. [92]
4.2.6.2 Paristroika and the revival of African constitutionalism
Paristroika refers to the changing aid policy of France in the early
1990s that attempted to stimulate or accelerate political liberalization
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in francophone Africa by attaching political requisites to aid. [219]
This policy trend coincided with a wave of liberalization beginning in
the early nineties in sub-Saharan Africa where semi-presidential insti-
tutions were widely adopted. The wave of political change in franco-
phone Africa, in particular, since 1989, could be described in various
instances as ‘reform’, ‘liberalization’, or ‘democratization’. However,
it appears that the manifest trend was constitutional reform, while
democratization, in a teleological sense, remained sporadic and pre-
carious. [86] Of these constitutional events, there were a number of
instances where African leaders attempted to reform the authoritar-
ian presidential state to make government more responsible, if not,
responsive, to legislative confidence. Benin pioneered the instrument
by which similar changes took place.
In 1989 the military government of Benin, responding to internal
and external pressure for liberalization, held a ‘national conference’
that attempted to mobilize civil society to exact national reconcilia-
tion and political reform via a nationally broadcast forum where dis-
sidents could work together with other sections of society in design-
ing a blueprint for future political reforms. The outcome of this forum
in Benin was the return of civilian rule and constitutional democracy
under a presidential framework. [64]
The conférence nationale model was then transferred, following Benin’s
successful trial, under slightly different guises to Congo (Brazzaville),
Niger, Mali, Togo, Madagascar and Zaire. In Zaire, the recommenda-
tions of the national conference were ignored by dictator Mobutu. In
Togo, the military elite resisted reforms urged by delegates at the na-
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tional conference. However, in Congo (Brazzaville), Mali, Madagascar
and Niger, the national conference played a decisive and transforma-
tive role in rendering these states semi-presidential democracies. [54]
By the late 1980s, these states could be characterised as one-party
states where a limited amount of political competition was tolerated
within officially prescribed channels. The weakness of civil society in
the states precluded the emergence of corporatist-like autocracies, as
had developed in Southern Europe. Instead these regimes could be
characterized as personalist, presidential dictatorships. Despite the
deficiencies in civil society, in many cases it was pressure from the
bottom-up that initiated the series of national conferences. [36, pp.65-
79] The move to semi-presidentialism in these states was an effort
to return the stricture of legislative confidence and to broaden the
tent of government following the repression of the post-independence
era. There were striking differences in the nature of these transitions,
however. The Republic of Congo (along with Angola, Benin, Guinea-
Bissau, Ethiopia and Mozambique) was a self-accredited Marxist au-
tocracy with strong ties to the USSR. The government in Brazzaville
decided to return to a multiparty state following the Central Com-
mittee of the Parti Congolais du Travail’s desire to abandon Marxist-
Leninism during its meeting in early 1990, which was certainly influ-
enced by the contemporaneous changes occurring to its main backer,
the USSR. [50]
In contrast, in Niger the instigation of a multiparty state was ush-
ered in as a response to pressure from below stemming from military
dictator, General Saïbou’s introduction of unpopular austerity mea-
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sures in the late 1980s. Niger’s transition to semi-presidentialism was
not, in contrast to inter-war Europe, the product of the politicization
of the presidentialism versus parliamentarism debate, but out of the
national conference delegates’ desire to wrest executive power from
the old regime elite by taking the reins of government and by reintro-
ducing formal constraints on executive power via the requirement of
legislative confidence on the parliamentary executive. This led to the
reintroduction of the post of prime minister in 1991, which had pre-
viously existed under the 1983 constitutional framework, but which
was abrogated by President Saïbou in 1989 in his attempt to trans-
form Niger from a military oligarchy to a plebiscitary, personalist
dictatorship. [90]
In Congo (Brazzaville) the office of prime minister had been re-
tained since independence, making the transition to semi-presidentialism
in the 1991 national conference a much more organic development -
the major, and often elusive, challenge being the consolidation of civil-
ian government and inter-ethnic harmony within the power-sharing
arrangement of the 1991 semi-presidential framework. Madagascar’s
political reform following its national conference took on a similar
form, in the sense that a dual executive had existed since indepen-
dence, but the office of prime minister traditionally took marching or-
ders from the presidency. Constitutional reform in Madagascar took
the form of a recalibration of the presidential-prime ministerial bal-
ance of powers to return a substantial share of executive author-
ity back to the parliamentary executive. Since the 1975 constitution,
Madgascar had been modelled after a collectivist, Soviet-style frame-
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work. However, the degree of single party competition did not reflect
the kind one could observe in the USSR following Brezhnev’s 1977
constitutional framework. In this regard, Madagascar was a classic
case of the caudillismo presidential state, with President Didier Rat-
siraka ruling from 1975 to 1993. [44]
4.3 how sticky are constitutions?
If constitutional design can be manipulated to maximize the size of
rents captured by political leaders and their supporters, why do we
see such low empirical rates of regime transition? Can existing the-
ory account for the magnitudes? Figure 2 gives the histogram of
regime type age for democracy as given in Cheibub’s constitutional
dataset. [48] The temporal rigidity of constitutions (if this is indeed
the case) would hint at the proposition that constitutions are exoge-
nous to short-term social, economic and political developments. It is
therefore necessary to back up for a moment in order to gauge the
age distributions of different constitutional features.
Parliamentary regimes have the highest median age of all demo-
cratic regime types (28 years) following by a large gap the presi-
dential regimes (11 years). Semi-presidential regimes are just behind
presidential regimes in median age (10 years) while the overall me-
dian for democracies is 14 years. It is certain that the United King-
dom is an outlier that is pushing up the parliamentary values, which
is why order statistics are given. The figure does not incline us to
conclude that therefore constitutional models involving presidential
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Figure 2: Age distribution of regime types
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and alloy regime types can be assumed to be exogenous in the short
and medium term. As such, the sort of enterprise that Robinson and
Torvik are engaged with, in terms of developing a dynamic model
of constitutional choice, appears to be sound in the assumption of
endogenous constitutions.
4.4 from accounts to inferences?
The historical accounts in this chapter paint two basic narratives:
a story of path dependence and one of collective choice and strat-
egy. Invoking path dependence to account for semi-presidential selec-
tion does not work as an ultimate explanation because it is bounded
on more than one dimension. The perspective of colonial influence
is weak because semi-presidentialism only gains a foothold in sub-
Saharan Africa long after, during the 1990s, and its emergence is
brought about endogenously from the conférence nationale process.
Path dependence is most persuasive in the sense of a semi-presidency
that allows for old regime bonds to live on while old parts are re-
placed, e.g., the replacement of governor-generals in Ireland and Ice-
land and the transitioning from a state run by the party chairman in
Russia. In a much more basic sense, i.e., serial correlation, path depen-
dence explains semi-presidential selection as the outcome of iterative
constitutional experiments. For example, the Third French Republic
was not so much founded as it was cobbled through the promulga-
tion of a series of laws spanning the period 1871-1940. The regime
was mixed in the sense that a presidential chief executive was elected
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by both houses of parliament who possessed considerable executive
powers, was only responsible to the legislature in acts of high trea-
son and who appointed a prime minister (President of the Council
of Ministers) and cabinet who were responsible to parliament. [105,
pp.269-283] The Third Republic features largely as a constitutional
precedent for semi-presidential innovations under the French Fifth
Republic and Portugal (specifically c.1911).
An alternative thematic account of semi-presidential selection is
that of the compromise model emerging as equilibrium in the collec-
tive choice process of constitution building. Constitutional selection
in the first generation of European semi-presidential republics (c.1919-
1929) makes sense when described in this language. The left and
right ideological divide separated regime type preferences between
presidentialism and parliamentarism. However, the collective choice
narrative can be generalized beyond this ideological dimension. For
example, while in Poland (c.1989) the semi-presidency possessed a
type of ‘place-holding’ effect to hedge the electoral uncertainties of
the old regime elites, the same place-holding effect can describe the
role of semi-presidential selection in early 1990s sub-Saharan Africa
where political rivalries were actually ethnic and federal in nature.
Related to this collective choice narrative is the strategic idea that
the decisions of the constituent assembly of a newly minted republic
are nested within diplomatic games. In the scenario where national
sovereignty is fledgling, the semi-presidency acts as a way of promot-
ing galvanized leadership in diplomatic arenas despite a preference
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for parliamentary democracy. This logic is present, for example, in the
accounts of Ukrainian, Irish and Icelandic constitutional transitions.
Each transition to a semi-presidential constitution requires some
kind of catalyst crisis. My expectation is that crisis is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for semi-presidential selection. There is
a sense in which every major constitutional event requires a crisis in
order to overcome resistance from office holders who prosper under
the status quo ante. However, there is no reason to believe a priori that
crises are correlated to the selection of specific constitutional features
(although I make this claim only in regard to crises that are exogenous
to domestic politics so that examples related to institutional stasis,
such as cabinet formation, are excluded). Based on Cheibub’s sam-
ple of semi-presidential republics, 66 percent of transitions to semi-
presidential systems were preceded by exogenous shocks, i.e., crises
that were produced externally to domestic politics such as interstate
armed conflict, decolonization or the fall of the USSR. 49 percent of
cases followed endogenous crises, such as democratic revolution, civil
conflict or regime liberalization. 14 percent of cases experienced crises
of both natures.1
1 From country-years: France (1871), Portugal (1911), Finland (1919), Germany (1919),
Austria (1929), Ireland (1937), Iceland (1944), France (1958), Congo-Leopoldville
(1960), Senegal (1960), Brazil (1961), Portugal (c.1976), Poland (1989), Romania (1990),
Bulgaria (1990), Comoros (1990), Russia (1991), Cape Verde (1991), Sao Tome and
Principe (1991), Ukraine (1991), Croatia (1991), Macedonia (1991), Slovenia (1991),
Mali (1992), Niger (1992), Congo-Brazzaville (1992), Mongolia (1992), Moldova
(1992), Madagascar (1993), Haiti (1994), Armenia (1995) and Taiwan (1996). [48, p.45]
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What is significant is not the actual role of crises but the pretreat-
ment factors behind them since most cases cluster around the collapse
of the USSR, which emphasizes the dependence of semi-presidential
selection on being under the influence of soviet political architectures
or being a state positioned such that the flood of democratic reforms
during this time was bearing down on it.
At this juncture the pertinent question is what explanations or the-
ories have some generality with regard to constitutional choice, com-
prehensive of the whole regime type spectrum. Two studies in particu-
lar are useful in addressing this question: Robinson and Torvik [183]
and Hayo and Voigt [108]. These papers are the only ones that I am
aware of that systematically study why states choose presidentialism
over parliamentarism. Robinson and Torvik’s working paper consists
of a theoretical model of constitutional choice where constitution-
makers/politicians vow preferences for institutions that maximize
their rents. Although an important undertaking in hammering out
our intuitions about constitutional-making behaviour, one problem
with Robinson and Torvik’s working paper is the omission or under-
emphasis of a consideration of the importance of cultural beliefs in
understanding the problem of constitutional endogeneity. It may well
be true that competition for rents enters into the constitution-maker’s
decision process but we must not forget that they also bring with
them a vision of what the nation and its government ought to be.
The earlier historical discussion closed rank on a certain correspon-
dence between preferences for presidentialism and the rightwing na-
tionalists attempting to adapt the royalist Catholic authority struc-
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ture to a vacant executive. It was with a contrite heart that Simón
Bolívar reflecting on the failures of early nineteenth century republi-
canism in Latin America remarked, ‘America is ungovernable. Those
who have served the revolution have ploughed the sea’. [233, p.232]
The construction of the independent state in Latin America was beset
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by the problem of
establishing a political regime that could retain a consensus among
the rival social groups sufficient to enable the requisite trust of and
obedience toward the organs of the state. For a time this was ostensi-
bly achieved during the colonial period under the Catholic Monarchy
of Castile. However, a consistent motif in the history is the difficulty
of enthroning royal heads of state propitiously and how this amounts
to a problem of supply. Not only must the monarch have his ori-
gins in an authentic line of secession to the crown he must have the
attributes necessary to effect a consensus among his subjects. This
supply, however, dried up when Napoleon Bonaparte conquered the
Iberian Peninsula unseating the Spanish monarchy. This sequence of
events not only physically removed the Spanish Catholic Monarchy,
it destroyed the reservoir of legitimacy that the monarchy could use
to offer to the Latin American states what Bagehot would call the
dignified office of constitutionalism - that is, the exaction of wilful obe-
dience.
Hayo and Voigt’s study has the character of a more exploratory
and empirically oriented investigation into regime selection. The au-
thors present regression results that point to the possibility that so-
cial and economic factors account for very little variation in consti-
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tutional models, while variables related to politics, leaders, constitu-
tional modes of selection and conflict promise some purchase on the
problem. Fitting parameters to their global dataset using fixed effects
ordered logit estimation where the presidentialism-parliamentarism
axis is measured with a discrete variable = {−3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3} they
come to the conclusion that there is a positive association between the
use of referendum and the transition to presidentialism, that previ-
ous levels of democratization are correlated to parliamentary regime
types, and, for example, that where leaders die in office or are ex-
iled there is a greater probability of the state being presidential. [108,
p.48] It is commonsensical to study the connection between constitu-
tional choices and the mode of constitution-making. In fact, this was
the subject of an earlier study by Ginsburg, Elkins and Blount who
make out a correspondence between the level of popular involvement
in the constitution-making process and the existence of democratic
and human rights related references in the constitutional document
itself. [93] The array of variables and estimates in Hayo and Voigt es-
tablish a useful benchmark with which to repeat the exercise using
Cheibub’s triune constitutional classification. Regression analysis of
constitutional adoption complements the earlier historical discussion
by offering a sense of the magnitudes at work.
Included in the regression analysis are regressors giving informa-
tion on civil conflict, inter-state conflict, changes to the global state
system, attributes of the national leader, institutional data related
to democratization and regime characteristics, data on the mode of
constitutional transition and religion. The religion variables contain
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demographic data aggregating individuals’ form of religious adher-
ence. Religion matters for two reasons. First, the historical trajectory
of national legal systems which inform constitutional law are depen-
dent on religious-cultural heritage in a way that cannot be ignored.
The first written constitutions were those of the European cities of
the high middle ages granted to them by monarchs in the form of
urban charters. However, these urban charters were part of a larger
framework of Western law developed by the Norman, Frankish and
German Kings, which part of a broader flourishing of secular law
that borrowed much from the system of Canon Law that developed
as a consequence of the Gregorian reform of the 11th and 12th cen-
turies. These were the conditions in which national legal systems in
Europe incubated. Although there was a continual struggle for power
between secular monarchs and the Catholic Church after the harmo-
nious reign of Charlemagne which came to a resting point at the con-
clusion of the Italian Resorgimento. Canon Law was in a sense a techno-
logical innovation in medieval Europe that became the motherboard
of future national legal systems. Secondly, religion is relevant to con-
stitutions for sociological reasons. The Protestant tenet of a nominal-
ist Christian Church is more congenial to an attitude of compromise
and accommodation with secular rulers. The Catholic doctrine of the
Church being a physical, manifest and historical institution has al-
ways created a basis for State-Church conflict and confronted faithful
citizens with the demand of electing the recipient of their true loyalty,
Rome or Babylon. This notion has been adumbrated by von Kuehnelt-
Leddihn in his analysis of why political institutions are so unstable in
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Catholic countries. [227, pp.179–208]. The Catholic Church’s inability
to be digested by the stomach of modern secularism like some steel
ball is not necessarily a bad thing. For opposition to the rise of the
National Socialist party in the Weimar Republic was largely from the
southern Catholic regions adjacent to Austria.
I admit the focus of this discussion is exclusively European. But
there is a general sense in which this matters. Religion gives us an
absolute ordering of the universe in which all other social and politi-
cal considerations are endogenous. The lexical ordering of our episte-
moi (before modernism became the fashion) forms a nested hierarchy:
theology gives us natural law, natural law gives us moral philoso-
phy, moral philosophy, political philosophy and political philosophy,
constitutional law. Moreover, the Europeans exported their legal sys-
tems to the rest of the world as a consequence of colonization. Le-
gal historian Harold Berman maintains that the divergent pathways
of the Protestant Reformation effected national legal systems in Eu-
rope with different tenors. In England where Calvinism impacted the
Puritan Commonwealth following the first English revolution of the
17th century, we see a consolidation of a legal system that Berman
characterizes as traditionalist. This is in contrast to the German and
French national legal systems. In Germany where Lutheranism pre-
vailed there emerged a national legal system that was more concep-
tual in nature than the English system. In France, where Deist ratio-
nalism became supreme following the French Revolution, a positivist,
codified legal system came into place. [30, pp.8-20] As such, dummy
166 constitutional selection and semi-presidentialism
variables are also examined to assess the relevance of national legal
systems as well. 2
In order to sort through important features of the large dataset I
provide two group difference of means and proportions tests along
Czech Republic (1995-2004), Slovak Republic (1995-2004), Estonia (1995-2004),
Latvia (1995-2004), Hungary (1990-2004), Lithuania (1995-2004), Mongolia (1990-
2004), Croatia (1995-2004), Slovenia (1995-2004), Macedonia (1995-2004), Poland
(1990-2004), Romania (1990-2004).
2 Details of the sample used in the regression analysis is as follows: the coverage
is global, meaning that very few states are actually absent from the sample. Of
course, the sample will vary depending on different specification choices. To convey
a sense of the samples here is a list of the case-complete observations for the spec-
ification, Semipresidential(0, 1) polity2 + homeland_territorygainwar(0, 1) +
natural_death(0, 1) + govt_crisis + catholics + fractionalization + GDP:
USA(1975-2004), UK (1975-2004), Austria (1975-2004), Belgium (1975- 2004), Den-
mark (1975-2004), France (1975-2004), Germany (1990-2004), Italy (1975-2004),
Netherlands (1975- 2004), Norway (1975-2004), Sweden (1975-2004), Switzerland
(1980-2004), Canada (1975-2004), Japan (1975-2004), Finland (1975-2004), Greece
(1975-2004), Ireland (2000-2004), Portugal (1976-2004), Spain (1977-2004), Turkey
(1975-2004), Australia (1975-2004), New Zealand (1977-2004), Argentina (1975-2004),
Bolivia (1979-2004), Brazil (1979-2004), Chile (1990-2004), Colombia (1975-2004),
Costa Rica (1975-2004), Dominican Republic (1979-2004), Ecuador (1979-2004),
El Salvador (1984-2004), Guatemala (1975-2004), Honduras (1982-2004), Mexico
(2000-2004), Nicaragua (1984-2004), Panama (1989-2004), Paraguay (1989-2004),
Peru (1980-2004), Uruguay (1985-2004), Venezuela (1975-2004), Guyana (1992-2004),
Trinidad and Tobago (1975-2004), Cyprus (1983-2004), Israel (1975-2004), Bangladesh
(1986-2004), Sri Lanka (1975-2004), India (1975-2004), Indonesia (1999), South
Korea (1988-2004), Nepal (1991-2001), Pakistan (1975-1998), Philippines (1986-2004),
Thailand (1975-2004), Burundi (1993-1995), Central African Republic (1993-2002),
Republic of Congo (1992-1996), Benin (1991-2004), Ghana (1979-2004), Guinea-Bissau
(2000-2004), Kenya (1998-2004), Madagascar (1993-2004), Malawi (1994-2004), Mali
(1992-2004), Mauritius (1976-2004), Niger (1993-2004), Nigeria (1979-2004), Senegal
(2000-2004), Sierra Leone (1996-2004), Sudan (1986-1988), Uganda (1982-1984), Fiji
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Table 8: Data used for constitutional selection model
Type N Min Max Mean Std Dev Test statistic (H0: no difference)
Democracy indicators
Polity2 continuous 3588 -10 10 7.96 2.84 t=-0.06
Durable (Polity IV) Count 3591 0 203 29.62 36.16 t=9.45****
Fragment (PIV) Ordinal 1265 0 3 0.13 0.56 t=-0.02
Civil liberties(FH) Ordinal 3434 1 7 2.21 1.17 t=-4.27****
Political rights(FH) Ordinal 3434 1 7 1.9 1.16 t=-6.13****
Competition(Van) continuous 2973 0 70 53.4 12.08 t=0.36
Participation(Van) continuous 2973 0 70.16 40.7 15.48 t=-8.95****
Political institutions
Majoritarianism Bernoulli 3496 0 1 0.38 0.49 z=7.23****
Proportional representation Bernoulli 3496 0 1 0.56 0.5 z=-4.07****
Federal Bernoulli 3501 0 1 0.25 0.44 z=1.66*
Public sector size continuous 2553 4.96 104.24 27.53 11.8 t=-10.44****
Party fractionalization(DPI) continuous 2810 0 0.98 0.64 0.17 t=-2.15**
Polarization ordinal 2507 0 2 0.77 0.91 t=-0.17
Party fractionalization(Banks) continuous 3426 0 9827 6184.6 1831.34 t=-9.52****
Coups d’etat Bernoulli 3537 0 1 0 0.06 z=0.12
Cabinet Size count 3531 0 68 18.81 7.44 t=-2.53**
Constitutional events
New constitution Bernoulli 3669 0 1 0.03 0.16 z=-2.25**
Amendment Bernoulli 3669 0 1 0.23 0.42 z=-1.73*
Reinstated Bernoulli 3669 0 1 0 0.05 z=0.4
Interim Bernoulli 3669 0 1 0 0.02 z=0.47
Economics, geography and society
GDP continuous 3648 5.7E+ 07 1.4E+ 13 3.5E+ 11 1.1E+ 12 t=4.1****
Delta GDP continuous 3650 -44.44 37.48 3.42 4.42 t=1.99**
World oil prices continuous 3985 10.64 113.56 47.64 29.94 t=-2.21**
Oil production continuous 784 0 11297 1624.62 2513.21 t=-6.22****
Latitude continuous 3981 0 0.71 0.33 0.2 t=-20.88****
Years since independence from UK continuous 1684 0 0.93 0.24 0.36 z=4.29****
British common law system Bernoulli 1684 0 1 0.32 0.47 z=4.96****
French legal system Bernoulli 1684 0 1 0.47 0.5 z=5.66****
German legal system Bernoulli 1684 0 1 0.09 0.29 z=-4.64****
Scandinavian legal system Bernoulli 1684 0 1 0.12 0.32 z=-11.87****
Catholics percentage continuous 3961 0 0.98 0.42 0.37 t=2.38**
Regional share of semi-presidentialism continuous 4623 0 0.5 0.12 0.14 t=-34.13****
Leadership
Leader change in current year Bernoulli 2840 0 1 0.26 0.44 z=4.79****
Leader age when taking office count 2840 27 86 55.19 9.55 t=0.6
Previous times in office count 2840 0 4 0.22 0.53 t=5.09****
Tenure count 2840 1 366 317.63 98.6 t=-3.37****
Female leader Bernoulli 2840 0 1 0.05 0.22 z=4.16****
Dies natural death in office Bernoulli 2840 0 1 0.04 0.2 z=1.7*
Leader installed by foreign power Bernoulli 2840 0 1 0.01 0.08 z=1.98**
Leader’s term ends in exile Bernoulli 2840 0 1 0.04 0.19 z=0.03
*=10%LOS,**=5%LOS,***=1%LOS,****=.1%LOS
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Table 9: Data used for constitutional selection model (cont’d)
Type N Min Max Mean Std Dev Test statistic (H0: no difference)
War and social conflict
Assassinations count 3615 0 26 0.22 1.15 t=3.62****
General strikes count 3615 0 7 0.19 0.63 t=2.73****
Guerrilla warfare count 3615 0 11 0.17 0.58 t=4.85****
Government crises count 3615 0 7 0.23 0.6 t=1.21
Purges count 3615 0 13 0.07 0.41 t=1.81*
Riots count 3614 0 55 0.54 2.18 t=4.11****
Revolution count 3614 0 9 0.12 0.41 t=3.85****
Anti-government demonstrations count 3614 0 60 0.59 1.96 t=2.38**
Conflict index continuous 3612 0 27625 863.21 1868.44 t=6.39****
Territory loss Bernoulli 4196 0 1 0.02 0.15 z=0.45
Territory gain Bernoulli 4196 0 1 0.02 0.15 z=1.93*
Loss of homeland territory Bernoulli 4196 0 1 0.01 0.07 z=-0.81
Gain of homeland territory Bernoulli 4196 0 1 0.01 0.1 z=0.79
Loss of homeland territory through conflict Bernoulli 4196 0 1 0 0.03 z=-0.33
Gain of homeland territory through conflict Bernoulli 4196 0 1 0 0.01 z=0.48
Loss of dependent territory Bernoulli 4196 0 1 0.01 0.11 z=0.78
Gain of dependent territory Bernoulli 4196 0 1 0.02 0.15 z=1.93*
Gain of dependent territory through conflict Bernoulli 4196 0 1 0 0.05 z=1.44
Loss of dependent territory through conflict Bernoulli 4196 0 1 0 0.03 z=-0.08
Beginning of interstate war Bernoulli 4196 0 1 0.01 0.11 z=1.78*
Initiator of war Bernoulli 4196 0 1 0 0.07 z=1.57
Vanquished in new war Bernoulli 4196 0 1 0 0.04 z=1.17
Begins involvement in militarized interstate dispute Bernoulli 4196 0 1 0.24 0.43 z= 3.24***
Initiator of new militarized interstate dispute Bernoulli 4196 0 1 0.22 0.41 z = 3.42****
Region
South America Bernoulli 4623 0 1 0.09 0.29 z=10.29****
Central America/Caribbean Bernoulli 4623 0 1 0.15 0.36 z=13.93****
Western Europe/US/Canada Bernoulli 4623 0 1 0.26 0.44 z=-7.57****
Eastern Europe Bernoulli 4623 0 1 0.1 0.31 z=-22.28****
Oceania Bernoulli 4623 0 1 0.07 0.26 z=8.96****
Africa Bernoulli 4623 0 1 0.09 0.28 z=-10.46****
Middle East and North Africa Bernoulli 4623 0 1 0.01 0.12 z=4****
Decade
1960s Bernoulli 4623 0 1 0.09 0.29 z=3.51****
1970s Bernoulli 4623 0 1 0.09 0.29 z=2.7***
1980s Bernoulli 4623 0 1 0.13 0.34 z=5.37****
1990s Bernoulli 4623 0 1 0.22 0.41 z=-2.83***
2000s Bernoulli 4623 0 1 0.25 0.43 z=-6.83****
2010s Bernoulli 4623 0 1 0.1 0.3 z=-3.14***
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with some descriptive statistics. The sample statistics in Tables 8 and 9
allow for a smaller set of candidate variables for the constitutional se-
lection model to be identified. The two groups in the sample statistics
reported in the above table correspond to democracies classified as
semi-presidential in the sample and those that are not. The test posits
a t-statistics for difference-of-means two group tests and a z-statistic
for difference-of-proportions two group tests. Clearing the 0.1 percent
level of significance in the two group tests we have the variables re-
lated to democratization (Polity IV’s variable ‘durable’, the freedom
house democracy indicators, Vanhanen’s variable for participation),
dummies for electoral system types, legal system dummies, economic
output, public sector size, Banks’ political violence variables, lead-
ership characteristics related to sex, previous times in office, tenure
and leader change, latitude, oil production, and the Correlates of War
dummy indicating the state engages in a military interstate dispute.
The empirical approach to constructing the constitutional selection
model is grounded in a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) technique.
This method suits an undertaking such as this where there is little
theoretical information to mobilize in order to construct the selection
model. BMA results are based on a Bayesian Linear Probability Model
(LPM) of the data. BMA is used because our task is to reduce a large
set of candidate variables to a best performing statistical model that
estimates the true population parameters. This is done using a data
driven approach. BMA offers a logically coherent method for data
driven model construction. The conditional model probabilities are
(1992-1999), Papua New Guinea (1977-2004), Armenia (1996-2004), Georgia (2004),
Bulgaria (1990-2004), Moldova (1996-2004), Russia (1992-2004), Ukraine (1995-2004),
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Table 10: Bayesian Model Averaging Results
PIP Post Mean Post SD
P4_DURABLE 1 -0.002 0.0002
PROPREP 1 -0.2598 0.0382
SP_REGION_SHARE 1 1.1077 0.0647
DPI_FRAC 1 -0.3124 0.0501
LATITUDE 0.9999 0.3152 0.0599
MAJORIT 0.9999 -0.195 0.0385
COW_chrstcatpct 0.9967 0.0975 0.023
FH_polright 0.9249 0.0374 0.0134
COW_MIDINTERS_STARTER 0.5231 -0.0472 0.0475
COW_MIDINTERS_BEGIN 0.4935 -0.0432 0.0461
FH_civlib 0.1236 0.0039 0.0116
WB_GDPconst2005USD 0.0435 -4E-16 2E-15
computed with an MCMC algorithm. The linear regression model is
implemented using Zellner’s g-prior. 3
The BMA results indicate that the best performing models of the
30 million regressions averaged have a design matrix of nine columns
reduced from the 12 candidate covariates. The nine regressors that
enhance statistical inference are Polity IV’s ‘durable’, proportional
representation, majoritarianism, percentage of Catholics, Military In-
3 The BMA analysis is performed using the R package ‘BMS’. One may question
whether it is more appropriate to use a logit model. However, for the purposes
of achieving a qualitative idea of which variables are important the LPM suffices.
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Figure 3: BMA Model Size
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Posterior Model Size Distribution 
 Mean: 9.1056
Model Size
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Posterior Prior
172 constitutional selection and semi-presidentialism
Figure 4: Posterior Coefficient Densities of Top Nine Covariates
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terstate Dispute (MID) initiator, the commencement of a MID, the
annual regional share of semi-presidential states, the DPI fractional-
ization index, Freedom House’s ‘political rights’ and ‘civil liberties’
indices and the standardized latitude of the nation’s political capi-
tal. The probability of a state being semi-presidential increases with
a unit increment in the variables ‘SPREGIONSHARE’, ‘LATITUDE’,
‘CATHOLICS’, ‘FHPOLRIGHTS’, and ‘FHCIVLIB’. Conversely, a neg-
ative effect sign corresponds to the variables ‘DURABLE’, ‘PROREP’,
‘DPIFRAC’, ‘MAJORIT’, the militarized interstate dispute dummies,
and GDP in levels. It should be noted, however, that the size of the
effect of ‘DURABLE’ is exceedingly small.
4.5 conclusions
This chapter offers what is believed to be the first analysis of semi-
presidential selection from a global perspective. The historical evi-
dence mounted here promotes the view that proximate explanations
can be traced in terms of a diffusion process where path dependence
is weak in terms of colonial ties but, by and large, visible in terms of
domestic constitutional history. Furthermore, semi-presidentialism as
a rational choice outcome has explanatory currency when articulated
in terms of a mediation of left-right institutional preferences in post-
Versailles Europe and as a refitting of executive posts after commu-
nism. Similarly, the semi-presidency appears to be a strategic choice
in the consolidation of national sovereignty.
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One implication of this analysis is that there are a set of risk fac-
tors underlying the propensity of a state to operate under a semi-
presidential framework. The non-random allocation of such constitu-
tional models has importance from the causality perspective. First,
statistical differences between constitutional models require an as-
sumption of unconfoundedness that appears to be violated in the
presence of variables predicting national constitutional identities. Sec-
ond, the outlining of these predictors paves the way for more accu-
rate cross-national matching. As an ostensible compromise model,
the semi-presidential constitution is an interesting group factor in
the sense of evaluating whether it is has an attenuating effect on the
debated policy-effects of presidentialism. As such, in addition to ac-
counting for semi-presidential diffusion, this paper illustrates a set of
factors that would have to be held constant if the differences in distri-
bution across constitutional lines were argued to have causal signifi-
cance. For example, national aggregates of the percentage of French
speakers would seem like a natural predictor of semi-presidentialism
but as has been shown colonial francophone ties are weak predictors
of semi-presidential institutions. Rather attention would be better in-
vested on processes related to the significant variables identified in
the BMA analysis such as religious demographics, militarized inter-
state disputes and the state’s track record of democratic practices.
However, as Shakespeare’s Hamlet warns us ‘there are more things
in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt in your philosophy’.
There is still much more room for qualitative studies of the role of
factors such as the implementation of the conférences nationaux, consti-
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tutional law descended from the French Third Republic, previously
existing Soviet-styled institutions, how bifurcated the opposition is
in constituent assemblies or an indicator of the extent to which the
achievement of sovereign independence was nationally endogenous
- the erection of semi-presidencies appears to be a common strategy
ostensibly for breakaway republics to exploit the office of the presi-
dency as a diplomatic megaphone.

Part II
R E G I M E E F F E C T S A N D C O N S E N S U S

5
I S T H E S E M I - P R E S I D E N T I A L C O N S T I T U T I O N A
H A L F - P R E S I D E N T I A L C O N S T I T U T I O N ?
5.1 constitutional models and democracy
In this chapter I explore empirical differences among regime types in
order to evaluate the case for semi-presidentialism as a compromise
model. I adopt the principal-agent typology developed in Przeworski,
et. al., [179, pp.13-77], and Cheibub [48, pp.26-48]; to whit: you are
semi-presidential if you have a cabinet that is hireable and fireable
by both the legislative assembly and an independently elected presi-
dency. 1 This problem is motivated by examining the implications of
a mixed regime type for the anti-presidentialism hypothesis. Specifi-
cally, one implication predicts that semi-presidentialism will mitigate
the bad effects of presidential constitutions in terms of political in-
stability caused by legislative deadlock. I test this prediction using
data on democratization and quality of governance indicators. In or-
der to remove selection effects inherent in observational data I use a
matching strategy to exclude correlation between the constitutional
1 Przeworski, et al.’s binary democracy classification is used when a scale variable is
not used for democratization.
179
180 is the semi-presidential constitution a half-presidential constitution?
treatment variable and pretreatment factors that give predictive infor-
mation about which cases have the constitutional model of interest.
In Borrowing Constitutional Designs Skach argues that semi-presidential
constitutions contain systematic hazards that may heighten the risk of
fledgling democracies becoming stillborn democracies. Skach posits
that this is because only semi-presidential regimes can accommodate
a divided minority government where the presidential executive and
the prime-ministerial executive head herald from different parties
that are both denied majority support. [200, pp.123-4] The hypothesis
she forwards is that semi-presidentialism therefore generates consti-
tutional hazard in the presence of a highly partitioned party system
because the latter increases the odds of divided minority government
happening.
This perspective was repeated by constitutional consultants Mau-
rice Glele and Robert Dossou in their advocacy of a presidential
framework for Benin during its democratic transition of the early
1990s. [54, p.85] Ostensibly, divided minority government in a semi-
presidential republic will produce institutional hemorrhaging as leg-
islative deadlock leads the presidency to rule by fiat through the ex-
ploitation and expansion of emergency powers and executive privi-
leges. Skach develops this argument with an analysis of semi-presidential
Weimar Germany, where she explains the role of the 1919 German
constitution in sowing the wind for the whirlwind of the National-
sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei. Skach selects the semi-presidential
French Fifth Republic as the appropriate counterfactual comparison
to Weimar Germany. Unlike Weimar Germany, the French Fifth Re-
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public had a tractable party system, and unlike Weimar Germany,
democracy became relatively consolidated in the years and decades
after the promulgation of the 1958 constitution.
The phenomenon of cohabitation, best illustrated in the case of the
French Fifth Republic, instantiates a potential source of instability in
semi-presidential states. Cohabitation is a situation unique to semi-
presidential political systems where executive power is shared be-
tween a president and prime minister from opposite political parties
without any pre-committed coalition alliance who possess separate
democratic mandates. The obvious source of trouble is a stalemate
situation where either or both parties refuse to assent to crucial gov-
ernment legislation such as budget bills. This situation is analogous
to the competition between a president and an opposition congress
in the presidential model. However, the true consequences are not
well understood when such conflict is contained inside the executive
branch according to the fashion in which this happens during a co-
habitation. Ardant and Duhamel argue that in the French case the
dynamics of cohabitation were to varying degrees influenced by the
prime minister or president’s ability to maintain party discipline in
addition to their party’s seat share in the assembly. [9] Shugart and
Carey observe that at the onset of cohabitation there are incentives
for either executive head to move quickly to dissolve the situation to
their advantage by issuing a referendum to amend the constitution to
their favour. This tendency characterizes the experiences of Portugal
and Sri Lanka where president and opposition prime minister con-
flict forced constitutional revisions. In this situation there is generally
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only one winner when the new constitution is promulgated - either
the assembly or the president. The criticality of cohabitation depends
to a large extent on how ambiguous constitutional law with respect
to presidential and prime ministerial powers and prerogatives are ex
ante. [199, pp.65-7]
In the French case there have been three episodes of cohabitation.
From 1986 to 1988 French President François Mitterand of the Parti
Socialiste (PS) cohabited with Prime Minister Jacques Chirac of the
Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) after PS defeats in the assem-
bly which followed Mitterand’s disastrous program of nationalization
of major French manufacturing industries. Again from 1993 to 1995
Mitterand cohabited with an opposition prime minister, this time
Edouard Balladur of the RPR. Following the PS’s enlistment of a new
left coalition, circumstances forced incumbent President Chirac to ap-
point socialist party leader Lionel Jospin as his prime minister in a
new cohabitation government which lasted from 1997 to 2002. [175]
During the long cohabitation of Chirac-Jospin French opinion became
increasingly alarmist about the tendency of cohabitation which was
being driven by legislative ballots occurring in the mid-stream of a
presidential term. For example, the question of whether cohabitation
was the Achilles’ heel of the semi-presidential regime of the French
Fifth Republic was explored in a pessimistically titled edited series
by Rouvillois, La Cohabitation: fin de la république?. [186] Despite such
alarmism, the tendency to cohabit appears to have been corrected by
changes to the electoral law of France which synchronized legisla-
tive and presidential elections. To a certain degree cohabitation was
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self-righting in the French case since although French constitutional
law gives the president the power to appoint governments at his own
discretion, in practice the president will only select a government
coalition that has the seat share to pass budget law. [47, p.75]
Some reservations ought to be expressed about the use of Weimar
Germany as a case study. First, it is not clear whether the right coun-
terfactual is chosen. The counterfactual case must not only be differ-
ent in party system terms but should also be without a semi-presidential
framework to be in the control group. Second, Weimar Germany may
not be an informative case study given the contribution of extraor-
dinary circumstances that preceded its downfall, such as hyperinfla-
tion, social revolution, attempted coups and world war. Given these
factors it would seem overly optimistic to expect more than a very
small influence from legislative-executive constitutional engineering
prior to the Third Reich. In Shugart and Carey’s assessment of the
Weimar Republican constitution they point to the unbalanced load-
ing of presidential powers as the source of institutional crisis. The
Weimar Constitution granted too much latitude to the President to
appoint Chancellor and governments and to pass emergency pow-
ers, dissolve Reichstag whenever it became political expedient to do
so, and to make government policy by decree. These facts coupled
with the electoral system that recruited assembly members from a
nationwide district on the basis of proportional representation led
to the system of fractured, impotent minority governments. A weak-
ened president, Shugart and Carey claim, would have given greater
incentives for coalition building. The problem with the constitutional
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design of Weimar ostensibly stemmed from the extent to which it
was a reaction to the French Third Republic’s fluid parliamentarism
that placed too much power in the legislative assembly. This led to
a situation where powers were stacked too heavily in the opposite
direction. [199, pp.68-71]
The case against semi-presidentialism is strikingly similar to the
anti-presidentialism hypothesis. Linz’s work has criticized presiden-
tial institutions on grounds that a ruling president with a minority
legislative support base will roll out undemocratic executive powers
in order to resolve policy crises amid legislative paralysis. [141] The
fact that under semi-presidentialism this occurs and this legislative
opposition is seated in cabinet meetings does not seem to make a
significant difference in light of the fact that in either case the exit
route out of legislative paralysis is through the voluntary formation
of cross-party voting coalitions. Even in presidential regimes the chief
executive will often be forced to trade portfolios for such coalitions.
Indeed, if the semi-presidential system can make it possible for the
legislative opposition to take a place at the podium of cabinet govern-
ment, it would seem that the right expectation is for this system to
make the necessary cross-party voting coalitions easier to form from
the welter of assemblies with copious parties - i.e., the legislative op-
position would have more bargaining power in this scenario. Given
these considerations the case against semi-presidentialism does not
seem strong since it has not yet been demonstrated that there is some-
thing sufficient to the semi-presidential framework that reduces the
incentives for cross-party coalition formation. For example, empiri-
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cal investigation by Cheibub found that of 1,856 coded country-years
of parliamentary democracy there were 12 cases where the execu-
tive was controlled by a single party that had a legislative minor-
ity. [48, p.77] Cheibub’s findings pull in the same direction as those
of an earlier study by Shugart and Carey who find that presidential
regimes have been actually less prone to breakdown than parliamen-
tary democracies, particularly in the developing world. [199, pp.40-1]
This fact emphasizes caution in basing conclusions on assumptions
about the formal properties of political institutions. Although the sit-
uation I have described should not happen in principle, it may be
more feasible in practice for equilibria to emerge outside of the party
system such that it is not necessary to run elections every time legisla-
tive assemblies become overly fractious. In other words, the problem
of party system appears to be, a priori, a problem for every regime
type and so for constitutional hazards to exist in the terms outlined
by Skach it is necessary to articulate how the structural incentives for
coalition formation differ between regime types.
Shugart and Carey take a very explicit position on the problem
of alloy regime types where there is a problem of dual mandates.
They posit that the worst case scenario where there is a system that
mixes a presidential head of state with a parliamentary type execu-
tive is where there is an asymmetrical balance of appointment powers
couples with a symmetrical balance of dismissal powers. This means
a constitutional configuration where the president has the power to
unilaterally appoint ministers but the assembly majority and the pres-
ident both have the power to remove cabinet ministers. The problem
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Table 11: Regime Formation (new polities entering the international system),
1950-1990
Total regime formations, 1950-1990 70
Regimes who are bureaucracies in first year of formation 51%
Regimes who are parliamentary democracies in first year of formation 27%
Regimes who are autocracies in first year of formation 19%
Regimes who are presidential democracies in first year of formation 1.5%
Regimes who are semi-presidential democracies in first year of formation 1.5%
is that this creates a disincentive for presidents to negotiate with their
opposition in the assembly over government formation and for nego-
tiation at the dismissal stage. In short, it tends toward a pattern of
short lived governments particularly in a highly fragmented assem-
bly environment. Shugart and Carey enumerate the historical exam-
ples where this dynamic played out. Not only in Weimar Germany
did asymmetric appointment-dismissal powers create havoc but also
in pre-revolutionary Cuba, Peru prior to the 1962 coup, Portugal be-
tween 1976 and 1982, and Chile prior to 1925. [199, p.121].
An old claim in the comparative politics literature is whether pres-
identialism leads to democratic breakdown. [6] This claim might also
be an old canard. Based on data from Alvarez, et al., it appears that
presidential states have tended toward breakdown only slightly more
than parliamentary democracies. The sample of semi-presidential states
is too small to invite comparison. Table 12 reveals a high degree of
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Table 12: Regime Transitions, 1950-1990
Total number of transitions 229
Transitions from autocracy to bureaucracy 28%
Transitions from bureaucracy to autocracy 28%
Transitions from autocracy to presidential democracy 9%
Transitions from presidential democracy to autocracy 8%
Transitions from parliamentary democracy to autocracy 6%
Transitions from bureaucracy to presidential democracy 5%
Transitions from autocracy to parliamentary democracy 4%
Transitions from bureaucracy to parliamentary democracy 3.5%
Transitions from presidential democracy to bureaucracy 3%
Transitions from parliamentary democracy to bureaucracy 2%
Transitions from bureaucracy to semi-presidential democracy 1%
Transitions from semi-presidential democracy to bureaucracy 0.5%
Transitions from semi-presidential democracy to autocracy 0.5%
Transitions from parliamentary democracy to semi-presidential democracy 0.5%
Transitions from semi-presidential democracy to presidential democracy 0.5%
Transitions from presidential democracy to semi-presidential democracy 0.5%
188 is the semi-presidential constitution a half-presidential constitution?
oscillation between bureaucracy and autocracy within states that is
not immediately apparent when looking at a simple frequency ta-
ble like this. A much higher subpopulation of semi-presidentialism
exists if we include the 1990s. What is missing from this table? No
states between 1950 and 1990 made any of the following transitions
directly: presidentialism to parliamentarism, parliamentarism to pres-
identialism, semi-presidentialism to parliamentarism or autocracy to
semi-presidentialism.
5.2 key facts about institutional differences in democ-
racies
In this section I look at factors that contribute to divided and minor-
ity government and see if they fit prior assumptions about democratic
consolidation and regime types. Data show that emergent democra-
cies do not on average have a higher dimensional party system than
consolidated democracies - reassuring in the sense that large fractur-
ing implies a risk of divided government. Figure 5 graphs the mean
number of effective parties (i.e., parties in possession of a percentage
of assembly seats above a nominal threshold) against the number of
successive years a country endures as a democracy. 2 There is clearly
an upward trend: as democracies become older the party system be-
comes larger.
2 Data is from Cheibub (2007). Here a dichotomous classification is used for democ-
racy.
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Figure 5: Party system size and democratic age (7,879 country years, 1946-
2002)
This trend is still extant with only young democracies (democracies
of less than 29 years) that sprouted during the Third Wave of democ-
racy. In this subgroup party system size wobbles around three effec-
tive parties. There is a slight cohort effect. Breaking young democ-
racies down into two generations (1946 to 1974 and 1975 to 2002),
regimes between 11 and 30 years had larger party systems in the first
generation. For example, the 26 to 30 year band had a party system
that was 0.7 of a point higher than their corresponding states in the
second generation. This difference is reversed in the younger bands.
At 0 to 5 years the second generation of democracies had larger effec-
tive party systems by 0.3 units. One implication of these data is that
during the critical unconsolidated phase of democratization, say, less
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than ten years since the fall of the ancien regime, impediments to con-
solidation are generally not present in the form of a nebulous array
of parties. This seems intuitive since the structure for a robust, adver-
sarial party system is likely to be absent in the undemocratic ancien
regime.
Another contributing factor to the hazard of divided government
can come from the way the electoral system turns preferences into
collective decisions about the composition of government institutions.
Proportional representation will ostensibly make majorities, both ab-
solute and relative, harder to achieve. Moving the age data into 15
bins I plot the ratio of plurality to proportional representation sys-
tems within each bin. These data represent the electoral system used
to elect deputies to the lower house. [25] 3
Figure 6 indicates a pattern where plurality electoral rules are used
most often among the youngest democracies, those aged between
zero and 10 years, and secondly by middle-aged democracies (56 to
89 years old). Although it seems clear that young democracies are
not constantly hostage to the caprices of PR, a lot of cases are miss-
ing from the classification in figure 6 because they do not run lower
house national election according to a system that is purely PR or
purely majoritarian. In fact, there are more cases of these in the DPI
dataset than there are single system regimes. As such, figure 7 plots
the results for states that use more than one electoral algorithm for
lower house ballots by taking the system used for the majority of
seats.
3 Electoral system data is from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck, et al., 2001).
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Figure 6: Electoral system composition of democracies (2,967 country-years,
1975-2006)
Figure 7: Predominant mode of recruitment used in mixed electoral systems
(3,260 country-years, 1975-2006)
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The largest users of proportional representation in this sense are
young democracies and eye-balling the linear trend suggests plu-
rality voting systems become increasingly more popular with age.
These exceptions cannot be disregarded because this represents a
larger sample than the states who only operate under one system.
Therefore, the fact implied is that instability from institutional im-
pediments to majority government are real in the sense that PR is
extensively used in young democracies. Using the same DPI data in-
formation was collected on the percentage of electoral systems used
within each regime category. The trend from this graph supports the
idea that semi-presidential systems face the peril of PR-induced leg-
islative minorities. A vast majority of semi-presidential states use a
purely proportional recruitment mechanism for deputies. Using the
mixed system sample, semi-presidential systems maintain the same
rank among democracies in terms of PR use, but the nett implemen-
tation of the system is much lower.
Taking stock of the facts so far reveals that young democracies
are not comparatively more prone to crowded party systems and
that within the large portion of states with mixed lower-house elec-
toral systems, PR is more prevalent in young democracies. Finally, a
large enough division of semi-presidential states use PR to motivate
Skach’s concern that such a system can undermine the calcification
of the party system. Taking all these risk factors together, how do
semi-presidential states look? In order to answer this question I cre-
ated a panel sample that satisfied a nominal set of risk factors: being
young (less than 30 years), having PR (in both the pure and mixed
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Figure 8: Electoral system usage within regime types (1975-2006)
Figure 9: Usage under mixed electoral formulae
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system sense used previously), and being fragmented on partisan
lines (having in excess of 2.5 effective parties). From this perspective,
these interactions seem to associate with semi-presidential states the
least. The remaining sample is, in descending order of democracies,
43 percent parliamentary, 35 percent presidential and 21 percent semi-
presidential (the remainder is made up of states that are technically
not democracies). In other words, there is no indication ex ante that
semi-presidential regime are lacking in institutional tensile strength
should they endure minority governments.
But are semi-presidential executives more at risk of lame electoral
mandates while in power? The Cheibub data from 1946 to 2002 sug-
gest no. Defined as a country-year where the party or parties in ex-
ecutive government collectively hold less than 50 percent of seats in
the lowerhouse, minority government affected parliamentary democ-
racies 18.8 percent of the time and semi-presidential regimes 13.3 per-
cent of the time. From 1971 to 2007, divided government, construed
as a situation where the president’s governing coalition holds less
lowerhouse seats than the largest opposition party, happened 24.4
percent of the time in presidential states and 19.7 percent of the time
in semi-presidential ones.
What can be learned from this section is that selected descriptive
evidence places semi-presidential democracies somewhere in the mid-
dle of parliamentary and presidential models in terms of institutional
risk factors that may provoke legislative sclerosis. In particular, the
data on divided and minority government downplays the prevalence
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of this within semi-presidential systems as compared to presidential
and parliamentary alternatives.
5.3 differences across various dimensions of governance
In this section I look directly at regimes differences in the level of
democratization in terms of the revised polity score - an integer score
of democratization over [-10,10] with positive scores indicating more
robust democratic institutions and practices. [151] Reduced form es-
timates support the working hypothesis that the semi-presidential
constitution influences a less egregious democratic deficit than the
presidential alternative. The POLS baseline shows semi-presidential
states at about one point further in distance than presidential states
from the countries that are dichotomously classified as dictatorships.
Here we may wish to relax the Order Condition (OC) to allow ar-
bitrary correlation between the error term, uit and the unobserved
time-invariant country effects, αi, such that, E[uitαi] > 0. Replac-
ing the POLS estimator for the Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition
(FEVD) estimator is convenient for this task since it allows us to es-
timate the effect of the time invariant institutional parameters of in-
terest while dropping out the unobserved country effects as a source
of dependence. FEVD estimates indicate that semi-presidential states
slightly more ahead of presidential states than the OLS results, al-
though coverage probability is wider in this model. The FEVD estima-
tor offers more credible identification than POLS because it removes
effects from unobserved and stationary country information in a way
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that does not eject information from the constitutional intercept but
does control for information from the institutional factors studied in
the previous section that may be relevant. [177] To account for the
fact that polity scores are closed between -10 and 10 I also estimated
a tobit model, which reports a more conservative gap between semi-
presidential and presidential regimes. However, the point estimates
are qualitatively congruous with those of the other models. 4
4 Countries used in the global sample for the quality of governance indicator re-
gressions are as follows: (covering 1996-2011 for most countries, including some
gaps) USA, UK, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Finland, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ar-
gentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, The Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Belize, Ja-
maica, St. Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Bahrain, Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Is-
rael, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab
Emirates, Egypt, Yemen, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, Sri
Lanka, India, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, South Korea, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives,
Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Djibouti, Algeria, An-
gola, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad,
Comoros, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Benin, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Cote
d’Ivoire, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Namibia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Burkina
Faso, Zambia, Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Arme-
nia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Albania, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Bulgaria,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, China, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Cuba, Czech
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A feature of the constitutional differences as they are classified in
Cheibub’s typology is that countries with democratic regime types
must satisfy Przeworski et al.’s binary classification of a democratic
political system. This calls into question the overall information con-
tent of the polity IV measurement of democratization used in the pre-
vious regression models. The values on the polity IV score are hence
censored from the left and there will be much overlap between pres-
idential and semi-presidential cases, which invites uncertainty over
how much accuracy can be gained from the polity score with differ-
ences as small as one point. For example, if the confidence intervals of
the polity IV variable overlap by a factor of one or more unit it is un-
true that a difference of one point can provide a useful interpretation.
Moreover, there is a sense in which analysing the difference of means
from institutional differences on democratization is too far down the
chain from the theory of how political institutions are relevant in this
setting. The hypothesis is that political institutions may affect democ-
ratization via the effects they exact on government operations - in
terms of the effectiveness of government as it functions under a con-
stitutional status quo. Citizens and leaders make decisions over time
about whether to respect the social contract with government or to
ignore it and act with the intention of establishing a new political
system. This typically translates to a movement against democracy
via the mechanisms I discussed in regard to Linz and Skach’s work
Republic, Slovak Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Lithuania, Mongolia, Croatia,
Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Poland, Romania.
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Figure 10: The distribution of democracy
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(e.g., heads of government enacting emergency powers to pass law or
military elites overthrowing the civilian government).
The degree of perceived government ineffectiveness alters this cal-
culus. As such, data is also analysed in terms of World Bank’s World-
wide Governance Indicators (WDI) that provide information about
the perceived levels of effectiveness and quality of government across
different dimensions. Furthermore, if we recall the discussion in the
introduction, short-term democratization scores are a somewhat otiose
indicator of the value of a regime type. Often the breakdown of
democracy occurs because the political system of very democratic
at a critical moment of social upheaval. Moreover, democracy is to
a certain degree contained within the classification of constitutional
regimes itself and so we run the hazard of talking ourselves into cir-
cles of tautology if we make value judgements on the basis of democ-
ratization scores alone.
The WDI variables are intended to measure the fulfilment of Bage-
hot’s dignified and efficient qualities of constitutional performance.
They also provide an adequate picture of the extent to which cit-
izens feel a Rechtsstaat is in existence in their political community.
The WDI variables put together by Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi
are aggregated and factorized from some 31 different data sources
including household surveys and datasets issued by public sector or-
ganizations. 5 I estimate constitutional performance as a difference-
of-means against three key variables from the WGI: ‘political stabil-
5 Details of the aggregation methodology can be found at info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/index.aspx.
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ity’, ‘government effectiveness’ and ‘rule of law’. Political stability
contains data on the prospect that government will be destabilized or
overthrown by illegal or violent means, which also includes terrorism.
Government effectiveness measures perceptions of the quality of gov-
ernment services. This also includes perceptions of the independence
of the public service from political pressures, the quality of policy for-
mulation and implementation and the credibility of the government’s
commitment to its policies. Rule of law measures citizens’ confidence
in the quality of contract enforcement, the justice system, property
rights, the police force and citizens’ perceptions of the prospect of
crime and violence. [122]
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Table 15: Quality of Governance
Political Stability Government effectiveness Rule of Law
POLS FGLS FEVD POLS FGLS FEVD POLS FGLS FEVD
Intercept -0.303 -3.7713 -3.2659 -4.4933 -5.7725 -2.9756 -3.4898 -5.4925 -3.3383
(0.6985) (0.9642) (0.0295) (0.6581) (1.1012) (0.0279) (0.6816) (0.9649) (0.0183)
Parliamentary 0.7168 0.2835 0.6495 0.9038 0.0663 0.9423 0.9857 0.0938 0.9910
(0.157) (0.1379) (0.0142) (0.1428) (0.0697) (0.0062) (0.1503) (0.0706) (0.0077)
Semi-presidential 0.3846 0.2086 0.4886 0.3556 0.1051 0.3087 0.3964 0.1522 0.3926
(0.166) (0.1327) (0.0178) (0.1572) (0.1065) (0.0133) (0.1745) (0.134) (0.0164)
Presidential 0.223 0.0244 0.0558 0.3104 -0.0084 0.3997 0.2743 0.141 0.287
(0.16) (0.2177) (0.0197) (0.1462) (0.1104) (0.0092) (0.1494) (0.1238) (0.0115)
Latitude 1.6215 0.9805 0.724 1.229 1.3769 1.6772 1.3247 1.4592 1.3778
(0.4433) (0.4686) (0.0201) (0.4645) (0.4833) (0.0143) (0.4524) (0.4621) (0.017)
ln(GDP) -0.0237 0.1347 0.1111 0.1583 0.2204 0.09 0.1115 0.203 0.1034
(0.0328) (0.0426) (0.0012) (0.0318) (0.0495) (0.0007) (0.0318) (0.0426) (0.0007)
N 2168 2168 2168 2163 2163 2163 2168 2168 2168
Panels 170 170 170 170 170 170
Common year effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Clustered Stand. Err. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-stat 13.42 45.2 36.52
Wald χ2 67.1 120.31 120.27
R2 0.2342 0.1389 0.9067 0.5121 0.415 0.9687 0.4563 0.3338 0.9701
Using the same design matrix from the Polity IV regressions, I es-
timate the constitutional effects on the WGI variables as intercepts
conveying the difference-of-means in relation to a non-democratic
base-group. The most accurate estimates are given by the POLS and
FEVD estimators. These results indicate that on average the parlia-
mentary regimes have the best constitutional performance, ahead of
both semi-presidential and presidential groups in relation to their
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difference in distribution from the non-democratic states. The semi-
presidential democracies occupy a middle place - just ahead of presi-
dential regimes on most point estimates. It is as if we have confirmed
the title of this chapter - the semi-presidential constitution is a half -
presidential constitution.
5.3.1 Institutional regimes as treatment effects
The estimates of regime effects in the previous regression models
came at a cost: the most plausible set-up, FEVD, has bad proper-
ties. FEVD standard errors have been shown to be too optimistic
and FEVD is an inconsistent estimator if the constitutional propor-
tions are correlated to the error term. [37] An alternative specification
based on the Hausman-Taylor estimator has little purchase there is no
basis, from intuition or previous studies, for knowing exactly which
regressors are instrumental variables and which are endogenous in
the democracy equation. In order to address these issues, I triangu-
late by re-presenting regime effects in terms of the Neyman-Rubin
potential outcomes framework. [187]
If we think of constitutional effects more generally in terms of dif-
ferences of means, it is possible that the estimate of the causal pa-
rameter will be biased due to the fact that the Bernoulli variable de-
scribing institutional differences is not randomly distributed across
the zeros and ones in a fashion that would happen in a success-
fully controlled experiment. Thought experiments based on coun-
terfactuals are informative here. The causal, or treatment, effect dif-
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fers from the observed difference of means because it reflects not
just observed differences but true outcomes under the unobserved
counterfactual scenarios. Specifically, the group factor indicating the
presence of a semi-presidential constitution (SPit = 0 for all i con-
taining presidential constitutions, and SPit = 1 for those having a
semi-presidential structure) has to reflect a within-country counter-
factual, i.e., E[Y1|SP1 = 1] − E[Y1|SP1 = 0]. The problem is that we
cannot simultaneously observe the same country in both states of SP.
This implies that the treatment effect quantity has to be estimated
from cross-national comparisons. Whether or not the cross-national
differences E[Yi|SPi = 1] − E[Yj6=i|SPj6=i = 0] are an accurate ap-
proximation of the counterfactual information depends on whether
two conditions hold: ignorability of treatment assignment (ITA) and
stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA). The key principal
in treatment effects estimation is that counterfactual outcomes are
identified when the assignment of the SP values is random. Ran-
domness in this context is conceptualized as a situation where SP
is orthogonal to the response variable. ITA states that the response
variable is mean independent of SP given the pretreatment controls,
E[Y|SP,Z] = E[Y|Z]. SUTVA is just an assumption of independence in
SP, i.e., Pr(SPi,SPj6=i) = Pr(SPi)Pr(SPj6=i). In an observational study,
ITA can be maintained by resampling so that Z is from the same dis-
tribution in both states of SP. A way to evaluate this that avoids the
high dimensional problem of sampling so that all the marginal distri-
butions of Z are identical, is to use a discrete choice model describing
Pr(SP|Z). When, through resampling, Z are independent of Pr(SP|Z)
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Rosenbaum and Rubin demonstrate that the correct choice of Z has
been implemented and the adjusted condition, strongly ignorable
treatment assignment (SITA), is maintained (‘strong’ because it im-
plies functional independence, not just mean independence). [185]
Matching estimators offer a framework for implementing this that
remove bias that conditioning on Z may introduce by exploiting the
law of iterated expectations. Iterated expectations imply that aver-
aging over local differences of matched observations removes infor-
mation from Z in the overall estimate. For the matched pairs, d,
E[E[(Yd|SPd = 1− Yd|SPd = 0)|Z]] = E[Yd|SPd = 1− Yd|SPd = 0].
Choosing the candidate Z vector presents some challenges. Many
semi-presidential states are under-developed sub-Saharan states where
reliable data is incomplete. Fortunately, this work has been already
done in the previous chapter on the origins of the semi-presidential
model. Additionally, limited data availability constrains the study to
estimation of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT): the
matched sample is matched over the support of the treatment group
only, so that emitted data are those where SP = 0. This means that
the counterfactual only encompasses what would occur if the treat-
ment regime on semi-presidential cases were flipped. In this setting
I choose a blunt force data mining strategy instead for selecting pre-
treatment controls for two reasons. First, iterated expectations means
that not much harm can be done to the estimates from including
idle variables in Z. A plenary design matrix of pretreatments is good
in principle because it makes the selection on observables assump-
tion more credible. Second, the number of potential confounders are
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simply too high to be guided by a qualitative historical perspective.
The catch of approximating a SITA condition is that the identification
strategy falls apart if one can point out observable confounders that
are not in Z (we assume treatment status is selected on observables).
On the other hand, replies to such doubts can be found in goodness-
of-fit tests because there are testable null hypotheses related to an
absence of ignorability.
The selection model used here differs from Persson and Tabellini’s
set of pretreatment controls on a similar model of presidentialism. I
made this choice because of the original historical research done on
semi-presidentialism and also because PT were criticized, rightly in
my mind, for applying Hall and Jones’ institutional variables in a
way that was too specific given their original application to political
institutions in a very general sense. [174] In their 1999 paper, Hall
and Jones are interested in accounting for unexplained cross-national
variation in labour productivity. They do this by elaborating on the
reduced form Solow model to account for differences in government
policies and political institutions. [100] As such, the propensity score
model used here is more in step with the presidential selection mod-
els presented in Hayo and Voigt’s article. [108]
5.3.1.1 Relaxing the Linear-in-Parameters (LP) Assumption
Propensity Score Matching allows us to relax the Linear-in-Parameters
identifying assumption. Treatment effects are identified without any
specific functional form, i.e., non-parametrically. This flexibility is de-
sirable insofar as we may not be entitled to assume the existence
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of constant population effects. For example, the literature suggests
that the institutional effect of semi-presidentialism may vary with as-
pects of the party system structure and the electoral laws. After suc-
cessively checking balance of treatment and control groups I came
to the following propensity score model that includes higher order
terms which were found to enhance pretreatment covariate balance:
Semipresidntial(0, 1)Durable+Durable2+PROPREP+SPREGIONSHARE+
SPREGIONSHARE2+ FRAC+ FRAC2+LATITUDE+LATITUDE2+
MAJORIT +CATHOLIC+CATHOLIC2+FHPOLRIGHT +FHPOLRIGHT2+
COWMID+ FRAC ∗ CATHOLIC. The full list of computed country
propensity scores is given in the Appendix (A.2). The sample used in
the matching estimates are not the same of those used in the previ-
ous regression estimates. In this instance the control group is simply
all non-semi-presidential democracies (no non-democratic cases are
used in the PSM estimates). Error bars of the estimates are given in
Figures 11 to 13. These treatment effect estimates are provided over
the availability of the WGI data which is roughly from 1996 to 2011.
The estimates are given year by year and also in a pooled sample.
Generally speaking, the PSM estimates fail to reject a null hypothe-
sis of zero difference between semi-presidential and non-semipresidential
democracies. It may be, however, that this is due to a lack of power
in the samples as the semi-presidential group is generally quite small.
In some years the semi-presidential group appears to perform visi-
bly worse (2000, 2004, 2009) than the control group in terms of gov-
ernment effectiveness while semi-presidential regimes are perhaps
slightly ahead of the control group on political stability in the pooled
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Figure 11: PSM Results Across Three Measurements of Governance, 90 per-
cent CIs (emboldened line=50% CI)
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Figure 12: PSM Results Across Three Measurements of Governance (cont’d)
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Figure 13: PSM Results Across Three Measurements of Governance (cont’d)
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sample. Yet, by and large, whatever semi-presidential effects can be
posited from the PSM estimates can only be tentative at best. 6 The
PSM approach outlined by Rubin allows us to correct for pretreat-
ment covariate imbalance on the basis of a univariate score. However,
modern computing has made this problem of high dimensionality no
longer insuperable with the advent of new algorithms that exploit in-
novations in search heuristics. As such, matching estimates were also
computed that use a genetic matching algorithm to correct for imbal-
ance across all the pretreatment covariates directly. These results are
by and large more accurate than the PSM estimates (results are dis-
played in section A.2). Of those genetic matching results that returned
measurable effects we see that semi-presidential regimes are ahead of
the control group in relation to political stability, while they perform
worse on the government effectiveness and rule of law indicators.
One thing that I do not do in these models is control for the level
of democracy in terms of Polity IV’s democratization variable (the
‘revised polity score’). Some may object to this omission since the
level of democracy could be correlated to state performance on the
governance indicators. If this is the case then omitting the polity
score would mean that the true institutional effects are occluded by
omitted variable bias. While this is true of the parametric regression
models, it is not true of the treatment effects models. The propen-
sity and genetic matching models provided produce their results by
controlling on pre-treatment control variables. The selection of pre-
6 All matching, propensity score based and multivariate, was done using the R pack-
age Matching.
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treatment variables in not based principally on the relevance to the
dependent variable but in terms of their power to reduce confounding
differences between the control and the treatment group. The statis-
tics computed for the constitutional selection model in chapter four
did not motivate the addition of the revised polity IV score in the
PSM or the GM models (the Bayesian Model Averaging algorithm did
not select the revised polity score). This does not mean that no data
relevant to democratization is included in the models. For example,
the selection model includes the variable ’durable’ from the Polity IV
dataset, which relates to the number of years since the last substantial
change in the polity IV variable. Also the Freedom House ‘political
rights’ indicator is used, which is treated by many different authors
as a relevant democratization indicator (for example, Tilly uses it in
Democracy).
Assuming selection on observables allows some insight into the
causal regime effect. However, post-treatment bias presents a sub-
stantial degree of uncertainty surrounding this quantity. For example,
many of the variables used to predict constitutional states could also
be correlated to political stability and democratization, which means
that even if the counterfactual approximation is accurate, the pretreat-
ment controls if excluded in the post-treatment equation will cause
omitted variable bias, but if included will make causal estimates in-
consistent. [116] One limitation of treating the data as pooled cross-
sections is that the presence of large time effects has the potential to
make inferences spurious. For example, if a state receiving the insti-
tutional change of interest has a measurably higher average than the
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state that did not we may conclude that this was caused by the new
institution after we conditioned on all the relevant cross-sectional in-
formation that could be a source of omitted variable bias. But if there
were also a larger growth rate in the response variable in the state
receiving treatment that was occurring independently to the inter-
vention then this would mean that the effect of the treatment would
not be identified. Large seasonal trends in governance and democra-
tization have occurred at a global level. For example, Huntington de-
scribes several major global waves of democratic reform in the 20th
century and research by Leeson and Dean finds evidence that na-
tional democratization can be affected by events happening outside
the domestic borders in neighbouring countries. [114, 131] Compar-
isons with before and after constitutional transitions are beset by a
scarcity of cases studies for this problem. Most cases of states adopt-
ing semi-presidential constitutions happen in the context of demo-
cratic regime change or the capture of state sovereignty. This makes
it more challenging to establish base rates for a control group and to
create an adequately large treatment subsample.
5.4 conclusion
We have seen that the semi-presidential regime category can indeed
be characterized as half-presidential in the sense that on key risk
factors and performance measures there is evidence that the semi-
presidential political system tends to be somewhere between the high
achieving parliamentary states and the more chequered presidential
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regimes in such a way that suggests alloy constitutional design exerts
an attenuating effect, which not only supports the case that semi-
presidential constitutional law is not inconsequential but that afortiori
we are not entitled to assume that presidential effects have no basis
in reality.
Using more robust non-parametric matching based estimates, we
have seen that semi-presidential performance on key qualitative as-
pects of governance pertaining to efficiency and the state of the Rechtsstaat
is independent in distribution from the parliamentary and presiden-
tial cases. The matching methodology permitted us to overcome to
some extent the problem of incommensurable cross-national com-
parisons. From here we can come no farther in terms of answering
the question from cross-national reduced form estimates. Future ef-
forts ought to be invested in coming to a deeper understanding of
the specific processes at work in coalition formation within a semi-
presidential context.

6
I S T H E R E A PA R L I A M E N TA RY P R E M I U M O N
S O V E R E I G N C R E D I T ?
Stir a cesspit, and a foul stench arises; stir a perfume, and a delightful
fragrance ascends. But the movement is identical.
- St. Augustine of Hippo.
6.1 why isn’t australia argentina?
Constitutional design has consequences for public policy by placing
limitations on what are legal political mechanisms for responding
to policy crises. In this chapter I am interested in how this happens
under presidentialism, and more specifically, how it affects macroe-
conomic policies that determine national savings. The importance of
institutions can be motivated further by thinking about the outcomes
in Argentina and Australia’s individual economic pathways. In 1870
both states were rich in natural resources and comparable to West-
ern Europe in terms of economic productivity and living standards.
Historian Edwin Williamson characterizes the early Argentinian econ-
omy thus:
From 1880, the year in which Buenos Aires was constitution-
ally recognized as the federal capital of the nation, Argentina
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embarked on an astonishing rate of growth - sustaining an an-
nual of at least 5 percent until 1914 - to become one of the rich-
est nations in the world. The territorial acquisitions of the 1870s
invigorated the economy, based as it was on cattle, sheep and, in-
creasingly, cereals. As always in Argentina, there was a pressing
need for labour, and now more so then ever - labour to work the
land, to fence in and convert the barren pampas into wheatfields,
and to lay the railway that would link up the provinces and
turn the disparate regions into an integrated, modern nation.
European immigration was therefore encouraged, and workers -
mostly from Italy and Spain - flooded into this vast, empty coun-
try. In 1870 the population was less than 2 million; in the next
fifty years approximately 3.5 million immigrants would come to
Argentina.
[233, p.277]
In addition to the economic causes of Argentina’s hapless economic
record are those related to government policies and institutions. Aus-
tralia’s parliamentary system makes the initiation of elections endoge-
nous to government’s ability to maintain legislative support. The anti-
presidentialism hypothesis posits that this mechanism washes out po-
litical blockages over policy reform. So holding differences in policies
constant, this view posits that in Argentina presidentialism’s fixed
election cycles raised the incentives for illegal political actions that
would lead to institutional instability while Australian parliamen-
tarism has always had a natural release valve for such disputes, re-
moving these incentives. Therefore, we must cede the possibility of
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a set of institutional causes of divergent development pathways, in
the sense of the concrete mechanisms of the political system, which
are distinct from what may be called the deep institutions that play a
role - for example, the practice in Latin America of caudillismo, which
spans back to the Reconquista of the Iberian Peninsula (eight centuries
of warfare is difficult to get out of your system); where military of-
fice and landed aristocracy went hand-in-hand with systems of local
patronage and protection rackets, and the large social inequalities in
Latin America - the result of the asymmetric division of land during
colonization into vast haciendas, creating an aristocratic class of land-
holders and poor peasants, and in addition the emulsion of cultural
groups in Latin American society - creole European, native Ameri-
can, and African slave - into an integrated society where confronta-
tions were frequent and racial differences aligned with differences in
economic class.
There is as it were a temptation to associate fiscal drama with
the presidential governance of the Americas. In the USA the Clin-
ton and Obama administrations both witnessed confrontations with
Congress over the passing of supply that eventually led to the brief
closure of government services. More grave instances of fiscal crises
occurred in several of the Latin American republics in the early 1980s
where governments defaulted on the interests payments to their for-
eign creditors. The experience of Brazil, Argentina and Mexico was
archetypal of the default crises in Latin America. The common cul-
prit in the cessation of interest payments in these states was the
choice to correct structural imbalances in their economies by em-
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barking on ambitious transformations from agricultural intensive pro-
duction to modern manufacturing while substituting imports of for-
eign goods through tariffs and the engineering of artificially high ex-
change rates. The reduction to foreign earnings caused by these poli-
cies created downward shocks to government revenues, which were a
leaven to government deficits. These deficits were exacerbated by the
volatility of agricultural export markets from where much of these
economies’ earnings flowed. The pursuit of these policies of import-
substitution industrialization required a large investment of foreign
capital. Latin American governments accessed this capital via loans
from foreign creditors which were borrowed at floating interest rates.
The decision not to borrow at fixed rates was unfortunate. When
OPEC elected to drastically increase oil prices in 1973 and then in
1979 the United States responded by increasing interest rates, which
led to a high growth in the interest rates of the Latin American gov-
ernments’ loans; ultimately precipitating in the choice to cease debt
repayments by Mexico in August 1982. A domino effect followed, af-
fecting most Latin American governments, each, in turn, defaulting
on their scheduled debt repayments, l’un et l’autre. [233, p.334, p.365]
These episodes raise the question of whether presidentialism truly
is a propitious system of government for fiscal management. Correc-
tions to unwise or hapless public financing decisions involve a con-
frontation between the interests of labour and capital - and frequently
carries the prospect of disestablishing extant patronage agreements
with agricultural producers. These challenges underline the exigency
of coalition building.
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The salient fact at the level of global government spending trends is
that there has been a steady increase in the interest payment burdens
of government budgets since the 1980s among the major industrial
powers. Since about 1960 globalization led to accessible capital mar-
kets for all national governments. 1960 is also a punctuation point in
the rate of government spending among industrial powers. The pe-
riod between 1960 and 1980 can be viewed as an Age d’Or of Keyne-
sianism, where the growth of government spending increased in ve-
locity from the post-WWII rate of growth. However, as governments
took on ever greater debt liabilities to finance their expanding pub-
lic programs anxieties about their capacity to repay them became
reflected in real interest rates. The average rate of real interest on
public debt of OECD nations grew from 0.8 in the period 1968-73 to
4.4 in the period 1980-90. At the same time gross public debt among
the OECD nations has increased from an average of 42.9 percentage
points of GDP in 19700 to 71 points in 1997. [212, p.64,85] The tim-
ing is without doubt reflective of the Latin American debt crisis of
the early 1980s. A corresponding development has been the stabilisa-
tion of public spending rates among the G-7 nations. The increased
rate of growth in public spending since 1960 has not witnessed a
proportional improvement in the incomes of the lower two fifths of
the income distribution or improvements in educational and health
indicators. [212, pp.108-114] Cuadra and Sapriza investigate the de-
pendence of sovereign default premia and bond yields on political
conflict and leader turnover. [59] Likewise, Moser examines how cab-
inet changes affect bond yields in Latin American states. [165] Both
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studies find evidence to support the notion that the solvency of public
finances is adversely affected by political instability.
6.1.1 How the presidential system shapes government formation, coalitions
and incentives
In this chapter a system counts as presidential if cabinet government
is responsible to a nationally elected president and not to the leg-
islative branch. Where cabinet government is responsible to the leg-
islature exclusively the system is classified as parliamentary (where
government is accountable to both it is semi-presidential). The work-
ing hypothesis in this chapter is that there is a parliamentary pre-
mium on national credit, and this is driven by the temporal inef-
ficiencies that the presidential system generates in the passing of
legislation to resolve macroeconomic crises. There are two mecha-
nisms of action through which this could occur. First, presidential
systems are more likely to sustain bad debt policies than parliamen-
tary ones because only under a presidential framework can a partic-
ular type of executive-legislative cohabitation occur where a minor-
ity single party government controls the executive at the same time
that an opposition majority controls the legislature. Although theoret-
ically persuasive, this does not realistically characterize the essential
difference between presidential and parliamentary systems because
the same scenario has occurred in parliamentary systems where it
was presumably easier to simply bargain with the legislative opposi-
tion(s) for votes instead of going to the polls. Cheibub identifies 53
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country-years where this type of minority government has happened
in presidential democracies and 12 where it happened in parliamen-
tary democracies [48, pp.77-8].
A second channel through which presidentialism can affect dead-
lock is through coalition formation. Even if the party of the president
is not a legislative majority, deadlock can be overcome between elec-
tions by forming voting coalitions. If coalition formation is more diffi-
cult under presidentialism then this characteristic of presidentialism
will produce roughly the same legislative consequences of minority
government with an opposition legislative majority. Cheibub’s data
supports the conclusion that coalition formation is common in presi-
dential systems and that presidents often trade portfolios to opposi-
tion parties for votes. However, at the mean, coalition government is
still more prevalent in parliamentary democracies and this inequality
is indicative of the differences in incentives created by the separation
of powers [48, p.61].
Shugart and Carey identify the symptoms of inefficient presiden-
tialism to be a situation where the president has resort to extensive
legislative powers and there is an electoral system that precludes the
emergence of a two party system with strong central party control.
The four historically resilient world presidential powers, the United
States, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Dominican Republic, all work ac-
cording to a system of a president with restricted legislative pow-
ers. This enables compromise and negotiation between president and
congress as opposed to mutual defection. Conditions for the emer-
gence of a two party electoral system, namely, closed party lists and
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plurality electoral formulas for assembly elections, ensure that the
system is electorally efficient, i.e., that voters can truly judge the per-
formance of government at the ballot box by voting for or against
the government. In Chile for some time between the 1930s and 1950s,
the presidential framework was surprisingly buoyant under a numer-
ous party system. However, this was because of the localistic nature
congressional elections in Chile at this time pace Shugart and Carey.
Where there is strong party control and congressional elections are
ideological in nature, these large party systems gain no traction in
presidential democracies.[199, p.183] The problem with presidential-
ism under institutional constellations that favour distributed respon-
sibility through broad representation or consensus is that there is less
a sense of responsibility when parties defect from coalition negotia-
tions.
The principle guiding this chapter is that debt crises are not just
the result of short-sighted policy choices by governments but also
of missed opportunities. Runaway growth in national debt can be
caused by rare macroeconomic disasters. In such events governments
have a limited window of opportunity to make policy changes be-
fore national debt exceeds a point of criticality. The difficulty of coali-
tion formation in presidential systems then implies that under pres-
identialism there is a higher potential for debt to pass this tipping
point before the correct legislative instruments are put in place. Cross-
national differences are large with regard to what is a debt-to-GDP
ratio that exceeds a nation’s carrying capacity. A study by Rheinhart,
et al., emphasizes the relevance of historical events and institutions,
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but also suggests that the debt-to-GDP ratio where new sources of ex-
ternal borrowing dry up could be as little as 15 percent for particular
cases. [181, p.1]
6.1.2 Linear analysis based on the inter-temporal budget constraint
To this end I attempt to identify in this section presidential differences
in tail risk of debt differentials, discount factors based on a conven-
tional inter-temporal government budget constraint and in waiting
times before consolidation of primary balances.
How we tell when public debt is at a point of criticality is not with-
out controversy. In this part I describe and implement measures used
in academic public finance, financial institutions and transnational
public finance organizations for gauging debt sustainability. Gener-
ally speaking, the axiomization of sustainability begins by defining a
No-Ponzi Scheme (NPS) criterion, which states that in the long-run
debt cannot grow faster than the interest rate compounding it. For
nominal interest rates, i, and nominal GDP growth, γ,
lim
N→∞(1+ i− γ1+ γ)NDN = 0 (3)
In other words, debt must in the long-run multiply out to zero against
growth adjusted interest rates. The intuition here is that if this were
not the case it would be possible to just continually borrow oneself
out of debt with more debt. [33] The practical problem with the NPS
criterion is that stating it formally requires an asymptotic expres-
sion. With a long enough time horizon, it is theoretically possible to
226 is there a parliamentary premium on sovereign credit?
counter-balance even the most glutinous fiscal spending with future
frugality. However, this problem is characterized by data and political
processes that exist only in the medium and short term. As such, it
is more convenient to use short and medium term measures of debt
sustainability. From here it is convenient to define a budget constraint
that posits government expenditure, Gt, and current debts from pri-
vate sources plus accrued interest, itDt−1, have to be paid for by the
troika of tax revenues, Tt, growth in borrowing from private sources,
Dt −Dt−1, and growth in money, Mt −Mt−1:
Gt + itDt−1 = Tt + (Dt −Dt−1) + (Mt −Mt−1) (4)
This equations implies growth rates that are informative for short to
medium term debt paths. [76]
Since potential tax revenues and borrowing leverage depend on
economic output, debt accumulation can be viewed as short-term
risky when real interest rates are growing faster than real GDP. When
this is the case, without a large enough budget surplus to counterbal-
ance this inequality, debt will continue to grow larger (forgetting at
this stage the option of monetizing debt). With this in mind, it is pos-
sible to describe empirical differences in debt sustainability in terms
of a discount factor, φ = 1+r1+g , where r is the real interest rate and g
is real GDP growth. φ is greater than one when interest rates outpace
economic growth. And less than unity vice versa. This allows cur-
rent debt to be expressed in terms of a linear difference equation that
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states the necessity for changes in government outlays or seignorage
to occur depending on the value of the discount factor:
Dt = φtDt−1 + (Tt −Gt) − St (5)
The seignorage variable, St, states the impact of changes to the money
supply in real terms by dividing by real GDP, Y, adjusted for prices,
St =
∆Mt
PtYt
. [56] In order to make national accounts comparable, fi-
nancial data are made scale invariant by stating them in terms of
ratios to GDP. Where possible, externally held sovereign debt is pre-
ferred because it netts out the less consequential debt that countries
owe to themselves. For example, the domestic debt bought by central
banks through seignorage. Generally speaking, national debt aggre-
gates are gross aggregates because they do not factor in all financial
assets owned by central governments, which are not easily available
or comparable cross-sectionally.
The fact that government bonds are traded extensively in secondary
markets means that the cost of borrowing reflects expectations about
a government’s ability to respect its contractual obligations to its cred-
itornewpages. Summarizing the real interest rate as a single aggre-
gate that can be used in cross-national comparisons is problematic
because debt instruments are heterogeneous and mature according to
different schedules. One method for honing-in on real interest rates
is to compare treasury bond yields against those of a baseline na-
tional authority that is regarded as a lender of good repute. I use an
implementation of this from the World Bank Global Economic Monitor
database (10 year US treasury bills are the baseline) and J.P. Morgan’s
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Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) in order to make empirical es-
timates of the key growth-series (coverage in this case is only for
emerging market states, e.g., Latin America and Eastern Europe).
The fatter tails on the presidential density estimates in Figure 14
suggest a greater frequency of extreme ‘in the red’ discount factors,
i.e., a greater propensity for interest rates to outpace growth. How-
ever, the interpretation of these results depends on other factors since
the value of φ can be compensated for with strategic surplus sizes. 1
Of course, other factors will determine whether a discount factor
in the red is indicative of circumstances that can potentially vitiate
a government’s capacity to pay for its programs. A more direct way
to evaluate institutional effects is to analyse waiting times before an
overtaking of the interest rate differential is answered with an attain-
ment of the right target primary balance. First differencing the debt
level from the discount factor model gives:
Dt −Dt−1 =
rt − gt
1+ gt
Dt−1 + (Tt −Gt) (6)
If our goal is to bring the debt differential down to zero, Dt−Dt−1 =
0, then the required surplus is (Tt −Gt)∗ = gt−rt1+gt Dt−1. So any sur-
1 This paper disregards the effect of seigniorage, st = ∆MPtYt , because of the difficulties
of making extensive cross-national comparisons given the available data. Ostensibly,
central banks can monetize external public debt by purchasing it through newly
printed money. This suggests that nations with effective monetary institutions will
have more policy options when discount rates are high and primary balances are
insufficient. However, the seigniorage tax argument posits that this mechanism will
act as an interest free mechanism for accessing credit that ultimately taxes citizens by
devaluing the currency and hence individual savings. For more see: Contessi (2012,
pp.219-20)
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Figure 14: Observed upper tail events in discount factors (emerging market
states)
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plus at least as big as B∗ = (Tt −Gt)∗ will do this. One important
fact contained in the emerging markets sample is that 40 percent of
the time presidential states were running what I describe tentatively
as ‘bad budgets’ on the basis that discount factors were larger than
one while simultaneously primary balances were below the surpluses
necessary to halt debt growth. However, we see a five percent higher
occurrence of bad budgets in these terms in non-presidential emerg-
ing market countries. One qualification that should be made is that
presidential states are over-represented in this sample, which is based
largely in Latin America. Among parliamentary states in the sample,
the proportion of bad budgets is about the same as that for the presi-
dential states (40.6 percent).
Figure 15 models the probability that primary balances will come
in under the target balance B∗ (by rescaling the data I made it so that
values greater than the threshold B∗ indicate surpluses less than the
target surplus). 2 The probability that a given balance will fall under
the target for sustainable debt growth is computed using a Pareto
probability density function,
Pr(B˜c > B˙c) =
αcB˙c
αc
B˜it
αc+1
(7)
2 The new budget balance-to-GDP variable, ˜Bit = −Bit − a, where a is an arbi-
trary constant to keep the logarithms and exponentiated figures rational: a =
minima(Bit) + abs|n|, where n ∼ N(0,σ2); n is a single random normal deviate
so the lowest sample value is not equal to zero. The threshold value B∗ is scaled in
exactly the same way: B˙c =
(
(N−Kc)
−1
∑N−Kc
i=1 B
∗
c
)
− a.
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Figure 15: Paretian excess models for the probability that primary balances
fall under B∗
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The subscript, c(0, 1), indicates whether values are aggregated over
states with presidential constitutions (c = 1) or not. 3
The take-home message from the Pareto models is that among
emerging market states, presidential systems have historically a greater
propensity to miss their target deficit or surplus. This is indicated by
the fact that the threshold value for the presidential subsample is 1.6
units lower than the non-presidential systems. That said, there ap-
pears to be more extreme outliers in the non-presidential group. The
goodness-of-fit implied by the QQ-plot is very poor, which suggests
underlying population differences in how well states with different
constitutions close-in on their target surpluses.
I speculated earlier that the presidential effect would be expressed
in terms of response times before fiscal policies are adjusted due to
the constraints on inter-party coalition formation that presidential
constitutions create. In order to provide evidence for this I provide
here some linear analysis of projected primary balances against sus-
tainable balances informed by the intertemporal budget constraint.
Given a function, f(t), that describes linear growth in budget balances
over time for an initial balance value:
f(t) = B0 + (∆B)t, (9)
3 Maximum likelihood estimates of αc were obtained analytically,
αˆc =
N∑N
i=1 ln
(
´Bit
B˙c
) (8)
Due to small sample sizes simulated data (N=10,000) were used in the histograms.
These were created by plugging uniform random deviates into the Pareto quantile
function fitted with the empirical ML estimates.
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and the function, f(r,g,Dt−1), that maps the strategic balance, B∗,
f(r,g,Dt−1) =
gt − rt
1+ gt
Dt−1 = B
∗. (10)
Then at fixed values of B0, r,g,Dt−1, there exists a value, t∗, such
that f(t) = f(r,g,Dt−1), as long as, B0 < B∗ given ∆B > 0 or B0 >
B∗ given ∆B < 0. Where B0 > B∗ given ∆B > 0, t∗ does not exist
because projected balances will always be above the strategic surplus,
while for B0 < B∗ given ∆B < 0, t∗ does not exist because projected
balances will always fly under the minimum strategic surplus for a
zero debt growth differential. Provided the above conditions holds
then, t∗ can be computed as:
t∗ =
B∗
∆B
−B0 (11)
The results are graphed on to Figure 16. Average time projections
appear to be higher under the presidential sub-sample.
The median value from simulated data based on a Weibull fit is
0.11 points higher in presidential regimes. Presidential states appear
to be described by a more right-shifted distribution underlined by the
differences in the QQ-plot and the numerical estimates of the shape
parameter, which is larger in the presidential group. 4
4 Weibull estimates for the shape parameter, α, and the scale parameter, λ, were
obtained numerically by using the Nelder-Mead algorithm to minimize the
negative log-likehood function, logL(xi|α, λ) = nαlog(λ) − nlog(Γ(α)) + (α −
1)
∑n
i=1 log(xi) − λ
∑n
i=1 xi.
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Figure 16: Projected waiting times before primary balances converge to B∗
at current levels
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6.2 estimates of constitutional effects on fiscal pol-
icy
The inter-temporal budget constraint equation translated to a statisti-
cal setting gives national debt in country i and year t as a first order
autoregressive (AR-1) model with interaction terms for institutional
effects of a series of k constitutional factors, {I1, I2, ..., Ik}, and controls
matrix, X:
dit = αdit−1 +βbit + γI
k
it + δ(bit ∗ Ikit) + η(Ikit ∗ Ij6=kit)
+ζ(Ikit ∗ Ij6=kit ∗ bit) + θTXit + uit
(12)
6.2.1 POLS estimates under Strict Exogeneity (SE) and Serial Indepen-
dence (SI)
The POLS baseline models are given in Tables 16 to 18. In the absence
of serially correlated errors and endogeneity these figures should be
adequate to convey the magnitude of the constitutional effect on fiscal
management. 5
5 The baseline global sample of countries which are case-complete in Model 2 is as
follows: United States 1970-2011, United Kingdom 1970-2011, Austria 1970-2011, Bel-
gium 1970-2011, Denmark 1980-2011, France 1991-2011, Germany 1975-2011, Italy
1980-2011, Luxembourg 1975-2011, Netherlands 1980-2011, Norway 1972-2011, Swe-
den 1970-2011, Switzerland 1986-2008, Canada 1974-2011, Japan 1975-2011, Fin-
land 1990-2011, Greece 1985-2011, Iceland 1972-2011, Ireland 2001-2011, Malta 1980-
2011, Portugal 1980-2011, Spain 1970-2011, Turkey 1987-2011, Australia 1978-2011,
New Zealand 1978-2011, South Africa 2000-2005, Argentina 1990-2004, Bolivia 1993-
2005, Brazil 1991-2011, Chile 1982-2005, Colombia 1990-2011, Costa Rica 1970-1997,
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The POLS estimates are generally consistent with intuition. Budget
surpluses reduce the share of public debt. Economic growth does so
as well. However, this effect is not robust across all specifications and
In addition, a sample of OECD member countries prior to 1993 is used, which is
as follows: USA (1970-2011), United Kingdom (1970-2011), Austria (1970-2011), Bel-
gium (1970-2011), Denmark (1980-2011), France (1991-2011), West Germany/FDR
(1975-2011), Italy (1980-2011), Luxembourg (1975-2011), Netherlands (1980-2011),
Norway (1972-2011), Sweden (1970-2011), Switzerland (1986-2008), Canada (1974-
2011), Japan (1975-2011), Finland (1990-2011), Greece (1985-2011), Iceland (1972-
2011), Ireland (2001-2011), Portugal (1980-2011),Spain (1970-2011), Turkey (1987-
2011), Australia (1978-2011), New Zealand (1978-2011).
Ecuador 1990-1997, El Salvador 1970-2011, Guatemala 1990-2011, Honduras 1970-
2005, Mexico 1971-2000, Nicaragua 1990-2005, Panama 1990-2001, Paraguay 1990-
2005, Peru 1990-2011, Uruguay 1990-2011, Venezuela 1970-2005, The Bahamas 1973-
2008, Barbados 1977-2010, Grenada 1999-2005, Belize 1990-1996, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines 1986-2005, Trinidad and Tobago 1993-2007, Bahrain 1990-2007, Cyprus
1976-2011, Israel 2000-2005, Jordan 1990-2012, Lebanon 2000-2005, Oman 1990-2010,
United Arab Emirates 1997-1999, Egypt 1991-2007, Bangladesh 2001-2003, Bhutan
1990-2009, Sri Lanka 1973-2007, Hong Kong 2002-2011, India 1974-2011, Indone-
sia 1991-2011, South Korea 1990-2005, Malaysia 1990-2010, Nepal 1975-2010, Pak-
istan 1990-2005, Philippines 1970-2012, Singapore 1990-2011, Thailand 1980-2011,
Botswana 1990-1996, Cape Verde 2005, Republic of Congo 1999, Democratic Re-
public of Congo 1990-1997, Benin 2001-2003, Ethiopia 1990-2005, The Gambia 1973-
1993, Ghana 2001-2005, Guinea 1998, 1999, Kenya 1997-2005, Lesotho 1990-2005,
Madagascar 2000, 2001, Mauritius 1977-2011, Morocco 2002-2011, Nigeria 2004-2008,
Zimbabwe 1990-1997, Rwanda 1990-1992, Seychelles 1993-2012, Senegal 1999-2001,
Sierra Leone 1999-2005, Namibia 1991-2005, Sudan 1998, 1999, Swaziland 1999-2003,
Tunisia 1990-2011, Uganda 1999-2011, Zambia 1998, Fiji 1970-1997, Vanuatu 1990-
1999, Papua New Guinea 1975-2002, Azerbaijan 2008-2010, Belarus 1992-2011, Alba-
nia 1995-2004, Georgia 1997-2012, Kazakhstan 1997-2011, Kyrgyzstan 1995-2001, Bul-
garia 2009-2011, Moldova 1997-2011, Russia 2002-2011, Tajikistan 1998-2004, China
2002-2004, Ukraine 1999-2011, Czech Republic 1993-2011, Slovakia 2003-2011, Esto-
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Table 16: Baseline POLS Estimates
Model 1-POLS Model 2-POLS Model 3-POLS Model 4-POLS
Sample Global Global OECD OECD Global Global OECD OECD Global Global Global Global OECD OECD
Intercept 87.58 44.02 -2.92 -19.63 85.33 42.99 -18.15 -34.57 75.7 37.34 57.84 20.68 48.41 -5.21
(9.25) (13.48) (18.68) (20.18) (9.24) (13.48) (19.92) (21.08) (9.23) (13.43) (10.26) (14.7) (23.55) (24.59)
Surplus -1.68 -2.2 -2.35 -3.42 -1.61 -2.14 -2.11 -3.18 -1.58 -2.05 -1.64 -2.15 -2.04 -3.02
(0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (0.24) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.24) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.23)
Growth -0.79 -1.08 -0.04 -0.29 -0.77 -1.07 -0.17 -0.53 -0.73 -1.01 -0.72 -1 -0.12 -0.45
(0.2) (0.2) (0.39) (0.46) (0.2) (0.2) (0.39) (0.45) (0.19) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.37) (0.43)
ln(GDP) -1.51 -0.94 -0.71 -0.17 -1.66 -1.02 0.14 0.72 -1.35 -0.86 -0.67 -0.05 -2.73 -0.53
(0.38) (0.37) (0.67) (0.62) (0.39) (0.37) (0.74) (0.68) (0.38) (0.37) (0.44) (0.43) (0.92) (0.87)
Agriculture Exports -0.43 0.14 -0.01 0.62 -0.41 -0.13 -0.11 0.5 -0.47 -0.14 -0.31 -0.05 -0.76 0.18
(0.13) (0.13) (0.22) (0.21) (0.13) (0.13) (0.22) (0.21) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.24) (0.24)
Fuel Exports -0.24 -0.24 -0.08 0.08 -0.24 -0.24 -0.17 0 -0.24 -0.28 -0.21 -0.21 -0.24 -0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08)
Oil Price -0.1 0.21 -0.07 0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.08 0.17 -0.1 0.21 -0.11 0.17 -0.06 0.19
(0.03) (0.2) (0.03) (0.1) (0.03) (0.2) (0.03) (0.1) (0.03) (0.2) (0.03) (0.2) (0.03) (0.1)
Population share over 64 0.67 0.33 5.05 3.81 1.02 0.52 4.8 3.56 1.16 0.65 1.17 0.59 5.51 4.03
(0.18) (0.18) (0.34) (0.34) (0.21) (0.2) (0.35) (0.34) (0.21) (0.2) (0.23) (0.22) (0.35) (0.34)
Non-democracy(0,1) 8.74 10.21 -17.47 1.03 12.57 12.11 -20.6 -2.36 8.71 10.64 11.55 10.58 -19.74 1.51
(1.92) (1.85) (9.27) (9.07) (2.22) (2.14) (9.14) (8.95) (2.28) (2.21) (2.27) (2.2) (16.04) (15.41)
Presidential(0,1) 5.39 2.41 -21.68 -19.83 5.33 3.05 7.44 4 -14.67 -11.56
(2.33) (2.24) (4.12) (3.82) (2.59) (2.49) (2.37) (2.29) (4.05) (3.75)
Pres*Surplus -0.84 -0.53 -3.48 -2.78 -1.02 -0.73 -1.03 -0.7 -2.97 -2.1
(0.48) (0.46) (1.21) (1.13) (0.48) (0.46) (0.47) (0.45) (1.15) (1.07)
OPEC(0,1) 2.31 17.36
(6.55) (6.4)
Africa(0,1) 20.55 12.06
(2.83) (2.8)
South America(0,1) 0.27 -4.49
(3.04) (2.94)
Federal(0,1) -6.9 -6.69 -10.61 -13.79
(1.85) (1.78) (1.96) (1.84)
Majoritarian(0,1) 5.28 3.63 18.33 12.73
(1.59) (1.53) (2.5) (2.35)
N 2079 2079 743 743 2079 2079 743 743 2079 2079 2039 2039 738 738
F-stat 33.27 11.25 51.99 13.83 28.34 10.91 45.82 14.3 26.46 11.01 23.88 10.16 47.38 16.62
R2 0.11 0.21 0.36 0.49 0.12 0.21 0.38 0.51 0.14 0.23 0.12 0.21 0.44 0.56
Common year effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 17: Baseline POLS Estimates (cont’d)
Model 5-POLS Model 6-POLS Model 7-POLS Model 8-POLS
Sample Global Global OECD OECD Global Global OECD OECD Global Global OECD OECD Global Global OECD OECD
Intercept 63.6 46.19 61.99 30.95 78.33 77.26 16.67 34.21 98.61 55.47 -51.37 -47.74 101.7 59.32 -35.58 -37.74
(10.62) (14.08) (24.94) (24.19) (16.74) (18.49) (40.69) (46.38) (9.08) (13.34) (21.37) (21.73) (9.11) (13.31) (31.04) (29.99)
Surplus -1.64 -2.14 -2.06 -3.09 -1.78 -1.84 -3.35 -3.68 -1.73 -2.21 -2.2 -3.25 -0.69 -1.05 0.18 -3.8
(0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.23) (0.27) (0.27) (0.34) (0.4) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (0.24) (0.3) (0.29) (15.98) (15.88)
Growth -0.72 -1.07 0.05 -0.41 -0.91 -1.28 0.56 -0.61 -0.77 -1.07 -0.17 -0.47 -0.77 -1.08 -0.17 -0.53
(0.2) (0.21) (0.38) (0.45) (0.28) (0.31) (0.55) (0.81) (0.2) (0.2) (0.39) (0.45) (0.2) (0.2) (0.39) (0.45)
ln(GDP) -0.86 -0.34 -3.33 -1.02 -0.69 -0.68 -1.54 -1.93 -1.7 -1.05 0.63 1.11 -1.76 -1.14 0.14 0.72
(0.46) (0.45) (0.98) (0.93) (0.69) (0.69) (1.58) (1.61) (0.39) (0.37) (0.72) (0.67) (0.39) (0.37) (0.74) (0.69)
Agriculture Exports -0.29 -0.09 -0.47 0.43 -0.29 -0.31 0.29 0.4 -0.42 -0.14 -0.05 0.56 -0.37 -0.09 -0.11 0.5
(0.13) (0.13) (0.26) (0.26) (0.18) (0.18) (0.58) (0.6) (0.13) (0.13) (0.22) (0.21) (0.13) (0.13) (0.22) (0.21)
Fuel Exports -0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.04 -0.29 -0.28 0.29 0.37 -0.24 -0.24 -0.15 0.01 -0.23 -0.22 -0.17 0
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.13) (0.14) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08)
Oil Price -0.15 -0.02 -0.1 -0.06 -0.08 -0.02 -0.08 -0.09 -0.1 0.2 -0.07 0.19 -0.1 0.22 -0.08 0.17
(0.03) (0.22) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.19) (0.03) (0.2) (0.03) (0.1) (0.03) (0.2) (0.03) (0.1)
Population share over 64 1.38 0.84 5.92 4.43 0.36 0.39 5.58 5.4 1.04 0.52 4.72 3.49 1.05 0.53 4.8 3.56
(0.23) (0.23) (0.36) (0.36) (0.32) (0.32) (0.58) (0.6) (0.21) (0.2) (0.35) (0.34) (0.21) (0.2) (0.35) (0.34)
Non-democracy(0,1) 14.5 13.38 -20.16 0.38 11.7 11.81
(2.36) (2.31) (16.12) (15.59) (3.3) (3.32)
Presidential(0,1) 10.4 7.2 -0.12 0.24 3.58 3.06 -20.64 -21.78 -5.4 -8.57 5.16 -12.45 -8.87 -11.66 -4.25 -16.59
(2.53) (2.47) (6.85) (6.34) (3.36) (3.39) (6.2) (6.45) (2.14) (2.06) (9.58) (9.29) (2.4) (2.31) (24.22) (24.01)
Pres*Surplus -0.65 -0.42 -0.85 -0.34 -1.14 -1.22 -2.52 -2.98 -1.77 -1.63 -5.77 -2.15
(0.48) (0.47) (1.48) (1.38) (0.62) (0.63) (1.51) (1.54) (0.54) (0.51) (16.01) (15.9)
Federal(0,1) -3.7 -4.62 -8.98 -12.11 -5.04 -5.19 -10.91 -10.32
(1.95) (1.9) (2.04) (1.94) (2.63) (2.65) (2.79) (2.88)
Majoritarian(0,1) 4.34 3.52 15.81 10.39 4.7 4.86 11.02 10.69
(1.63) (1.58) (2.59) (2.45) (2.31) (2.32) (4.04) (4.1)
Leftwing(0,1) -3.36 -1.14 -4.76 -4.92
(1.64) (1.61) (1.87) (1.77)
Interest -0.28 -0.26 -0.03 -0.04
(0.11) (0.11) (0.28) (0.28)
Non-presidential(0,1) -12.67 -12.16 20.54 2.33 -15.6 -15.7 17.43 3.23
(2.22) (2.14) (9.18) (8.98) (2.35) (2.26) (23.97) (23.84)
Non-pres*Surplus -1.42 -1.71 -2.29 0.63
(0.37) (0.36) (15.97) (15.87)
N 1943 1943 686 686 1241 1241 358 358 2079 2079 743 743 2079 2079 743 743
F-stat 22.57 9.71 39.95 16.12 15.13 6.2 31.06 12.37 31.11 11.1 49.49 14.36 27.24 11.24 41.6 14
R2 0.13 0.2 0.434 0.55 0.14 0.15 0.52 0.54 0.12 0.21 0.38 0.5 0.13 0.22 0.38 0.51
Common year effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 18: Baseline POLS Estimates (cont’d)
Model 9-POLS Model 10-POLS Model 11-POLS Model 12-POLS
Sample Global Global Global Global Global Global Global Global
Intercept 43.3 7.37 36.05 20.81 57.34 21.69 88.34 70.24
(10.44) (14.61) (10.74) (14.02) (10.44) (14.59) (9.58) (13.26)
Surplus -1.76 -2.21 -1.64 -2.06 -0.84 -1.16 -0.52 -0.91
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.31) (0.3) (0.32) (0.31)
Growth -0.71 -1 -0.71 -1.04 -0.71 -1.02 -0.68 -1.04
(0.19) (0.2) (0.19) (0.2) (0.19) (0.2) (0.2) (0.21)
ln(GDP) -0.26 0.33 0.02 0.44 -0.28 0.25 -1.08 -0.63
(0.44) (0.43) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.43) (0.4) (0.39)
Agriculture Exports -0.38 -0.11 -0.42 -0.15 -0.34 -0.07 -0.18 0.02
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Fuel Exports -0.24 -0.24 -0.28 -0.3 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Oil Price -0.1 0.19 -0.15 0.02 -0.1 0.21 -0.14 0.02
(0.03) (0.19) (0.03) (0.22) (0.03) (0.19) (0.03) (0.22)
Population share over 64 1.33 0.72 1.74 1.17 1.34 0.73 0.93 0.44
(0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21)
Non-democracy(0,1) 12.28 10.94 13.48 14.18
(2.26) (2.18) (2.4) (2.34)
Presidential(0,1) 23.46 19.28 30.5 27.26 11.51 8.34 -10.04 -12
(2.98) (2.87) (3.22) (3.14) (3.34) (3.22) (2.47) (2.4)
Pres*Surplus -0.06 -0.24 -2.03 -1.91
(0.7) (0.67) (0.54) (0.53)
Federal(0,1) -7.87 -7.96 -6.4 -7.53 -7.36 -7.16
(2.08) (1.99) (2.13) (2.08) (2.09) (2)
Majoritarian(0,1) 12.17 10.27 11.51 10.82 11.79 9.85
(1.77) (1.7) (1.81) (1.76) (1.77) (1.7)
Leftwing(0,1) -5.11 -2.05
(1.62) (1.6)
Non-presidential(0,1) -14.91 -14.25 -16.25 -15.43
(2.39) (2.3) (2.45) (2.38)
Non-pres*Surplus -1.23 -1.52 -1.6 -1.85
(0.38) (0.37) (0.39) (0.38)
Fed*Pres -5.65 -6.86 5.8 4.28 -14.07 -12.6
(4.05) (3.87) (4.5) (4.38) (4.73) (4.53)
Fed*Pres*Surplus -3.78 -2.25
(1.16) (1.13)
Maj*Pres -34.42 -36.02 -38.81 -39.27 -37.54 -38.59
(4.25) (4.06) (4.25) (4.12) (4.6) (4.4)
Maj*Pres*Surplus -2.28 -1.94
(1.06) (1.02)
Fed*Pres*Maj 12.45 19.23 -1.83 2.14 18.48 24.14
(6.26) (6.01) (6.77) (6.59) (8.57) (8.25)
Fed*Pres*Maj*Surplus 4.05 2.92
(2.32) (2.24)
OPEC 6.32 16.74
(6.64) (6.51)
South America -12.22 -14.82
(3.31) (3.22)
Africa 15.16 7.66
(2.93) (2.92)
Election -1.21 -2.21
(1.59) (1.54)
N 2039 2039 1943 1943 2039 2039 1966 1966
F-stat 26.09 11.63 24.96 11.83 20.71 11.15 23.28 10.06
R2 0.15 0.24 0.19 0.25 0.16 0.25 0.12 0.2
Common year effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
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in some the effect of economic output can be more accurately mea-
sured in terms of levels and not as a growth series. A covariate con-
taining data on agricultural exports as a share of total merchandise
exports is included in the models due to the historical importance
of national governments’ commitment to modernization (often at a
very high price due to the dominance of dependency theory in pol-
icy thinking among elites of developing nations in the latter half of
the twentieth century). Second, economies which are manifest largely
in the form of agricultural production often have a greater need for
foreign capital due to the volatile nature of agricultural commodities
markets. Crops such as bananas and coffee can easily be destroyed be-
fore market as a result of weather anomalies such as hurricanes and
droughts. Across the specifications in models 1 to 4 the agricultural
exports coefficient does not speak to the presence of a visible effect
on the central government’s debt burden, particularly among OECD
nations. A control variable for fuel exports, which means the share of
merchandise exports consisting of fuel minerals such as crude oil and
natural gas, is included in the models along with a variable recording
year-to-year global averages in oil prices. These additions were made
to reflect the power of fuel commodities markets to influence the in-
terest rates directing international capital markets. The Latin Ameri-
can debt crisis of the 1980s was largely brought about by shocks to
US interest rates effected by the dramatic increase in crude oil prices
agreed to by OPEC in 1973 and then once more in 1979. The other
nia 1996-2011, Latvia 1994-2011, Hungary 1995-2011, Lithuania 2000-2011, Mongolia
1992-2011, Croatia 1996-2005, Slovenia 1993-2005, Poland 2001-2005.
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sense in which fuel export markets are a source of dependence is
in terms of how economies characterized in terms of these products
lead to government’s which are effectively liberated from foreign cap-
ital due to the copious proceeds from taxing these export markets.
Estimates from the POLS models based on the global samples indi-
cate that fuel exports and oil prices reduce the debt share. The per-
centage of the population over the age of 64 effects an increase in
public debt ratios - a result which is congruous the observation that
significantly large shares of public spending are deposited in public
healthcare schemes and old age pensions. The intercept included for
non-democratic states makes visible a large difference of means be-
tween parliamentary regimes and these types of states in terms of the
debt-to-GDP ratio (parliamentary states are the baseline group in the
way the intercepts are configured for models 1 to 6). This happens at a
rate of about eight to twelve points of debt-to-GDP. Perhaps the latter
trend reflects the extent to which potentates exercise less restraint in
taking recourse to foreign finance to pay for public works. Or perhaps
such leaders are more weary of making waves among their patrons
by increasing income tax.
The key results related to presidential government are conveyed by
the interaction term PRES*SURPLUS. As parliamentary and mixed
regimes are the baseline group in models 1 to 6, the presidentialism
intercept reflects the difference of means between the former group
and presidential states’ fiscal behaviour. The range of alternative spec-
ifications reveals a sign change in the difference of means depend-
ing on whether the sample is restricted to OECD nations. Presiden-
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tial states have on average larger central debt burdens in the global
sample. However, among the industrialized OECD nations this pa-
rameter paints a drastically different picture of smaller debt burdens
as this estimate is computed in terms of the difference between the
United States and Switzerland during the last quarter of the twenti-
eth century and the parliamentary regimes of Western Europe, who
during this time pursued policies leading to public sector inflation as
a consequence of their singular embrace of the principles of ‘social
democracy’. Where it is statistically measurable the interaction effect
of PRES*SURPLUS indicates that the deflationary effect of primary
balance surpluses on debt-to-GDP shares is difficult to distinguish
from the overall effect of budget surplus, which stands somewhere in
the neighbourhood of -1 and -3.
To put the comparison into sharper focus model 8 reorganizes the
order of the intercepts so that both presidential and non-presidential
democracies possess their own interaction term. In this configuration
the negative global coefficient on surplus is slightly steeper within the
presidential group, although the standard errors are not sufficiently
small to call it one way or the other. More propitious error bounds
are seen under the specification of model 12 where it can be observed
that the presidential interaction term attends to a parameter which is
clearly steeper than that of the non-presidential interaction term from
global data.
Of course there are other dimensions of political institutions which
may affect debt levels and possibly differentiate the influence of presidential-
style government. For this reason I include additional intercepts and
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interaction terms in order to assess the possibility that such effects
maybe transported by differences in electoral system and state-central
governmental relations. Specifically, I include variable to record whether
or not the national legislative assembly recruits on the basis of a ma-
joritarian rule and whether there exists state governments with real
power of taxing and spending. The estimates indicate that majoritar-
ian electoral systems are associated with a higher average debt level.
This trend may be a consequence of the reduced power that the oppo-
sition has in restraining the fiscal goals of government. A legislative
majority gives government the practical ability to do what it wants
as well as the moral authority to do so. In contrast, the empirical fed-
eralism intercept posits that the existence of subnational government
with spending power and constitutionally guaranteed prerogatives
is associated with lower average debt-to-GDP. While majoritarianism
pushes up debt, federalism pushes it down. One possible explanation
of this that central governments simply have less demand for foreign
capital when much of their job is already done for them by state
governments in the provinces. Another clue is perhaps that foreign
credit is a good that is excludable and rivalrous, i.e., a private good.
If for instance a state government consumes one billion dollars worth
of foreign credit, that is one billion units of this commodity that the
central government cannot consume. Moreover, access to the good is
not directly open once the credit has been contracted. In this example
the central government has no rights over the billion dollars worth
of credit purchased by the state government, more or less. The stock
of foreign credit that governments can solicit is finite, which means
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that under federalism there is competition between state and federal
governments for this product.
The results in models 9 and 11 are congruous with the preced-
ing discussion. The difference of means for the variable FED*PRES is
smaller than that delimited by the presidentialism intercept up to a
sign change. Rather than an increase in the average level of central
government debt the interaction term MAJ*PRES speaks to a reduc-
tion in the average across presidential democracies. This pattern is
most likely the result of a selection effect rather than a clear repu-
diation of the tendency of majoritarianism to drive down the debt
burden. States that can be found within this intersection of majoritar-
ianism and presidentialism include Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador,
Ecuador, Chile and Bolivia. These states were all buffeted hard by the
Latin American debt crises of the 1980s. If we compute means of cen-
tral government public debt for presidential states outside of Latin
America (that is, outside of Central America, South America and the
Caribbean), we observe that the average is 73 points of GDP for states
with majoritarianism and 57 points of GDP those presidential states
without it defined in this sense.
In order to see whether these effects play out analogously in terms
of the regression slope for government surplus model 11 estimates the
coefficients for the interaction terms FED*PRES*SURPLUS, MAJ*PRES*SURPLUS
and FED*MAJ*PRES*SURPLUS. Not surprisingly, the negative slope
on FED*PRES*SURPLUS is steeper than the corresponding coefficient
on MAJ*PRES*SURPLUS. The 3-term interaction FED*MAJ*PRES*SURPLUS
gives a sign change from the FED*PRES*SURPLUS term. Does this
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mean that majoritarianism overpowers federalism? It is not possible
to say so with rigour on the basis of the evidence. This estimate is
based on a small subgroup including the USA, Mexico, the Philip-
pines and Nigeria. As such, the global sample does not have an agree-
able quantity of statistical power to test this hypothesis seriously. And
it goes without saying that any counterfactual claims we infer from
the data are to be treated with suspicion as we leave the ‘convex hull’
of the sample from which the fitted model is based.
6.2.2 Relaxing the SE and SI identifying assumptions
The current level of central government debt is essentially correlated
to its past values. In order to manage this source of dependence along
with the panel structure of the data I provide additional dynamic
panel estimates of the debt model. There is good reason to relax the
identifying assumption of strict exogeneity attending the POLS es-
timator, i.e., E[εit|Xit−1] = 0. Although, the POLS estimates are far
from otiose in giving us a clear picture of the magnitudes at work for
our purposes, without including past realizations of the dependent
variable on the right hand side of the regression equation we will
not sufficiently model the data generating process at work because
we know from theory that the current value of debt is driven by the
previous level of debt compounded by interest. However, including
the lagged dependent variable into a POLS model such as those is-
sued previously may produce a form of bias adumbrated by Nick-
ell, which the author terms ‘dynamic panel bias’. [168] This problem
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can be overcome by exploiting the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM). 6
The choice of estimators in this section differs slightly from the
suggestions given by Beck and Katz that the POLS estimator is rel-
atively benign in an AR-1 model of comparative political economy
panel data with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE). [23] [24]
Some clarification is required in light of this apparent incongruity. I
have headed Nickel’s warning to avoid bias produced by autoregres-
sive terms in panel data models with fixed effects, and consequently I
have explored a GMM identification strategy. The bottom line is that
if it is necessary to control for dynamic effects and fixed unit effects
at the same time, a GMM approach to estimation is the best recourse
due to the occurrence of Nickel’s bias. Whether Nickel’s bias is large
enough to be worthy of concern is determined by the length of the
time-series dimension in the data. Nickell’s bias is proportional to the
term 1T . As such, in long time-series the bias will be relatively negligi-
ble the larger the denominator. The rule of thumb in the econometrics
literature is to generally disregard Nickell’s bias for T > 20. [168] Since
it is advisable to control for unobservable country effects as fixed ef-
6 The Arellano-Bond specification uses Forward Orthogonal Deviations (FOD) of the
model at second and third order lags as GMM-style instruments. This approach
consumes less data than using First Differences as GMM-style instruments when the
panels are unbalanced. The Blundell-Bond specification uses Forward Orthogonal
Deviations and levels at second and third order lags as GMM-style instruments. The
rule of thumb is to keep the number of GMM-style instruments no greater than the
number of panels. PCA based factorization is used to keep this number down.
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fects and the fiscal equation necessitates a dynamic model, it is better
to use a GMM approach to estimate the dynamic panel data models.
In the case of the GMM estimates, the Arellano-Bond tests are
favourable to the dynamic models being specified with a first-order
autoregressive term. The introduction of the lagged dependent vari-
able in the dynamic models generally crowds out the effect of surplus
giving smaller coefficients than those contained in the POLS specifi-
cations. The effect of surplus stands somewhere in the area of -.4 to
-.7 for ever unit of surplus. Where the effect of the interaction term,
PRES*SURPLUS, is measurable (it appears so only in the second or-
der dynamic models) the magnitude of the effect is somewhere in
the upper region of the whole-sample surplus effect, i.e., somewhere
between -.6 and -.7. The surplus interaction term for non-presidential
democracy is barely measurable, but it appears to be between about
-.4 or -.5. One consequence of the GMM specification is that it intro-
duces more degrees of freedom into the model meaning that more
data is required to achieve the same level of statistical power that the
previous POLS estimates had. To the extent that the GMM-style in-
struments are effective, the coefficient value for the lagged debt term,
debtt−1, can be interpreted as the interest rate on central government
debt, which stands somewhere in the neighbourhood of -.7 and -.8.
6.3 changing the order condition
Macroeconomic disasters lead to debt blowouts through a number of
channels. Recalling the discount factor model, a deceleration in GDP
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Table 19: Dynamic Panel Data Models
Model 13
Estimator LSDV FGLS 1-Step Arellano-Bond 1-Step Arellano-Bond 1-Step Blundell-Bond 1-Step Blundell-Bond
Intercept 120.94 7.87 6.19
(52.79) (4.2) (4.15)
Debt t-1 0.79 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.78
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.16) (0.05) (0.11)
Debt t-2 0.03 0.1
(0.14) (0.12)
Surplus -0.76 -0.62 -0.71 -0.78 -0.71 -0.78
(0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.15)
Growth -0.46 -0.52 -0.49 -0.49 -0.53 -0.53
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.09) (0.09)
Population plus 64 0.93 0.09 0.27 0.15 0.13 0.15
(0.5) (0.05) (0.46) (0.43) (0.09) (0.07)
ln(GDP) -5.18 -0.19 -1.37 -1.69 -0.24 -0.21
(2.18) (0.13) (2.25) (2.11) (0.16) (0.16)
Agriculture 0.15 0.02 0.18 0.04 0.03 0
(0.15) (0.06) (0.14) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06)
Fuel 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Oil Price 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Non-democracy 0.44 1.12 0.25 1.38 1.41 1.68
(1.07) (0.84) (1.04) (0.7) (1.21) (1.06)
N 2022 2022 1904 1841 2022 1958
Panels 118 118 111 108 118 117
Common year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard Error Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
GMM-style instrument order 2nd, 3rd 2nd, 3rd 2nd, 3rd 2nd, 3rd
No. GMM-style instruments 87 86 128 127
Predetermined Variable Debt t-1 Debt t-1 Debt t-1 Debt t-1 Debt t-1
Moment condition type FOD FOD FOD, levels FOD, levels
F-stat 317.43 524.55 482.46 1055.06 1066.56
Wald χ2 217051.28
R2 0.84 0.93
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test p-value 0.002 0.044 0.007 0.024
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test p-value 0.185 0.3 0.188 0.203
Sargan-test p-value 0 0 0 0
Hansen-test p-value 0.038 0.127 0 0.848
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Table 20: Dynamic Panel Data Models (cont’d)
Model 14 Model 15
Estimator LSDV FGLS 1-Step Arellano-Bond 1-Step Arellano-Bond 1-Step Blundell-Bond 1-Step Blundell-Bond 1-Step Blundell-Bond
Intercept 121.27 7.66 5.66 25.18
(54.59) (4.2) (4.11) (8.77)
Debt t-1 0.79 0.92 0.91 0.88 0.87 0.78 0.57
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.15) (0.04) (0.11) (0.1)
Debt t-2 0.04 0.11 0.13
(0.14) (0.12) (0.1)
Surplus -0.75 -0.61 -0.7 -0.75 -0.7 -0.74 -0.97
(0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18)
Growth -0.46 -0.52 -0.49 -0.48 -0.52 -0.53 -0.58
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
Population plus 64 0.99 0.12 0.31 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.37
(0.51) (0.05) (0.47) (0.44) (0.09) (0.08) (0.21)
ln(GDP) -5.28 -0.2 -1.46 -1.82 -0.25 -0.2 -0.57
(2.26) (0.14) (2.3) (2.11) (0.17) (0.16) (0.33)
Agriculture 0.18 0.02 0.2 0.05 0.04 0.01
(0.15) (0.05) (0.14) (0.1) (0.07) (0.06)
Fuel 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Oil Price 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Non-democracy 2.72 1.38 1.84 1.39 1.84 1.89 4.09
(1.24) (0.84) (0.94) (0.89) (1.22) (1.16) (2.23)
Presidential 3.42 0.3 2.43 -1.13 0.59 -0.45 -0.07
(2.92) (1.01) (2.92) (1.8) (1.28) (0.79) (1.78)
Presidential*Surplus -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 -0.42 -0.07 -0.37 -0.61
(0.37) (0.3) (0.37) (0.23) (0.35) (0.21) (0.33)
N 2022 2022 1904 1841 2022 1958 2158
Panels 118 118 111 108 118 117 122
Common year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard Error Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
GMM-style instrument order 2nd, 3rd 2nd, 3rd 2nd, 3rd 2nd, 3rd 2nd, 3rd
No. GMM-style instruments 89 88 130 129 127
Predetermined Variable Debt t-1 Debt t-1 Debt t-1 Debt t-1 Debt t-1
Moment condition type FOD FOD FOD, levels FOD, levels FOD, levels
F-stat 292.8 674.6 443.34 1408.04 1041.64 168.62
Wald χ2 209104.6
R2 0.84 0.93
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test p-value 0.002 0.046 0.007 0.026 0.03
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test p-value 0.185 0.282 0.188 0.196 0.085
Sargan-test p-value 0 0 0 0 0
Hansen-test p-value 0.028 0.149 0.695 0 0
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Table 21: Dynamic Panel Data Models (cont’d)
Model 16
Estimator LSDV FGLS 1-Step Arellano-Bond 1-Step Arellano-Bond 1-Step Blundell-Bond 1-Step Blundell-Bond
Intercept 131.78 10.86 8.93
(53.87) (4.49) (4.4)
Debt t-1 0.79 0.92 0.9 0.87 0.87 0.77
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.15) (0.05) (0.11)
Debt t-2 0.04 0.11
(0.13) (0.12)
Surplus -0.38 -0.34 -0.41 -0.47 -0.38 -0.43
(0.17) (0.21) (0.14) (0.16) (0.21) (0.21)
Growth -0.45 -0.52 -0.48 -0.47 -0.52 -0.53
(0.1) (0.1) (0.11) (0.1) (0.09) (0.09)
Population plus 64 1.06 0.12 0.41 0.24 0.18 0.17
(0.52) (0.06) (0.49) (0.47) (0.1) (0.09)
ln(GDP) -5.6 -0.24 -1.96 -2.25 -0.29 -0.23
(2.23) (0.14) (2.28) (2.1) (0.17) (0.16)
Agriculture 0.17 0.03 0.19 0.05 0.05 0.02
(0.15) (0.06) (0.14) (0.1) (0.07) (0.06)
Fuel 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Oil Price 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Presidential -0.45 -1.58 -0.31 -3.36 -1.88 -2.96
(2.28) (1.37) (2.34) (1.5) (1.95) (1.36)
Presidential*Surplus -0.36 -0.34 -0.27 -0.66 -0.38 -0.68
(0.37) (0.34) (0.36) (0.24) (0.4) (0.26)
Non-presidential -4.03 -2.35 -2.94 -2.39 -2.93 -2.95
(1.62) (1.12) (1.29) (1.14) (1.55) (1.51)
Non-pres*surplus -0.54 -0.43 -0.43 -0.42 -0.49 -0.48
(0.25) (0.24) (0.22) (0.22) (0.26) (0.26)
N 2022 2022 1904 1841 2022 1958
Panels 118 118 111 108 118 117
Common year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stand. Err. Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
GMM-style instrument order 2nd, 3rd 2nd, 3rd 2nd, 3rd 2nd, 3rd
No. GMM-style instruments 90 89 131 130
Predetermined Variable Debt t-1 Debt t-1 Debt t-1 Debt t-1
Moment Condition type FOD FOD FOD, levels FOD, levels
F-stat 249.23 548.09 485.87 1257.48 870.36
Wald χ2 202059.54
R2 0.8289 0.9328
Arellano-Bond AR(1) p-value 0.002 0.043 0.007 0.025
Arellano-Bond AR(2) p-value 0.186 0.27 0.188 0.196
Sargan-test p-value 0 0 0 0
Hansen-test p-value 0.145 0.319 0.044 0.751
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Table 22: Dynamic Panel Data Models (cont’d)
Model 17
Estimator LSDV FGLS 1-Step Arellano-Bond 1-Step Arellano-Bond 1-Step Blundell-Bond 1-Step Blundell-Bond
Intercept 164.68 5.76 5.11
(57.76) (3.7) (3.48)
Debt t-1 0.78 0.9 0.91 0.88 0.86 0.77
(0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.14) (0.04) (0.11)
Debt t-2 0.04 0.11
(0.14) (0.12)
Surplus -0.54 -0.42 -0.54 -0.59 -0.44 -0.49
(0.15) (0.24) (0.13) (0.16) (0.26) (0.26)
Growth -0.45 -0.52 -0.48 -0.47 -0.52 -0.53
(0.11) (0.1) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Population plus 64 1.3 0.17 0.42 0.18 0.24 0.21
(0.57) (0.07) (0.57) (0.48) (0.11) (0.11)
ln(GDP) -7.07 -0.14 -1.78 -1.72 -0.14 -0.11
(2.4) (0.15) (2.75) (2.19) (0.16) (0.14)
Agriculture 0.15 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.04 0.03
(0.14) (0.06) (0.13) (0.1) (0.07) (0.06)
Fuel 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Oil Price 0.14 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Presidential 1.24 1.01 1.22 -4.43 1.32 -2.29
(3.71) (3.01) (4.07) (1.99) (3.49) (1.52)
Presidential*Surplus 0.31 0.23 0.31 -0.77 0.25 -0.69
(0.86) (0.82) (0.9) (0.29) (0.89) (0.29)
Non-presidential -3.36 -2.19 -2.33 -1.95 -2.6 -2.48
(1.67) (1.22) (1.18) (1.1) (1.6) (1.59)
Non-pres*surplus -0.37 -0.38 -0.29 -0.28 -0.42 -0.41
(0.24) (0.27) (0.21) (0.21) (0.3) (0.29)
Federal -2.41 -0.62 -0.43 -0.22 -0.84 -0.81
(1.3) (0.62) (1.31) (1.12) (0.78) (0.76)
Majoritarian 0.98 1.48 0.13 0.09 1.75 1.33
(1.13) (0.71) (0.97) (1.04) (0.86) (0.87)
Fed*Pres 2.84 -2.01 -1.38 1.15 -2.33 0.97
(3.43) (3.11) (3.69) (3.14) (3.77) (1.99)
Maj*Pres -2.92 -3.96 -0.81 3.51 -4.92 -0.66
(3.84) (2.93) (3.79) (2.23) (3.18) (2.1)
Pres*Fed*Maj -0.39 1.47 -0.84 -4.04 2.08 -1.92
(3.92) (3.26) (3.6) (2.74) (3.76) (2.14)
Fed*Pres*Surplus -0.98 -1.12 -1.07 -0.08 -1.19 -0.25
(1.01) (0.95) (1.01) (0.61) (1.01) (0.55)
Maj*Pres*Surplus -0.68 -0.52 -0.37 0.74 -0.61 0.38
(0.92) (0.81) (1) (0.38) (0.82) (0.27)
Maj*Pres*Fed*Surp 0.72 0.68 0.59 -0.43 0.81 -0.24
(1.03) (0.96) (1.05) (0.65) (0.99) (0.6)
N 1985 1985 1869 1809 1985 1924
Panels 116 116 109 106 116 115
Common year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stand. Err. Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
GMM-style instrument order 2nd, 3rd 2nd, 3rd 2nd, 3rd 2nd, 3rd
No. GMM-style instruments 98 97 139 138
Predetermined Variable Debt t-1 Debt t-1 Debt t-1
Moment Condition type FOD FOD, levels FOD, levels
F-stat 3200.36 2.43E+06 6733.18 1599.88 1513.16
Wald χ2 702059.77
R2 0.7645 0.9301
Arellano-Bond AR(1) p-value 0.002 0.036 0.006 0.025
Arellano-Bond AR(2) p-value 0.19 0.281 0.191 0.192
Sargan-test p-value 0 0 0 0
Hansen-test p-value 0.018 0.112 0.974 0.948
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growth can lead to interest rates overtaking economic output, which
may not be sufficiently counterbalanced if there is a related slump
in revenues. Cyclical budget expenses can also increase. For example,
more people will be entitled to welfare benefits during recessions.
Since endogenous fiscal policy choices have influence over much of
the information in these right hand-side variables, correct evaluation
of the size of the dependence of debt growth to cyclical budgetary
shocks is doubtful under a POLS exclusion restriction. For example,
reverse causality is active when revenue increases are a reflection of
a slow down in treasury-bill markets. Moreover, this chapter is seek-
ing out evidence reflecting how constitutions influence government
responses to exogenous crises in public finance.
With this in mind I develop a strategy for making cyclical bud-
getary dynamics conditionally independent using information from
instrumental variables on natural disasters and their fallout. A major
natural disaster is a determinant of variation in demand for public
services through the disruption it causes to human life, homes and
businesses. Disaster events also shrink the pool of taxable income by
killing tax payers or precluding them from taxable economic activ-
ity that they would have otherwise undertaken. This means that the
IV approach is not targeting disaster relief spending in the form of
accounts set up in the immediate aftermath of disasters to expedite
and maintain on the ground emergency efforts, but rather it targets
the blips in annual surpluses from shocks to cyclical budgetary com-
ponents. Data on natural disaster events was gathered from the EM-
DAT database. [46] Variables used in this study include event counts,
6.3 changing the order condition 253
total affected, killed and the estimated costs of disasters classified
as droughts, earthquakes, extreme temperature events, floods, dry
or wet massmovements, storms, volcanic eruptions, wildfires, insect
manifestations and epidemics.
With increasing rates of natural disasters occurring contemporane-
ously alongside temperature changes related to the Greenhouse ef-
fect, and the social devastation these things cause, there has been a
lot of interest in the EM-DAT database as a bank of variables to test
ideas about economic and political behaviour. Toya and Skidmore es-
timate the dependence of the severity of disaster impacts across a
series of development variables. [220] They conclude that develop-
ment in terms of education, economic output, better governance, a
smaller public sector, and a larger financial sector, provides a level
of insulation against the lethality and expensiveness of natural disas-
ter events. Investigations by Lis and Nickel suggest that the strength
and sophistication of the financial sector plays a role in providing
more and better insurance services to mitigate disaster losses. [144]
LN provide evidence of a statistically measurable influence of natural
disasters on annual central government budget outlays.
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The argument that disasters have good macroeconomic effects has
been pursued in terms of the Schumpterian ‘creative-destruction’ hy-
pothesis that catastrophes create opportunities for technological capi-
tal stocks to be upgraded leading to better long-term output growth
subsequently. This view was supported by Tol and Leek. [217] How-
ever, further digging by Cuaresma, et al., has found that this is only a
weak effect apparent in wealthy nations, while for the most part disas-
ters events have an observably negative effect on the level of research
and development transactions between states. [60] Yet, it is acknowl-
edged in the disaster literature that post-disaster reconstruction pro-
grams are economically stimulating, especially through improving
infrastructure, which, in turn, has a potential to reduce natural disas-
ter vulnerability in the future. [27, pp.9-28] These benefits, however,
often lag substantially after the disaster event.
The selection rule for which EM-DAT variables were picked was
informed by the goal of capturing variation in disaster fallout that re-
flected true ‘acts of God’, as opposed to disaster outcomes that were
the product of bad human policies and ineffective or corrupt govern-
ing institutions. Modern disaster management is based on putting
into place an infrastructure that can prepare communities for the
worst and in the event of a calamity move people and resources and
administer effective communication networks. If we imagine a vari-
able that describes the level of corruption in national governmental
authorities, this variable could be correlated to disaster fallouts that
deviate from the mean if poor disaster management has a real poten-
tial to push up disaster tolls. Additionally, if the corruption variable
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Figure 17: Cross-sectional differences in fatalities from natural disasters
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was a meaningful aggregate it would presumably be giving us infor-
mation about a state’s reputation as a borrower (i.e., a bad one) - and
so the exclusion restriction would make no sense (corruption would
make creditors doubt a state’s ability to respect contracts). In a similar
vein political instability is an important factor in the exacerbation of
disaster fallouts. For example, although Mozambique, Ethiopia and
Sudan have all experienced famine created by hapless natural condi-
tions, the depth and entrenchment of their food crises were the result
of civil conflict. [45, p.16] Therefore, this analysis needs to be mind-
ful of the fact that on closer inspection the magnitude of disaster tolls
are the result of natural circumstances and chance, but also of the in-
teraction of institutions and (often negligent) human behaviour. For
example, consider the landslide in La Josephina, Ecuador, 1993. Sec-
ondary flooding from the landslide led to the displacement of about
14,000 individuals and the deaths of approximately 200. Although
this area was predisposed toward massmovements of earth, the occur-
rence of the disaster event was fastened by over-farming of the valley
and monocultured crops that caused erosion. Moreover, the large toll
the disaster exacted was in part due to the ineffectual responses of
local authorities who waited too long on help from outside before
acting. [117, p.15]
Disaster events are heterogeneous in their impacts. Consequences
depend on national geographic and economic differences and the
type of disaster. In general, natural disasters will only have very small
effects on aggregate tax revenues. Because disasters would have to be
nationwide for noticeable effects on income tax, such an effect ap-
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pears to be native to geographically small states. Yet, disaggregating
reveals impacts. Large revenues related to export taxes on agricul-
tural products will take cuts especially in the aftermath of droughts
and flooding. Differences in national economies are important: na-
tional economies dominated by mineral extraction tend to be eco-
nomically resilient against flooding and droughts while agriculturally
intensive economies do not. While economic development implies na-
tions have a greater ability to to reduce their vulnerability to disaster
hazards, the growth in urbanization from development means that
greater harm can be done to public health from events that are geo-
physical in nature (for example, earthquakes). [27, p.15] A literature
summary is provided in Table 23.
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Table 23: A Selected Summary of Research on Natural Disasters
Citation Effect Mechanism Details
Cuaresma, Hlouskova and Obersteiner (2007) Change in technology transfers exogenous Reduction in technological transfers
Lis and Nickel (2009) Increase in government deficits exogenous Reduced revenues/increased demand for public services
Sawada (2007) Impact on household welfare exogenous Reductions on household consumption and wage earnings
Toya and Skidmore (2007) Reduction in disaster effects endogenous Smaller public sector, larger financial sector,
more education and output leads to cheaper disaster costs.
Table cont’d Disaster variables Key parameter Selected Estimates
(CHO 2007) Disasters per square kilometer, d ∂µTECHTRANSFER∂d [−0.04(se : .01),−5.81(1.72)]
(LN 2009) Occurrence of massive disaster event,D(0, 1) E
(
µsurplus|D = 1
)
− E
(
µsurplus|D = 0
)
[−0.2(se : .004),−.98(0.025)]
(S 2007) NA NA NA
(TS 2007) deaths, k, and costs/GDP, c ∂µln(k)∂ln(GDP) and
∂µln(c)
∂ln(GDP) [−0.2, (t = −2.2)], [−0.2(t = −1.2)] (Respective order)
The instrumental variables used to relax the exclusion restriction
are three principal components constructed from 12 variables from
the EM-DAT database which store fallout information from events
classified by EM-DAT as a ‘major natural disaster’. These include, for
example, the estimated financial cost of natural disasters in a given
year and the number killed by natural disasters. A ‘natural’ disaster in
this instance is any major disaster event that can be characterized as
a drought, earthquake, extreme temperature event, flood, dry mass-
movement, wet mass-movement, storm, volcano eruption, wildfire,
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insect infestation or epidemic. Details of the disaster variables and
principle components are provided in the Appendix (section A.2).
6.3.1 2SLS Estimates
The instrumental variables regressions are implemented using Balt-
agi’s Error Components 2SLS estimator. In the 2SLS models where
linear projections of health spending were not included (models 18,
20) surpluses have a greater effect in reducing the debt-to-GDP ra-
tio compared to the POLS models, which suggests that endogeneity
understates the effects of surpluses in reducing debt ratios. Split sam-
ples are used in this case to identify the constitutional effects because
the constitutional terms would have to be included in the instrument
set if the whole sample were estimated, which would condition data
on dummy variables, making a lot of information come out to zero.
Surplus coefficients in the non-presidential group do not differ to
any considerable extent from the global sample. Linear projections of
health care spending have a measurable effect of debt at about 5 to
8 - a magnitude significantly larger than the surplus itself. The sur-
plus parameter in the presidential sample is markedly higher than
those in the global and non-presidential samples within fairly nar-
row standard errors in model 20, for example, at about a -6 percent-
age reduction in debt for every unit increment in surplus compared
to the global sample estimate for this parameter of -3 and the non-
parliamentary one of about -5. We should bare in mind, however,
from the dynamic models, that omission of autoregressive terms in
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the debt model produces a fair amount of upward bias in the surplus
parameter. This bias is not caused by unobserved country effects since
in both the GMM and 2SLS models these effects are controlled for us-
ing random error components. Recalling the comparisons between
POLS and GMM estimates, omission of the first order autoregres-
sive term tends to overstate the magnitude of the negative effect on
debt by a factor of about 1 or 3. Achieving accurate estimates of the
surplus effect in presidential states is difficult, however, using this
split sample approach to instrumental variables regression because
the sample size is greatly reduced and 2SLS estimators are inefficient.
Many alternative specifications of the instrumental variables model
do not return statistically significant estimates on this parameter such
as GMM models including the autoregressive terms and the disaster
instruments together.
6.4 the question of constitutionally proscribed fiscal
rules
One obvious source of variation that remains unaccounted for in
terms of public spending dynamics is the differences that separate
states who have introduced constitutional law to regulate government
spending. For example, the German constitution binds government
to the rule that the budget deficit can be no larger than the items of
public investment in the budget. Moreover, the Netherlands has laws
placing upper limits on public spending in the medium term. [212,
pp.160-1] Perhaps the most pertinent constraint on public spending
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Table 24: EC2SLS Estimates using linear projections of primary balances
from factorized disaster data
Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21
Sample Global Non-presidential Presidential Global Non-presidential Presidential Global Non-presidential Presidential Global Non-presidential Presidential
Intercept 255.63 130.16 366.02 93.37 19.24 300.85 247.6 546.99 76.04 92.4 -7.8 301.82
(832.92) (1004.89) (2606.58) (51.36) (53.21) (71.81) (822.5) (1022.02) (2545.1) (40.52) (39.71) (66.43)
Surplus -3.79 -3.78 -7.34 -5.08 -4.7 -4.26 -3.42 -4.72 -6.48 -2.35 -2.43 -3.72
(1.02) (0.98) (1.08) (1.29) (1.54) (1.49) (1.01) (1.22) (1.12) (1.15) (1.29) (1.35)
Health 8.63 -0.75 0.98 5.88 1 2.38
(3.99) (3.06) (4.16) (3.17) (2.49) (3.29)
Growth -0.17 -0.12 -0.16 0.77 0.44 0.73 -0.19 0.09 -0.21 0.2 -0.11 0.68
(0.25) (0.29) (0.77) (0.33) (0.48) (0.5) (0.25) (0.31) (0.74) (0.31) (0.42) (0.5)
ln(GDP) -10.45 -5.84 -4.72 -3.98 -0.14 -11.27 -10.62 -7.88 -5.09 -2.86 1.33 -11.17
(1.56) (1.41) (1.27) (2.03) (2.27) (2.7) (1.6) (1.95) (1.67) (1.65) (1.75) (2.49)
Agriculture -0.15 0.95 -0.38 0.04 -0.25 -0.77 -0.12 0.8 -0.55 0.07 -0.49 -0.92
(0.21) (0.3) (0.32) (0.31) (0.49) (0.34) (0.2) (0.33) (0.32) (0.25) (0.41) (0.32)
Fuel 0.06 0 -0.07 0.14 -0.21 0.04 0.08 0.04 -0.21 -0.04 -0.43 -0.08
(0.09) (0.14) (0.11) (0.15) (0.24) (0.18) (0.09) (0.15) (0.12) (0.13) (0.21) (0.16)
Oil Price 0.16 0 -1.82 0.22 0.13 0.15 0.25 -3.48 0.87 0.16 0.11 0.16
(7.33) (8.85) (22.99) (0.15) (0.14) (0.29) (7.24) (8.99) (22.48) (0.13) (0.12) (0.3)
Pop65 4.85 4.93 -0.61 -0.91 1.49 1.36 4.82 6.42 -1.49 -0.4 1.05 -0.16
(0.52) (0.48) (0.79) (1.27) (0.99) (1.87) (0.52) (0.54) (0.83) (1.01) (0.8) (1.61)
President -6.52 -12.52 -7.37 -10.77
(3.15) (5.13) (3.16) (4.32)
Non-president -15.33 -10.66 -14.58 -11.94
(3.95) (5.31) (4.07) (4.48)
Federal 4.73 -6.1 12.04 1.13 -9.3 12.38
(2.11) (2.54) (6.49) (2.66) (3.23) (5.14)
Majoritarian 1.08 21.63 -7.64 3.04 13.5 -4.28
(2.54) (4.98) (5.26) (3.83) (4.74) (6.58)
N 1312 647 394 808 401 261 1295 643 394 800 397 261
Panels 113 58 28 110 56 28 110 57 28 108 55 28
F-stat 9.02 10.45 2.42 3.72 2.97 2.8 9.04 11.02 2.69 3.36 4.17 3.03
R2 0.1616 0.2472 0.1782 0.1411 0.2344 0.2089 0.1451 0.2886 0.2132 0.1321 0.3071 0.2673
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is that which would disestablish the power of legislators to increase
government spending via legislative amendments. Cheibub’s Presi-
dentialism, Parliamentarism and Democracy offers a useful survey of re-
straints on budgetary discretion within presidential republics. In the
Chilean 1980 constitution and that of Brazil in 1988 there is a nega-
tive constraint on the legislature’s ability to initiate budgetary legisla-
tion. Only the president can initiate budget bills. Moreover, Cheibub
observes that in no presidential regimes is there any denial of the
legislature’s prerogative to initiate amendments to a budget proposal.
However, amendments to budgetary law can be constrained in more
circuitous ways. There may be restrictions on which spending do-
mains the legislature can introduces amendments. Likewise consti-
tutional law can also deny or permit the introduction of budgetary
amendments from the legislative assembly that command increases
in government expenditure. Last, constitutional law has the capac-
ity to shape what happens when there is a failure to pass a budget
bill. [48, pp.101-3]
The differences in debt-to-GDP by differences in budgetary law are
given in Table 25 according to whether or not the president has domi-
nance of the process of passing budget law. Here ‘dominance’ is char-
acterized in terms of whether the president has exclusive authority to
introduce budget bills, constitutional law constrains the assembly’s
capacity to amend budget law, and whether the default protocol in
the case of a failure to pass budget law before deadline favours the
president. What we can see is that where there is presidential dom-
inance of the budget process the average level of sovereign debt is
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Table 25: Differences in central government debt shares between states with
and without strong presidential control of the budget law process
Constitutional environment
No-presidential budget dominance Presidential Dominance
1st percentile 8 3
5th percentile 11 12
10th percentile 13 15
25th percentile 20 26
50th percentile 39 44
75th percentile 66 67
90th percentile 97 176
95th percentile 109 239
99th percentile 188 423
N 188 230
Mean 49 69
St Dev 37 80
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significantly higher. The standard deviation is also higher for states
with a dominant president. What is going on? In the lower quan-
tiles of debt-to-GDP we there really is not much difference between
dominant presidents and dominated presidents. Only in the top 10
percent of the distribution does borrowing under a dominant pres-
ident take flight. One interpretation of this pattern is that granting
greater discretionary power to presidents entails that the quality of
fiscal management depends more strongly on the quality of the stock
of leadership recruited by presidential elections. Bad dominant pres-
idents can get away with more than bad dominated presidents (and
bad prime ministers).
Another striking comparison is the difference in public sector size
between presidential and parliamentary regimes. Persson and Tabellini
estimate the global treatment effect of presidentialism on central gov-
ernment spending to be a reduction to the mean of about five points
of GDP. [174, p.168] I see two possible factors at work here. One is the
automated feature of parliamentarism that prevents opposition legis-
latures gaining majorities without a change in government. In effect,
parliamentary governments have much more latitude in what they
can include in budget law. Second, parliamentary regimes are less
likely to have constitutional law preventing amendments to budget
law from assembly members that add to the government’s spending
priorities. Whatever conclusions or recommendations we therefore
make about the parliamentary premium must be put into perspective
alongside the tendency of presidential regimes to grow the public sec-
tor at a smaller rate than parliamentary regimes. Moreover, this osten-
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sible premium could also be a reflection of creditors’ understanding
that presidents have less control of the budget law process than par-
liamentary governments, or perhaps less confidence in their capacity
to coordinate fiscal policy in the medium and long term due to their
fixed terms.
6.5 conclusion
In this chapter the question has come before us as to whether the
presidential model itself can vitiate fiscal management. Observational
data analysis from emerging market discount factors to central gov-
ernment debt regression equations appears to reject this proposition.
This is congruous with the fact that parliamentary states have on av-
erage larger public sectors than presidential systems. The estimates
in this chapter constitute persuasive evidence to the contrary of Bage-
hot’s thesis about the inefficiency of presidential democracy. Fixed
elections cycles and opposition legislatures may not, after all, impair
the efficient use of fiscal instruments. Keeping in mind also the diver-
sity of constitutional law within presidential systems, we must also
recognize that presidential dominance of the budget process is as-
sociated with the highest accretion of central government financial
liabilities of presidential regimes.

7
I S L I F E B E T T E R I N A C O N S E N S U S D E M O C R A C Y ?
But the end of the city is not merely life; it is, rather, a good quality of life
- Aristotle
7.1 how are we better off?
One puzzle in constitutional engineering is whether society is better
off in the long-run if democracy works by giving power to majorities
or proportionately sharing it among the full diversity of constituent
parties. The commonsensical answer to this question has tended to be
‘it depends’. In societies with social divisions both deep and plural it
is intuitive to agree that minorities who are constantly excluded from
power are going to seek extra-constitutional methods for asserting
their interests which may wreak havoc on the regime’s stability. On
the other hand, there is a sense in which institutions that invite too
many conflicting interests into the decision making process will sink
into oblivion from ineffectively managed crises. The ‘it depends’ ar-
gument has been long championed in political theory from Aristotle
to de Tocqueville.
Where opinions in the empirical literature seem to converge is that
averages of things we care about move in happy ways when national
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institutions are more power-sharing in nature and representative of
a wider diversity of interests. For example, Lijphart has used factor
analysis to fold a set of power-sharing characteristics into an orthogo-
nal bivariate measure of how consensual democratic institutions are.
As regressors in bivariate OLS models these factors accurately predict
improvements in, for example, gender equality and civil order. [139,
266-296] More specifically, these factors are extracted from variables
representing cross-national information on bicameralism, party sys-
tem size, proportional representation, federalism, constitutional rigid-
ity, judicial review strength, central bank independence, and inter-
est group pluralism. These indicators are taken nominally to repre-
sent what Lijphart describes as ‘consensus democracy’ - a general
democratic alternative to majoritarian and exclusivist institutions (the
scope of his earlier work on the principles of consociationalist democ-
racy differed slightly in operationalization and was concerned with
nations that had specifically ethnic and sectarian divisions).
Sociological and historical forces often to play a major role in the
determination of why some societies flourish and others do not. Take,
for example, the divergent trajectories of Colombia and Costa Rica
during the twentieth century. In a continent seized by a welter of po-
litical instability Costa Rica has profited from relative stability under
a system of presidential democracy. Colombia on the other hand was
bled pale with civil violence, war and a continuing problem of law-
lessness in its rural territories. Much of this is explained by social
and economic structures operating in conjunction with that which
Machiavelli called fortuna. The confrontation between conservatives
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and liberals in Colombia reached its nadir in 1899-1903 during the
‘War of a Thousand Days’. The next significant episode of punctu-
ated civil conflict came in the form of what became known under the
perfunctory title of La Violencia - a period of civil war following the as-
sassination of Liberal leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán on 9 April 1948. The
terminus of the civil war did not arrive until the 1960s and by this
time the lawlessness in the rural parts of Colombia provided fecund
ground for the emergence of Marxist guerrilla groups which jeopar-
dized peace and stability in Colombia from the 1970s and who were
later reinvigorated by the subsequent growth of the global cocaine
market. [233, p.247,pp.343-4] Historical circumstances were more pro-
pitious in Costa Rica. Its isolation and good fortune helped it to avoid
foreign intervention by the United States or the Soviet Union during
the Cold War when such foreign excursions became the norm in Cen-
tral America. There is a sense, however, in which much of this sta-
bility was driven by structural factors. Because of the uniformity of
the Costa Rican economy, which depends on exporting merchandise
from its coffee crops (which were operated on a more egalitarian ba-
sis of small family owned farms) the political system did not host any
critical clash of economic interests. Moreover, the Costa Rican govern-
ment’s investment in universal education helped to prevent a Balka-
nization of its ethnic population of Mestizos, and Mulatos and native
Amerindians. The realization of this equilibrium was no doubt helped
along by the majority position of the landholding Creoles. [43, p.18]
[1, p.315] On the other hand, cases like Costa Rica and Columbia are
shaped by the quality of their political institutions.
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Lijphart’s work is representative of the New Institutionalist turn
in political science where attention has been reinvested in the ques-
tion of how the quality of political institutions determine political
and social cohesion. The causal argument in the consociational the-
sis emerged with Lijphart’s explanation of the effectiveness of Dutch
political institutions and behaviour despite multiple and salient cleav-
ages in Dutch society: the system’s presence and tractability was the
product of the culture of tolerant power sharing that had emerged
in the Low Countries. Here, Lijphart was expressing the importance
elite behaviour conducive to pragmatic coexistence that he believed
offered a more persuasive explanation of the buoyancy of the Dutch
regime than the extant focus on cross-cutting social cleavages (in
other words, social divisions that traversed groups, as opposed to
stacked social cleavages that divided them). [135, pp.184-9]
Between his 1968 work, The Politics of Accommodation, and the first
edition of PD, Lijphart’s ideas had changed from explaining what
drove elite cooperation in the Netherlands as a path dependent ef-
fect from Holland’s serendipitous, and yet precarious, combination
of shrewd leadership, religious coexistence, geographical separation
and cross cutting cleavages, to a position where these cultural and
historical developments could be abridged with the imposition of in-
stitutions that would foster such elite cooperation.
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7.2 specification issues
The statistical evidence marshalled toward the consensus democracy
hypothesis is susceptible to circumspection about the causal inter-
pretation of the parameters. Attempts to replicate and expand on
the evidence for consensus democracy’s policy effects presented in
Lijphart’s Patterns of Democracy (PD) have not been so persuasive.
This is unfortunate as the original evidence issued in Lijphart was
of an explicitly exploratory character. Achieving parameter identifica-
tion in this context in a way that posits uncontroversial assumptions
confronts us with a difficult analogous to that of beheading the fa-
bled Hyrda. In order to arrive at a sound measurement of consensus
democracy we need to be really clear about what it is. This is not that
easy because there are a number of different features promoted in the
literature. Consensus democracy can be about minority parties hav-
ing veto power. It can be about how fractured the legislature is along
partisan lines. It can be about the type of electoral system in place.
It can be about executive tenure. It can be about the strength and
diversity of civil society. And it can be about the powers of the mon-
etary institutions, sub-national government, the judiciary and consti-
tutional norms. This complexity becomes more exaggerated once we
introduce the distinction between consociatonalist sectarian democ-
racy and integrative consensus democracy.
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The general reduced form model used in the literature to capture
the policy effects of consensus democracy is a stochastic linear func-
tion modelling country-year panel data:
Yit = Xitβ+ εit (13)
where Yit is some policy performance measure, Xit a design matrix of
consociational factors and control variables, β a vector of coefficients,
ε a vector of residuals with zero mean and constant variance, and i, t
are the subscripts for country and year respectively.
Presumably, there exists a set of excluded covariates beside consen-
sus democracy that carry measurable policy effects. These effects can
be stated as the vector γit. There must also exist country effects on
policy outcomes, αi, that vary only cross-sectionally, such as culture,
history and institutions, which are not represented by the consensus
democracy variable. Finally, policy performance could be correlated
to time effects, which may be stationary or dynamic, τt. POLS esti-
mates of β, βˆPOLS, will therefore be biased due to the term:
δ = αi + γit + τt (14)
contained in the error term εit of the linear regression model above.
An unbiased estimator of the coefficients will have to control for δ for
the estimates to be N−
1
2 -consistent.
Anderson re-examines the evidence for consensus democracy’s im-
pact on macroeconomic performance using a similar model, specifi-
cally the effect on inflation and unemployment using a twenty year
cross-national panel of OECD countries. Anderson’s results suggest
that consensus democracies have on average higher inflation and un-
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employment, a reversal of the effects signs reported in Lijphart. [7]
No steps are taken, however, to control for economic determinants
of unemployment and inflation, for country effects or serial correla-
tion. Moreover, political variables such as consensus democracy, cor-
poratism and central bank independence are included in the same
equations, which are unlikely to be exogenous or uncorrelated, espe-
cially since central bank independence is actually a significant factor
in Lijphart’s federalism-unitary component of consensus democracy,
which would rule out a consistent estimate. In Anderson the changes
to the effect signs maybe the result of inconsistency and/or biased-
ness. Another possibility is that the use of time-series data as op-
posed to time-averaged data makes the consensus democracy vector
too sparse because contained in this component is a lot of constant
institutional factors such as federalism.
An earlier paper by Crepaz consistent with Lijphart’s evidence of-
fers a model expanded to panel data and control variables using stan-
dard errors that are panel-heteroskedasticity consistent and that in-
cludes an autoregressive term of type-1:
Yit = ζYit−1 +Xitβ+ εit (15)
It is a reasonable assumption, however, that country effects will not
be identical in a panel sample, i.e., αi = α and for this reason the
POLS estimator used in this paper is not ideal in this setting. The
other problem with this statistical model is that autoregressive mod-
els do not correct for endogenous covariates. If AR(1) serial correla-
tion exists, meaning that inflation at time t is a function of inflation
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at time t− 1, then lagging the dependent variable will correct for seri-
ally correlated inflation levels. However, lagged dependent variables
are not an instrumental variables in the sense of correcting for the
endogeneity of consensus politics. Lagged dependent variables can
be used in the case where regressors are only weakly exogenous, i.e.,
E(ε|Xit, Yit−1) = 0. In the case where the regressors are correlated
to the error term, E(ε|Xit) = 0, estimates are inconsistent, that is to
say, we don’t learn more about the true value of the effect size as
we feed more data into the estimator. Consider one aspect of power-
sharing politics: minimal winning coalitions; a factor used in the con-
sensus democracy components indicating the existence of a cabinet
where the member parties possess a majority in parliament but a ma-
jority dependent on the smallest cabinet party bloc. An endogenous
model of cabinet formation could reasonably assume that in some
m-dimensional policy space the vote share in a national election is a
function of the spread of citizens’ policy preferences. Macroeconomic
changes affect citizens’ policy preferences by limiting their choices
about how they save and consume. Therefore, the past macroeco-
nomic weather of a society marginally determines the future distribu-
tion of party preferences, which determines the future vote share. The
vote share determines cabinet fractionalization. If this model holds,
then the partial effect of consensus democracy on inflation could be
biased because it contains not only time-invariant institutional factors
but dynamically changing coalition politics. This means that part of
our measure of consensus democracy’s effect on inflation is actually
the inverse of the effect of inflationary fluctuations via the changes
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this triggers in voters’ policy preferences. Specification as a reduced
form model may therefore be inappropriate when examining political
variables of this nature.
The context in which this debate emerged are the measurements
of democratic inclusiveness presented by Lijphart. These are two sig-
nificant principal components: the executive-parties index measuring
aspects of cabinets, party system size, corporatism and elections, and
the federal-unitary index, derived from data on constitutional struc-
ture, monetary institutions and the judiciary. The underlying assump-
tion in the original study is that the significant principal components,
which bely the point of axis rotation capturing the maximum vari-
ance, are measuring democratic inclusiveness.
The next issue at hand is how we determine the policy and be-
havioural effects of inclusive democratic institutions, in the particular
consociationalist sense. Consider one aspect of power-sharing politics:
minimal winning coalitions; a factor used in the consensus democracy
components indicating the existence of a cabinet where the member
parties possess a majority in parliament but a majority dependent on
the smallest cabinet party bloc. A serious problem here is that the
size and contents of the governing coalition is determined by what
voters want, and what voters want can be caused by the same thing
we are trying to model as a dependent variable. Now imagine the
situation of national political leaders committing to go to war. Bueno
de Mesquita and Siverson identify a measurable negative statistical
effect between military engagement and the survival of political lead-
ers. [42] War can elicit voter backlashes against national leaders, par-
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ticularly in the case of augmented and unpopular military conflicts.
In addition, the commitment of military resources to a conflict has to
exert budgetary constraints on public transfers. Therefore, it might be
said that the actual inconsistent linear unobserved effects model we
would be implementing in this case is: Yit = αi + Xitβ+ εit, where
εit = uit + vit; vit representing the omitted partial effect of military
conflict, which is acting on cabinet duration and welfare expenditure.
The assumption that vit could be averaged out in the fixed effect αi is
unlikely given the panel being studied here covers multiple decades.
7.3 a vale of tears? an analysis of desiderata
Putting these specification problems aside for the moment, let us con-
sider the alleged welfare effects of consensus democracy. The litera-
ture is quite univocal on, for example, the largesse of the welfare state
when the political system of more consensual. But the welfare spend-
ing effects of consensus democracy may not necessarily indicate wel-
fare gains qua aggregate utility. In this chapter I pickup the multivari-
ate framework employed in Easterly [71] and transport it to the con-
sensus democracy setting. Here, quality of life is measured according
to seven variable categories: ‘individual rights and democracy’, ‘po-
litical instability and war’, ‘education’, ‘health’, ‘transport and com-
munication’, ‘inequality’ and various outcomes that are simply cate-
gorized as ‘bad’ (e.g., crime and environmental pollution). Statistical
inference on parameters across lots of models requires an assump-
tion that the error terms are not correlated. Easterly’s identification
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strategy for asymptotic standard errors is based on a Seemingly Unre-
lated Regressions (SUR) estimator, which loosens OLS moment condi-
tions to allow for errors to be contemporaneously correlated between
equations and also includes fixed-effects for static cross-national het-
erogeneity to be factored out of the model errors. The different re-
gressors used in this chapter make this approach less robust because
variables containing information about political institutions tend to
be fairly static in short to medium sized time-series. This means that
fixed effects will eject a lot of important information in the data. Be-
cause of this, it is more convenient to model national differences as
a factor influencing the interval width of national response averages,
i.e., random effects, provided they are uncorrelated to the regressors.
This condition may be violated for example in a situation where un-
stable coalitions due to the fragmentation of the legislative assembly
creates mixed policy performances. Moreover, differences in national
aggregates such as those related to political instability and civil vi-
olence or development are not realistically characterized as unequal
variances (e.g.,it would seem unintuitive to think of the amount of
bombings in Palestine and Canada respectively not as a difference
of levels but a difference in how predictable these events are). 1 In
1 Seemingly Unrelated Regression estimation was authored by Zellner to address the
imprecision in single equation regression estimators that is caused by not treating
a set of related conditional distributions as forming a simultaneous system of equa-
tions. This happens in the case of ‘seemingly’ related regression equations - that
is, where the similarity in the dependent variables leads to correlation across the
error terms, while the covariates are still exogenous. Not recognizing that the sys-
tem at large gives information about the individual error terms means that a single
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this instance aggregate social welfare is approximated by a function,
f(Y1, Y2, ...,YK) of K proxy variables, Yk. For our institutional vari-
ables, Ic, gains to social welfare are indicated by the partial deriva-
tives insofar as, ∂Yk∂Ic > 0. Social welfare is necessarily variegated and
so it is necessary to gather a large number of proxy variables. In this
application K = 80. These are from the dataset used by Easterly in his
economic growth study. [71]
This is admittedly a crude approximation. For example, we have
no idea about how these different proxies of social welfare should
be weighted according to their importance. As such, we are only con-
cerned here with making qualitative inferences from the effect signs. 2
We are chiefly interested in the social welfare effects of the executive-
parties index. Since the federal-unitary index is orthogonal to the E-P
variable it is uncertain how it should be interpreted qua a measure-
ment of the level of consensus democracy. 3 On balance the E-P index
equation estimator will not be the most efficient linear estimator in this application
if a tractable multiple equation estimator can be implemented. SUR fills this gap,
provided that the system of equations is not under-identified, by allowing the error
terms within each batch of conditional distributions being compared to be arbitrar-
ily correlated with each other. [238] In the case where some endogenous covariates
have to be instrumented with excludable independent variables, SUR is equivalent
to 3SLS.
2 Full regression results are given in the Appendix (A.2).
3 The F-U index pertains more to what Lijphart calls the dimension of ‘segmental
autonomy’.
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Table 26: Descriptive Statistics for Quality of Life Variables from Easterly
(1999)
Variable N min max mean variance
Freedom from expropriation 42 5 10 8.3 3.3
Government keeps contracts 42 4 10 7.8 3.5
Bureaucratic quality 61 2 6 4.9 1.8
Rule of Law 61 1 6 4.7 2.7
Freedom from corruption 61 0 6 4.8 2.3
Civil liberties 105 1 6 1.7 1.2
Human rights rating 58 54 99 88 123.3
Percentage of Children working 65 0 38.2 6.3 75.4
Political rights 105 1 6 1.5 0.7
Independence of military and politics 65 2 6 5.3 1.1
Number of Cabinet Changes 93 0 2 0.4 0.3
Deaths from political violence 56 0 0.3 0.011 0.002
General Strikes 127 0 6 0.3 0.8
Government Crises 128 0 5 0.5 1
Assassinations per million 95 0 0.092 0.0066 0.0003
Number of coups 99 0 0.2 0.002 0.0004
Number of revolutions 96 0 1.4 0.04 0.03
Purges 128 0 5 0.1 0.2
Riots 128 0 15 0.9 6.6
War deaths 144 0 1500.9 41.2 29110.2
Freedom from risk external conflict 65 2 10 8.9 3.2
Freedom from risk civil war 65 1 6 5.2 1.3
Absence of racial tensions 65 0 6 4.6 2.3
Percentage involved separatists 52 0 42 6 146.6
Schooling years adults 132 0.7 12.1 6.4 7.6
Percentage literate 92 20 99.5 88.6 330.5
Percentage without schooling 132 0 85.7 13.9 468.5
Gross enrolment ratio higher ed 136 0 0.58 0.16 0.02
Gross enrolment ratio secondary ed 134 0.01 1 0.62 0.07
Gross enrolment ratio primary ed 135 0.32 1 0.96 0.01
Museums per capita 46 0.4 54.5 18.3 251.8
Books published per capita 84 0 4.9 0.6 0.6
Life expectancy at birth 120 41 77.3 69.1 61.1
Infant mortality 132 5 175 34.1 1167.4
Child mortality 99 5 206 48.6 1910.6
Calorie intake daily 102 2030 3987 3030.9 201401.3
Protein intake daily 102 41.8 130.9 87.1 388.7
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Table 27: Descriptive Statistics for Quality of Life Variables (cont’d)
Hospital beds per capita 113 0.6 1939 223.8 154851.5
Doctors per capita 108 0.4 47.6 12.8 66.5
Nurses per capita 85 0.6 142.9 40.6 801.1
Percentage access safe water 23 17 100 74.1 562
Percentage rural access safe water 26 6 100 63.1 906.3
Percentage urban access safe water 26 44 100 91.7 194.1
Access to sanitation 57 7 100 83.6 670.8
Access to sanitation rural 39 0 100 79.7 1146.7
Access to sanitation urban 38 14 100 91.9 424.5
Share of roads paved 55 0 2.7 0.2 0.2
Road length per car 67 2.4 100 66.5 985.6
Railroad mileage per square mile 92 0 0.244 0.062 0.004
Telephones per capita 125 0 1 0.3 0.06
Telegrams per capita 59 0 1948.2 377.6 181605.2
Radios per capita 128 0 2.1 0.4 0.1
TVs per capita 128 0 0.7 0.2 0.02
Mail per capita 58 3.8 409.9 119 8746.7
Faxes per capita 55 0 32.2 5.6 52
Gini coefficient 106 23.5 62.8 37.3 68.9
Income share bottom fifth 95 0.019 0.0945 0.0624 0.0003
Income share third fifth 95 0.266 0.573 0.514 0.003
Income share top fifth 95 0.341 0.68 0.424 0.005
Female to male schooling years 132 0.255 1.062 0.866 0.029
Female to male literacy 95 31 118.92 93.1 199.04
Female to male primary enrolment 132 0.12 1.44 1 0.01
Female to male secondary enrolment 129 0.12 1.93 0.94 0.05
Female to male higher enrolment 130 0 1.29 0.67 0.07
Fraud rate per capita 71 0.1 1735.6 206.2 87230.5
Freedom from political terrorism 65 1 6 4.6 2.2
Homicides per capita 71 0.1 28.6 5 25.5
Manslaughter per capita 57 0 32.3 2.6 30.1
Robbery per capita 73 0.8 1492 82.6 34882.7
Rape per capita 70 0.5 100.1 12.2 258.6
Drug crimes per capita 73 1 746.2 116.6 18338.7
Carbon Dioxide emissions per capita 104 0.3 38 7.4 32.3
Industrial CO2 emissions per capita 136 0 11.1 2 3.7
Sulphur Dioxide emissions per capita 55 0 0.3 0.1 0.003
Nitrogen Oxides emissions per capita 59 2.2 89.5 38.8 443.6
Suspended particulate matter 33 15.9 371.7 83.3 7777.4
Annual forest area change 96 -0.0329 0.0326 0 0.0001
Waste paper production per capita 88 0 113.1 31.4 721.9
Injuries at work 44 0.1 135.7 29.7 961.6
Suicides per capita 40 23.7 316 130.3 5620.7
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Figure 18: Ordered t-statistics from SUR estimates
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Figure 19: Ordered t-statistics from SUR estimates (cont’d)
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gives more positive boosts to social welfare than negative on the basis
of Figure 18, i.e., there are more statistically significant positive coef-
ficients based on the t-statistics. The F-U index produces on balance
more negative social welfare effects. We might infer at this point that
conciliar democracy is better for the social welfare than majoritarian
democracy.
7.4 discussion
The problem is that the theory of consensus democracy has not been
developed in the comparative politics literature to the level of con-
creteness that would give a structural equation model outlining a
feasible reduced form that could be picked off and empirically anal-
ysed. Such provisions would also have to include an articulation of
the channels by which consensus democracy alters policy choices and
how these relate to other determinants of these outcomes. An exam-
ple of an early “grand theory” model of consensus democracy can
be found in the public choice literature by Ticchi and Vindigni. The
authors demonstrate how in a three-class model of society where pol-
itics is a collective choice problem about the redistribution of goods
what constitutional preferences are formed whether for conciliar demo-
cratic institutions or institutions that are exclusivist, competitive or
majoritarian. In their 3-class model the authors illustrate dynamics
where majoritarianism is preferred by the rich while the middleclass
prefer consensus democracy and the poor countenance either depend-
ing on the levels of inequality. When inequality is low the poor pre-
284 is life better in a consensus democracy?
fer consensus democracy. When it is high they prefer majoritarian-
ism. [214, p.3] One important upshot of Ticchi and Vindigni’s model
is that it makes the connection between the positive theory of consen-
sus democracy and moral philosophy by inviting us to consider what
are equilibrium preferences under a veil of ignorance assumption, i.e.,
in a situation where we would not know ex ante, which economic class
we will belong to.
The evidence in favour of the putative benedictions of inclusive in-
stitutions is not yet robust enough to assent to the proposition that
these are an accurate approximation of the causal parameters. There
could be, for example, self-selection in the data where consensus in-
stitutions appear to lead to be better democracies because political
systems that are more inclusive in nature are inseparably linked to
mechanisms that facilitate higher rent extraction by political leaders.
Positing that institutions that facilitate rent-seeking are equilibrium
institutions, i.e., political agents will penetrate through institutional
barriers that preclude rent-seeking behaviour, such as restrictions on
campaign contributions by lobby groups, it is natural to assume that
the self-selection effect is in the direction of inclusive institutions. As
such, systems that favour rent-seeking behaviour should be more per-
sistent historically than those that do not, at least not to the same
degree.
Recalling the factor variables of consensus democracy, inclusive-
ness is measured by taking information from axis rotation of data
on constitutional features such as bicameralism, federalism, electoral
laws, constitutional rigidity, and the review powers of the judiciary,
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and broader factors such as the size of the party system, special inter-
est diversity and central bank independence. Hence, some of these
things that are countervailing forces against rent-seeking seem at
first glance to be an independent central bank, unicameralism, first-
past-the-post electoral rules, a small party system, steeled constitu-
tional amendment procedures, and an interest group network with-
out crowding. As such, all the things that are exclusivist appear to
equate to the toughest barriers obstructing the capacity for large num-
bers of groups to successfully capture rents.
Upon further reflection there may not be a simple correlation be-
tween the amount of calories individuals dissipate in rent-seeking
activities and how inclusive political institutions are. Exclusive insti-
tutions may preclude the entrance of new effective rent-seekers but
they may also make individually large rents easier to capture and re-
produce. For example, in terms of political rents, it is plausible that
office holders face incentives to take home larger rents in winner-
takes-all systems while in power because their discount factors are
higher, i.e., waiting for payoffs is expensive because of the prospect
of losing office without an option to participate in coalition govern-
ments in the future. Out of this concern, I go on to examine this topic
in finer detail so that expectations by each institutional dimension can
be articulated from previous studies.
Some early predictions on institutional effects on rent-seeking were
made in McCormick and Tollison [153, pp.293-313], and in Con-
gleton. [55, pp.153-79] In the former, the authors illustrate a model
that leads to the conclusion that legislatures that are small and in
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possession of equally sized chambers favour rent-seeking behaviour
by interest groups. Congleton analyses institutional determinants of
rent-seeking behaviour by analysing dominant strategies under dif-
ferent versions of the ‘winner-takes-all-that-remains’ game with third
party arbitration. His result is basically that competition for support
of the arbitrators tends toward a higher level of competitive bidding
in a scenario analogous to proportional representation. This predic-
tion is supported empirically in Persson and Tabellini [174] and in
Milesi-Ferretti [160] The evidence in Milesi-Ferrettie, et al., is most
encouraging because proportionality in electoral mechanisms is mea-
sured on a finer scale than as a discrete Bernoulli variable and also
because spending is disaggregated to focus specifically on spending
that amounts to wealth transfers.
In contrast to the association of consensus democracy with gains
to social welfare we can also observe a correlation between consen-
sus democracy and the inefficiency of distributive justice. Just as we
might expect, power-sharing institutions favour rent-seeking in gov-
ernment on the behalf of various sectional interests. Figure 20 shows
the linear trend between levels of tax churning and the executive-
parties index. In states that score more highly on the E-P index such
as Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands we also see increased rates
of redundancy and waste in the system of wealth transfers as indi-
cated by the phenomenon of tax churning. Tax churning is a measure-
ment of the extent to which households who receive wealth transfers
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Figure 20: Correlation between inefficient wealth transfers and Executive-
Parties index
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Figure 21: Correlation between inefficient wealth transfers and Federal-
Unitary index
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are equally financing wealth transfers through taxation. 4 This rela-
tionship gives currency to the notion that political systems which
facilitate conciliar democracy will also be a leaven to poor coordina-
tion of distributive justice via the stimulus given to patronage net-
works and various other forms of rent-seeking behaviour. In contrast,
states which score high on the factor orthogonal to the E-P index,
the federal-unitary index, have much lower rates of tax churning (see
Figure 21). The case that appears to defy the trend is Japan, which
scores over 0.5 on the E-P index and has tax churning levels as low
as Canada’s. This anomaly is only apparent, however. There is less
tax churning in Japan mainly because there were less public welfare
services in Japan around the time this data was collected (mid 1990s).
Relative to its level of economic development, Japan runs a frugal
public welfare system. Cultural and structural factors account for this.
There has tended to be low demand for welfare services in Japan due
to low unemployment and associated social ills such as crime and
homelessness. Private subsidiarity has been alleged to play a large
role as well. Confucian values stress the responsibility of the fam-
ily and the local community in providing for the welfare of those
less fortunate persons. The combination of low unemployment and
widespread provision of corporate pensions and social benefits has
also reduced demand for public welfare services in Japan. [77, p.180]
Lastly, the high E-P index score for Japan is deceptive because while
it may have de jure power-sharing features in the architecture of its
4 Tax churning data was recovered from the OECD Economic Outlook of June 1998. [171,
p.163]
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political system, the political system was effectively a one-party state
when the conservative Liberal Democratic Party held government for
an astonishingly long period between 1955 and 2009, with only a
brief interregnum in 1993 and 1994 when a government coalition was
formed.
7.5 a closer look at the institutional effects of nego-
tiation democracy
For now I wish to turn to the World Bank’s dataset on political in-
stitutions in order to collect additional evidence on this subject and
address some of the endogeneity issues discussed in the opening of
this chapter. Specifically, I wish to address the question of whether
consensus democracy truly enhances social welfare by causing less
incidents of sub-war militarized social conflict and by boosting the
size of the public welfare sector.
7.5.1 Welfare
The growth of the welfare state in the twentieth century happened
within the broader context of the growth of government spending
more generally. Tanzi and Schuknecht posit three major historical
dénouements in global government spending trends during the nine-
teenth and twentieth century. The first comprehensive national health
insurance program was implemented by Germany under Bismark in
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1883, which operated at a time when the consensus among the in-
dustrial powers was to keep government spending low, maintain pri-
mary balances in the black and leave the responsibility of providing
for the educational, health related and social security needs of the
citizen to private bodies and individuals. The spirit of this period is
conveyed adequately in the title of Keynes’ manuscript The End of
Laissez-faire. The death of laissez-faire was preceded by a brief period
of laissez-payer when the stormhead of WWI stimulated an increase
in government spending in order to furnish the trenches of Europe
with men and arms. By the late nineteenth century government was
considerably smaller compared to the latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury with gross government spending among the industrial powers
of Europe as well as Canada, USA, Japan, Australia and New Zealand
resting at about 11 percent of GDP. The destruction of the laissez-faire
consensus described by Keynes as a result of the Great Depression
brought government spending up to almost a quarter of GDP on av-
erage among these nations by 1937. Growth in government spending
continued along this gradient after WWII until about 1980 at which
point it has stabilized ever since at a global average of about 42 per-
cent of GDP. It is no coincidence that this stabilization in spending
growth rates occurred while interest payments on public debt surged
and demographic dynamics have made universal healthcare and pen-
sion obligations difficult to meet. Nevertheless, the consensus among
industrial powers which appears to have no intention of abating is
that it is the government’s prerogative to insulate citizens from risk,
from the cradle to the grave. [212, pp.3-22]
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Figure 22: Global movements in welfare sector size and cabinet diversity
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The data being examined here are a vector of nationally aggregated
transfer payments that changes its value at regular time steps t. A
transfer payment is a government directed redistribution of income
by way of welfare assistance in the form of financial payments or
subsidies to individuals, households or organizations. For this mea-
surement, aggregate transfer payments are normalized by GDP. We
are interested in government expenditure on public transfers as a
measurement of welfare policy, which we treat here endogenously
as determined by how consensual political institutions are. Welfare
expenditure is an important policy area for its centrality to debates
about whether government mandated action can reduce poverty and
inequality. Wealth redistribution via taxation financed public trans-
fers is a system of pooled risk. Individuals are offered insurance in the
case of economic misfortune. However, the contribution they make to
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the pool is incongruous with the proceeds they receive. Trends in wel-
fare regimes among the OECD nations have gone through a number
of convolutions.
Crepaz argues that consensus institutions stimulate expansions in
the size of the welfare sector due to their greater capacity for different
special interests. [58, p.76] This view is echoed in World Bank panel
data if we characterize this diversity in representation in terms of a
government fractionalization - a variable that states the probability
that two randomly selected legislators (lowerhouse) will be from dif-
ferent parties. Levels of welfare spending do tend to rise and fall with
the diversity of political representation (outside of the first half of the
‘80s).
The fact that an increase in the width of representation goes hand
in hand with more wealth transfers, as can be observed in Figure 22,
raises a normative and a causal problem. First, why does a higher vol-
ume of wealth transfers mean better democracy? Couldn’t these num-
bers just be the sum of wasteful special interest projects that don’t
collectively produce more social benefits? Second, it seems that there
is an overlap between the definition of power-sharing institutions and
rent-seeking, which would reduce tautologically, for example, the ef-
fects on welfare spending. Rent-seeking is the act of pursuing ben-
efits or payoffs from a transaction in excess of what one is entitled
to based the related opportunity cost of the transaction. Political rent
extraction is the award of such payoffs through the solicitation of
a politically granted monopoly. For example, professional guilds that
are awarded a legal monopoly on determining who can gain entrance
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into a labour market (e.g., dentistry) is an example of rent seeking. As
a concept it does not have to mean things that are inherently bad but
rather it is intended to convey with greater clarity what in essence
characterizes resource allocations that are socially wasteful. [41]
This chapter intends to exploit panel data structure in order to
test the theory that the installation of institutional features associ-
ated with conciliar democracy will stimulate more buoyant democ-
racy hence. There are a number of reasons why panel data analy-
sis is superior to the cross-sectional approach deployed in PD. Most
notably, without a time-series dimension, we do not know whether
reverse causality is at play. Simply relying on cross-sectional infer-
ence to say that inclusive democracy creates better policy outcomes
does not rule out the possibility that countries with better policy out-
comes could select into consensus institutions. Panel data analysis
also offers more accurate estimates, a greater propensity to capture
dynamic causal effects, less multicollinearity, and better controls for
omitted variables than cross-sectional methods for the kind of data
being used here. [113] An illustrative example of this performance
gap between cross-sectional and panel analysis is provided in Ace-
moglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared [3] where the authors examine
the causal link between education and democracy.
Where possible fixed effects models were used with country clus-
tered standard errors. By adopting this approach, the estimator de-
nudes from the estimates biases that are related to unobservable coun-
try specific qualitative factors, such as culture, that may otherwise
interfere with the estimates. This quality makes the fixed effects esti-
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mator a powerful tool in comparative analysis as cross national com-
parisons invite a high potential for omitted variable bias. In addition
to controlling for these unobserved country-effects, year fixed effects
were also used in the models to prevent time-related effects, such as
cycles and punctuated equilibrium, from permeating the variation be-
ing observed by the institutional variables under examination. How-
ever, some of the independent variables do not change over time, a
common problem in examining institutional effects. Under these cir-
cumstances it is not possible to use fixed effects because the time
demeaning transformation used in the estimation removes time in-
variant variables from the model. As such a random effects estimator
can be used in place of the fixed effects estimator. The random effects
estimator is believed to be just as consistent as the fixed effects esti-
mator provided the assumption, that the unobserved country effect
is not correlated to the explanatory variables, holds. Hausman tests
are presented in order to test the consistency of random effects.
The design matrix used for the regression analysis was constructed
to provide proxies for the original four pillars of Lijphart’s institu-
tional model: grand coalition, minority veto, proportionality and seg-
mental autonomy. [139, p.25] Grand coalitions were identified by us-
ing a variable from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institu-
tions, the government fractionalization index, which gives the prob-
ability that two members of government parties selected at random
will be from different political parties. [25] As government fraction-
alization increases, it logically follows that there will be a larger gov-
ernment coalition for the given country-year. this measure is a slight
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departure from formal definition provided in the coalition dynamics
literature where a grand coalition is identified as one involving at
least two of the largest parties in parliament. This fractionalization in-
dex is preferred because it measures the differences in coalition size
on a gradation. To measure mutual veto in the regression analysis a
dummy variable was constructed from the DPI to represent the situa-
tion where the sum of government party votes minus those of the ith
smallest government party fails to reach a majority. This should ac-
curately approximate Lijphart’s concept of minority veto, where the
passing of a government sponsored bill is dependent on the support
of the smallest coalition member. [139, p.90] Electoral disproportional-
ity was measured using the Gallagher index, an index estimating the
dispersion effect between the number of votes won by parties and the
number of seats won for a given lower-house election. [82] 5 Lower
Gallagher index scores indicate higher proportionality. A variable for
segmental autonomy was provided by calculating a weighted addi-
tive score from the following factors: the existence of self-governing
regions, the existence of state government with authority over spend-
ing, legislating and/or taxation, local elections for state government,
the existence of an upper legislative house and local elections for mu-
nicipal government. [25]In order to compensate for the multidimen-
sionality of this variable, dummies were included for the existence of
autonomous regions and a federal constitutional structure. [174] Fi-
nally, a more general indicator of power sharing is provided by using
5 The data can be found at: http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_
gallagher/ElectoralStudies1991.pdf.
7.5 a closer look at the institutional effects of negotiation democracy 297
a variable from the DPI indicating the number of veto players in a
political system. This variable is incremented by one on the basis of
the number of agents in the legislative-executive complex with policy
veto power. [25]
In order to prevent omitted variable bias a series of control vari-
ables were selected to avoid bias from unaccounted exogenous sources
of variation. For welfare spending controls were included for eco-
nomics (income levels, economic growth and budget deficits) and
demography and geography (population size, age ratio, location and
country size). Openness to trade was also included in order to capture
the effect of increasing demand for welfare provisions in economies
that are more exposed to the vicissitudes of the free market. [87, 184]
(This relationship is far from being widely accepted in the literature.
Sceptical assessments can be found in Iversen and Cusak [118] and
Van Kersbergen [225].) The regression analysis includes for each in-
stitutional covariate models without control variables in order to com-
pensate for weak controls and to screen for multicollinearity.
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Table 28: Descriptive statistics of DPI regressors and regressands
N Min Max Mean St. Dev.
Guerrilla Warfare 8458 0 1 0.1 0.3
Welfare Spending 1772 0 26 6.3 6.1
Government Fractionalization 4404 0 1 0.2 0.3
Veto Players 5038 1 18 2.4 1.7
Minority Veto 4561 0 1 0.1 0.3
Segmental Autonomy 786 0 5.5 1.8 1.5
Federalism 2340 0 1 0.2 0.4
Electoral Disproportionality 3137 0.3 33.1 7.5 6.8
Ethnic Quota 5975 0 1 0.1 0.4
Autonomous Region 4859 0 1 0.1 0.3
What facts can we gather from these estimates? First, we see that
the probability weighted averages of welfare spending cannot be ac-
curately captured in the intercepts, which supports the assumption
of cross-national heterogeneity that led to the use of fixed effects to
condition-out variation in the response endogenous to unobserved
national differences. In other words, nation-wise variation is unlikely
to be generating from the same probability model (also, this motivates
the use of unit clustered standard errors, which comes at the cost of
wider standard errors due to SEs being computed from smaller sam-
ple sizes.) The correlative evidence reported in the aforementioned
figure on government fractionalization, appears to be stronger. Wel-
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Table 29: Effects on Welfare Expenditure (clustered SEs in parentheses)
Model 1-LSDV Model 2-LSDV Model 3-LSDV Model 4-LSDV Model 5-LSDV Model 6-LSDV Model 7-LSDV
Intercept 8.98 28.59 -9.99 8.9 27.89 10.45 23.92
(0.16) (28.66) (25.78) (0.22) (27.89) (0.12) (35.27)
Govt Frac 1.21 1 0.85
(0.61) (0.58) (0.53)
Veto Players 0.08 -0.05
(0.06) (0.06)
Minority Veto 0.36 0.39
(0.42) (0.34)
ln(GDP) 0.2 3.01 0.34 -0.01
(1.72) (1.7) (1.68) (2.24)
Growth -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Surplus -0.08 -0.11 -0.08 -0.11
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Trade openness -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
ln(Pop) -2.34 -0.82 -2.34 -1.26
(2.32) (2.29) (2.23) (2.78)
% Pop over 64 -0.06 0.03 -0.09 0.12
(0.37) (0.38) (0.34) (0.41)
Inequality 0.05
(0.07)
R2-within 0.018 0.233 0.294 0.004 0.226 0.005 0.269
F-statistic 3.88 3.90 5.92 2.25 3.89 0.73 4.53
N 765 725 634 772 732 627 593
Countries 65 61 53 65 61 62 57
Years 1975-1999 1976-1999 1975-1997 1975-1999 1976-1999 1975-1998 1975-1998
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 30: Effects on Welfare (time invariant regressors/clustered SEs)
Model 8-FGLS Model 9-FGLS Model 10-LSDV Model 11-FGLS Model 12-FGLS Model 13-FGLS Model 14-FGLS
Intercept 8.13 -4.54 10.32 10.01 -19.79 8.36 -5.39
(1.1) (9.8) (0.33) (1.02) (13.6) (0.77) (7.63)
Federalism 0.32 -0.9
(1.87) (1.11)
Electoral Disprop 0.13 0.11 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08)
Ethnic Quota -0.3 0.06
(2.21) (1.42)
Auto Region 0.01 -1.64
(0.16) (0.58)
ln(GDP) 0.6 2.62 1.04
(1.25) (1.59) (0.95)
Growth -0.07 -0.12 -0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Surplus -0.11 -0.14 -0.1
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Trade Openness 0.01 -0.01 0
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
ln(Pop) 0.12 0.41 0.39
(0.58) (0.79) (0.56)
% Pop over 64 0.75 0.74 0.66
(0.32) (0.26) (0.25)
Outside Euro/NA 2.62 -0.96 2.16
(2.36) (1.99) (1.96)
ln(landmass) -0.17 -0.45 -0.49
(0.42) (0.48) (0.36)
R2-within 0.022
R2-overall 0.006 0.728 0.034 0.561 0.005 0.687
F-stat 5.21
Wald χ2 0.03 138.08 4.55 56.61 0 98.85
Hausman p 0.566 0.039 0.004
N 764 713 631 615 599 773 728
Countries 45 44 43 43 43 65 60
Years 1971-1997 1972-1997 1971-1997 1972-1997 1973-1998 1975-1998 1975-1998
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No No No
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fare spending appears to be mean dependent on consensus institu-
tions based on these results. In particular, assembly fractionalization
is associated with statistically measurable, positive increments in wel-
fare spending. These model fits only have so much currency, however.
Plug-and-play identification remedies, such as GLS and within esti-
mation, for panel data of this nature have been shown to lack robust-
ness in models of aggregate government spending, (for example, see
the replication analysis done by Kittel (2006) of his own earlier find-
ings relating cabinet ideology to government spending. [123, 124])
Veto players, minority veto and federalism do not carry statistically
significant effects on welfare spending in the welfare models. (The
effect of the segmental autonomy variable could not be tested due
to sample attrition). Some of the signs are not consistent with conso-
ciational theory. Federalism, although not statistically significant, ap-
pears to reduce welfare spending by 0.9 of a percentage point of GDP
(Model 24). In addition, autonomous regions reduce welfare spend-
ing by 1.6 percentage points of GDP. This result is robust to the one
percent level of significance (Model 29). (The FEVD estimates give
a coefficient of -0.783 with approximate t-statistic). Hence, if, for ex-
ample, in Canada between 1975 and 1997 autonomous status was ex-
tended to the Quebec region, then the expected level of expenditure
on welfare, based on the parameters of Model 29, would have been
on average 1.4 percentage points lower than the fitted value given the
actual status of Quebec as a non-autonomous province. One possi-
ble explanation for this result is that autonomous regions comprise
land occupied by a large segment of the national population. As au-
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tonomous regions take on their own social policy prerogatives they
in effect contract the population of welfare recipients the central gov-
ernment serves.
Government fractionalization appears to increase welfare spending
by one percentage point of GDP, a result that, although only signifi-
cant at the ten percent level, is consistent with consociational theory
(Model 17). Crepaz argues that consociational institutions stimulate
expansions in the welfare state due to their greater capacity to rep-
resent the interests of excluded groups. The more of these groups
are represented in government, the more demands there will be for
government concessions. [58] Crepaz’s claims are not supported by
Models 19 and 20, which indicate that the number of institutional
and partisan veto players have no measurable effect on welfare ex-
penditure, or for that matter by the weak results contained in the
majority of the institutional coefficients. One problem with the re-
sults from Model 17 is that for many observations the probability of
randomly selecting two government members from different parties
is zero. Such observations are mostly the result of a presidential con-
stitutional structure, meaning that the effect of presidentialism may
be collinear with government fractionalization. This is a problem be-
cause Persson and Tabellini have established that presidential consti-
tutions tend to affect reductions in the size of the public sector. [174,
p.227] The good news is that having controlled for presidentialism,
the effect of government fractionalization on welfare expenditure ac-
tually grows in sign and significance. However, by including a control
variable for income inequality in Model 17 the statistical significance
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of government fractionalization retreats above the ten percent level.
Although not tenuous, the positive effect of government fractionaliza-
tion on welfare spending is tentative. 6
6 Some readers may be concerned about the high levels of missing data in some of the
regression models. It can be observed from reading the tables, in particular, in com-
paring the bivariate models with multivariate models, that the salient pattern is that
missingness appears largely in the models with full controls. This is self-explanatory:
more variables means more chances for rows to be thrown out from a single missing
cell. This fact is of little consequence to the interpretation of the results as the coeffi-
cients and p-values show little variation between bivariate and multivariate models.
This issue of missingness in regression analysis is a problematic one. The approach
adopted in this paper is that of ‘complete case analysis,’ meaning that if any element
is missing in the matrix of covariates, the entire row of observations correspond-
ing to that cell is dropped from the analysis. Some statisticians prefer to impute
missing values. However, imputation strategies for multivariate models are still a
nascent area of research. Certain independent variables carry higher missingness
than others. This is the case because some variables are composites of several vari-
ables: for example, segmental autonomy and minority veto, which again, happens
due to the use of complete case analysis (there is a higher chance of missingness
because the composites are derived from a matrix of multiple columns). Another
concern is what specific countries commonly occur in the regression models. Here
is a random list of countries that occur in the models: Argentina, Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Gambia, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, Israel,
Italy, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Panama,
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, Tanzania, United States,
Uruguay and Venezuela. This list was gathered by finding states with complete cases
in the following variables that occur frequently in the data: Guerilla Warfare, Wel-
fare Spending, Log(GDP), log(area), outside Europe/America, log(population) and
log(school enrolment).
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7.5.2 Violence
For the “gentler” facet of consensus institutions’ impact on the qual-
ity of democracy the dependent variable is a binary response (0,1)
indicating the incidence of guerilla warfare at t + 1. This means that
in testing the impact of consociationalism on civil violence a linear
probability model is implemented. As such, the parameters indicate
the marginal effect of consociationalism on the probability of insur-
gency in the next year. A value of ‘1’ for Guerilla Warfare indicates
the occurrence of sabotage, armed activity or bombings performed
by militants with the intention of overthrowing an existing govern-
ment. Some may question the appropriateness of using guerilla war-
fare as a surrogate measure for civil conflict because most the coun-
tries in Lijphart’s original sample will have a value of zero. In fact,
the average for this variable was 0.18 for Lijphart’s original sample
in PD, slightly higher than the global sample of 0.13. [16] Follow-
ing the Collier-Hoeffler model of civil conflict, a vector of controls
is introduced for socio-economic development (national income lev-
els, economic crisis, and school enrolment), demographics (popula-
tion size, age ratio and social group shares), geography (country size
and location), and history (foreign intervention in a country’s civil
war). [52] The last variable is important for parsing out the effect of
outside influence in the inflation of inter-group violence, a common
phenomenon during the Cold War where Soviet and American back-
ing of insurgents was frequent in the civil wars of Latin America and
Africa.
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The regression analysis shows that consociational institutions have
no systematic effects on civil violence. Once we have controlled for
unobserved effects, heterogeneity in the errors and omitted variables,
it appears that the results reported in PD lose their statistical signif-
icance. [139, ch.16] It cannot be said that consociationalism exacts a
causal effect on the quality of democracy. The amount of power shar-
ing in terms of policy veto players exerts a reduction in the likelihood
of guerilla violence that is ignorable. The same can be said for minor-
ity veto, segmental autonomy and federalism, all of which insignif-
icantly curtail the likelihood of guerilla violence by less than half a
percentage point. Electoral disproportionality has a negative effect
that is significant at the five percent level in reducing the likelihood
of guerilla activity by a negligible half a percentage point (Model 11).
However, once electoral systems with quotas for ethnic minorities are
factored in to the model this significance is lost (Model 12). There
is an obvious explanation for this. Higher scores on the Gallagher
index can be the product of both under-proportional distances be-
tween votes-won/seats-won and over-proportional distances between
votes -won/seats-won because, by taking the square of votes-won-
minus-seats-won, any negative values are transformed into a positive
number. Therefore, ethnic or gender quotas will register as dispro-
portional on the Gallagher index, a result that may easily be con-
fused with the existence of majoritarian institutions. In addition, it
will mean that the presence of minor coalition partners will skew the
index toward higher levels of disproportionality if vote pooling coali-
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Table 31: Linear probability models of incidents of guerilla warfare (clus-
tered SEs)
15 (LSDV-LPM) 16 (LSDV-LPM) 17 (LSDV-LPM) 18 (LSDV-LPM) 19 (LSDV-LPM) 20 (LSDV-LPM) 21 (FGLS-LPM) 22 (FGLS-LPM)
Intercept 0.139 0.448 0.164 -1.033 0.113 -8.000 0.125 -0.553
(0.013) (2.922) (0.035) (3.772) (0.005) (2.739) (0.074) (1.017)
Govt Frac -0.083 -0.165
(0.054) (0.102)
Veto Players -0.012 0
(0.009) (0.013)
Minority Veto -0.007 -0.037
(0.021) (0.043)
Seg Auto -0.025 -0.032
(0.026) (0.055)
ln(GDP) -0.056 -0.06 0.209 -0.003
(0.181) (0.191) (0.177) (0.082)
Output Shock -0.047 -0.044 -0.08 0.015
(0.067) (0.056) (0.049) (0.031)
ln(school) 0.034 -0.065 -0.190 0.091
(0.079) (0.087) (0.104) (0.072)
ln(pop) 0.016 0.136 0.519 -0.071
(0.242) (0.252) (0.283) (0.077)
% Pop below 65 -0.002 0.009 0.031 0.008
(0.021) (0.024) (0.02) (0.008)
Foreign Intrvn 0.022 -0.084 -0.043 0.006
(0.086) (0.116) (0.098) (0.036)
ln(landmass) 0.001
(0.031)
Outside Euro/NA 0.061
(0.071)
Ethnic Frac 0.153
(0.33)
Religious Frac -0.144
(0.19)
R2-within 0.004 0.046 0.003 0.044 0 0.059
R2-overall 0.006 0.022
F-stat 2.33 0.87 1.57 0.85 0.1 0.94
Wald χ2 0.91 3.84
Hausman p 0.376
N 2187 463 2193 467 1778 397 417 90
Countries 117 97 119 95 115 88 27 21
Years 1975-2006 1975-2001 1975-2006 1975-2001 1975-2006 1975-2001 1975-2004 1975-2000
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No No
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Table 32: Guerilla warfare (cont’d)
23 (FGLS-LPM) 24 (FGLS-LPM) 25 (LSDV-LPM) 26 (FGLS-LPM) 27 (FGLS-LPM) 28 (FGLS-LPM) 29 (FGLS-LPM)
Intercept 0.198 -0.859 0.143 0.104 -2.014 0.107 -2.009
(0.037) (2.011) (0.013) (0.027) (0.987) (0.02) (0.879)
Federalism 0.031 -0.023
(0.089) (0.088)
Electoral Disprop -0.005 -0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ethnic Quota 0.109 0.03
(0.076) (0.067)
Auto Region 0.007 0.069
(0.098) (0.118)
ln(GDP) -0.065 -0.067 -0.014
(0.086) (0.052) (0.043)
Output shock -0.017 0.028 0.134
(0.101) (0.06) (0.096)
ln(school) -0.008 0.054 0.006
(0.05) (0.056) (0.047)
ln(pop) 0.09 0.049 0.061
(0.066) (0.062) (0.052)
% Pop below 65 0.009 0.025 0.019
(0.014) (0.007) (0.005)
Foreign Intrvntn 0.071 0.074 0.078
(0.113) (0.153) (0.1)
ln(landmass) 0.001 -0.026 -0.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Outside Euro/NA -0.017 0.120 0.053
(0.079) (0.071) (0.062)
Ethnic Frac 0.133 0.1 -0.018
(0.151) (0.147) (0.102)
Religious Frac -0.06 -0.288 -0.069
(0.155) (0.149) (0.095)
R2-within 0.004
R2 overall 0 0.16 0.023 0.207 0.005 0.138
F-stat 5.70
Wald χ2 0.12 55.67 4.45 57.58 0.01 54.93
Hausman p 0.104 0.294 0.055
N 1576 890 2132 1419 427 2146 480
Countries 53 53 73 71 63 113 94
Years 1960-1998 1960-1998 1947-2006 1972-2004 1972-2001 1976-2006 1975-1999
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No No No
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tions are not counted as single parties. For this reason all vote-pooling
coalitions were counted as a single party.
The signs in Models 1-15 are for the most part consistent with the
models in PD. Consociationalism has the appearance of diminishing
guerilla violence but the magnitude of these effects is almost imper-
ceptible in the models displayed in Tables 31 and 32. However, this
may be the consequence of the models themselves. For example, the
assumption that imposing a linear model on the relationship between
an institutional status quo and political violence may be unrealistic.
This concern is underlined by the overall lack of robustness of the
models extended with control variables. In order to address this prob-
lem extended models were run using logistic regression in order to
allow for the institutional effects to vary dynamically. This exercise
did improve the original models by enhancing the effects of the in-
stitutional regressors. For example, replicating Model 1 with a fixed
effects logit estimator increased the size of the coefficient from -0.007
to -0.109. However, with the exception of autonomous regions the re-
gressors demonstrated similar p-value patterns as the linear models.
The logit replication of Model 15 gave a positive parameter for au-
tonomous regions that was significant at the ten percent level. This
coefficient indicated self-governing regions increased the likelihood
of guerilla violence by 84 percentage points. Without using an in-
strumental variable strategy, however, to correct for potential reverse
causality it is not clear whether this is counter-evidence to Lijphart’s
notion of segmental autonomy since insurgency is typically a vehi-
cle for establishing breakaway regions. Another problem with Model
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15 was the Hausman test, which indicated the possibility of inconsis-
tency in the random effects estimator. In order to address this, the
results from this model were matched with those from a fixed effects
vector decomposition (FEVD) model. FEVD allows for the vector of
unobserved country effects to be broken apart into a component con-
taining time invariant observed variables and an estimate of the true
unobserved effects. These vectors are then reinserted into an OLS
model to attain the final estimates. [177] This exercise produced a
coefficient of 0.037, although weaker than Model 15, the result is con-
sistent with the sign of the previous estimates including the logit
model.
7.6 conclusions
Consensus democracy, in and of itself, does not affect a curtailment
of civil violence, or augment welfare spending. One reason why this
may be the case is that previous attempts to model the effects of
consociational democracy on social and policy outcomes have failed
to control for endogeneity from unobserved country effects. [139,
ch.16] [58] [12] In other words, in assessing the impacts of consocia-
tional institutions on the quality of democracy, these authors failed to
control for unobserved differences in the countries themselves, such
as differences in culture or, for that matter, the quality of democracy.
Another reason for this divergence may be the decision to avoid re-
gressing multi-dimensional latent variables estimated from principal
component analysis. That being said, evidence was garnered to sup-
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port a positive relationship between coalition size and welfare expen-
diture.
These trends could be reflected in the differences in welfare state
size between continental Europe and majoritarian English speaking
countries such as Great Britain and the United States. Government
coalition size is partially determined by the proportionality of elec-
toral outcomes. Therefore, in electoral systems that facilitate the gov-
ernmental representation of parties defending the interests of voters
in the lower bound of the income distribution, greater wealth trans-
fers should be implemented. [5] Proportional representation could
affect this outcome since under this system it is much more difficult
for one government party to hold a basic majority. This argument
is supported in Persson and Tabellini who infer from cross-sectional
evidence that majoritarian electoral contests impede welfare spend-
ing, although only in aged democracies. [174, pp.172-3] However, the
underlying theory still contains many lacunae. Welfare spending is
supposed to be higher under proportional representation because in
countries where the poor are a minority they have more political mus-
cle within this framework than majoritarian representation. Yet this
also implies that where the median voter does belong to the indigent,
majoritarianism may actually be important in allowing the poor to
‘vote themselves rich’. This perspective offers an explanation of the
failure of the coefficient for government fractionalization to be robust
to the addition of a control for income inequality, which may carry a
confounding effect (Model 18).
7.6 conclusions 311
The effect of a proportional ballot on welfare spending may be en-
dogenous to voter behaviour. Even discounting the effect of income
distribution, the motivation for a poor median voter to select higher
wealth transfers could be attenuated by expected social mobility in
the future. Known as the ‘prospect of upward mobility’ hypothesis,
this states that a poor voter’s utility for selecting higher wealth trans-
fers at t0 may drop due to an unrealistic projection of his augmented
income at t1. Receiving social security for being poor at t0 doesn’t
mean you want to be paying for social security when you’re richer
than average at t1. [31] Likewise, in countries without a stable middle
class with which to emulate, poor voters’ wealth redistribution utility
may be raised on the expectation of future financial precariousness.
In addition, the simple story of the poor voting themselves out of
poverty in a country with proportional representation and normally
distributed income levels does not comprehend the potential for the
median voter’s utilities on welfare policy to be shaped by reciprocal
altruism, i.e., an estimation of how wealth transfers will affect oth-
ers’ consumption. [5, pp.205-6] In identifying a number of the loci of
potential endogeneity, it appears that the weaknesses of power shar-
ing institutional mechanisms in the regression analysis may be the
result of a number of confounding processes. The challenge of em-
pirically analysing the effects of consociationalism is made harder by
uncertainties in the theoretical framework. The reader may object to
the use of two dependent variables in this paper when the literatures
on welfare states and civil conflict are both voluminous and different.
This paper does not intend to provide a new theoretical framework
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to bridge these two subjects, or to provide a comprehensive review
of the literatures. Using multiple dependent variables is an accepted
practice in the political economy literature (cf. Easterly [71]).
This chapter demonstrates how key components of consociation-
alism fail to explain what makes some societies more bellicose and
others more generous. This finding should be interpreted as a chal-
lenge to consociationalism strictly at the theoretical level and not a
denial that in local contexts there may be persuasive arguments for
the installation of institutional architecture resembling Lijphart’s rec-
ommendations. Conversely, government coalition size does appear to
play a tentative role in government size. Where more political inter-
ests are represented in government coalition, more claims are made
for wealth transfers. On the other hand, there appears to be strong
welfare gains from power-sharing institutions but this evidence is of
a strictly correlative nature.
8
R E C A P I T U L AT I O N
In the course of these chapters we undertook to examine the puzzle
of constitutional engineering through four logically interconnected
problems: the origins of a political system model, the constitutional
effects of political system models, and the social welfare effects of con-
stitutions, taken from an alternative paradigm of consensus democ-
racy. Understanding the effects of constitutional models from the
canonical categories of regime types is an important problem hav-
ing practical importance for citizens and statesmen alike. However,
the question of the endogeneity of regime types is logically anterior
to the question of regime type effects since a proper understanding
of the causal mechanisms requires a more general structural under-
standing of what factors are associated with both political system
selection and institutional performance measures. Knowledge of the
factors associated with the semi-presidential model implies afortiori
knowledge of the determinants of parliamentarism and presidential-
ism because such knowledge can only be obtained by studying varia-
tion in constitutional models.
For all the data analysis conducted in this dissertation the statis-
tical experiments have not been supplied by the researcher but by
nature. This reality has forced us to be sensible to the limitations of
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the available observational data and to realize a research design that
best exploits what we can see under these limitations. This challenge
is directly related to our capacity to posit causal relationships in the
analysis. Using a treatment effects framework, various structural er-
ror components models, and instrumental variables, it is hoped that
these endogeneity issues have been mitigated to the extent that the
available data permits. What follows is a brief recapitulation of the
‘findings’.
I have surveyed the historical contexts in which the semi-presidential
model diffused itself throughout the world and I have reinforced this
analysis with broad exploratory data analysis demonstrating how a
set of sociological, geographical and historical variables can be honed
in on to distinguish the selection process of semi-presidentialism from
that of parliamentary and presidential systems. The prospects for
stability characterizing the institutional performance of states oper-
ating within a semi-presidential context has been gauged from ag-
gregated survey data. I have shown how the constitutional selection
model can be recycled to analyse the constitutional effects of semi-
presidentialism. The take-home message from this exercise was that
the semi-presidential model tends toward being ‘half-presidential’ in-
sofar as the effects of the presidential model appear attenuated under
the alloy function of semi-presidentialism.
Following the assessment of Paris model of democracy, I have moved
on to the Washington model to evaluate Bagehot’s conjecture about
the inefficiency of the presidential system by estimating the institu-
tional effects of presidentialism on a series of fiscal management mea-
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sures. By studying cyclical government surpluses and sovereign debt
levels I collected a range of statistics, which, by and large, repudi-
ate Bagehot’s opinions with regard to the génie of the Westminster
parliamentary model and its propensity for efficiency.
I then turned to the inclusive-exclusive dimension of political com-
petition. I have undertaken a re-evaluation of many of the purported
effects of conciliar democracy on the Commonweal. Generally speak-
ing, this dimension of constitutional engineering was found to cor-
relate with gains in total social welfare. However, the problem of in-
commensurability became relevant here since on closer examination
some of these effects seem to disappear once national heterogeneity is
held constant. Moreover, conciliar democracy tends to lead to welfare
sector inefficiency, which suggests it fosters rent-seeking behaviour -
a fact which in turn raises the moral problem of accountability. On
the other hand, such consequences may be a price worth paying if
the power-sharing dynamics this type of democracy engenders serve
simultaneously to pacify sectarian conflict in society.
Now that we have reached our terminus I wish to finish by not-
ing that the new institutionalism’s horizon is far from empty. The
research undertaken in this dissertation leads to a flourishing of new
questions which demand a more detailed understanding of how the
institutional mechanisms studied here affect coalition dynamics in
terms of the ease of coalition building and coalition survival.

A
A P P E N D I X
a.1 variable descriptions
AFFECTED - People requiring immediate assistance during a period
of emergency; it can also include displaced or evacuated people. [46]
AGE OF DEMOCRACY - as classified in Cheibub. [48]
AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS - primary industry exports as a per-
centage of merchandise exports. [237]
AMENDMENT - Dummy variable indicating the passing of an
amendment to the constitution. [93]
ANTIGOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS - Number of anti-government
protests. [16]
ASSASSINATIONS - Number of political assassinations. [16]
AUTONOMOUS REGION - Dummy variable indicating the exis-
tence of separatist regions. [25]
BEGINNING INTERSTATE WAR - Dummy variable indicating the
commencement of an interstate war involving the country in ques-
tion. [191]
BEGINNING MILITARIZED INTERSTATE DISPUTE - Dummy vari-
able indicating the beginning of a militarized interstate dispute, i.e.,
a sub-war hostile military incident with another country. [91]
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BRITISH COMMON LAW SYSTEM - Dummy variable from Pers-
son and Tabellini. [174]
CABINET SIZE - Number of cabinet members. [16]
CATHOLICS - Percentage of the population who identify as Catholic. [149]
CIVIL LIBERTIES - Freedom House index measuring civil liber-
ties. [80]
COMPETITION - Measurement of electoral competitiveness from
Vanhanen’s Polyarchy dataset. [226]
CONFLICT INDEX - Weighted average of Banks’ civil conflict vari-
ables. [16]
COUPS D’ETAT - Number of coups d’état. [16]
DAMAGE - Annual estimated cost of natural disasters, unit=1000USD. [46]
DEBT - Central government sovereign debt as a percentage of GDP. [237]
Augmented with data from Jaimovich and Panizza. [119]
DEPENDENT TERRITORY GAIN WAR - dummy indicating a year
in which the country gains dependent territory through military vic-
tory. [191]
DEPENDENT TERRITORY LOSS WAR - dummy indicating a year
in which the country loses dependent territory through conflict. [191]
DURABLE - Years since the current POLITY2 value has been main-
tained. [151]
ELECTION - Dummy variable indicating legislative elections in the
current year. [25]
ELECTORAL DISPROPORTIONALITY - A measurement of how
majoritarian electoral outcomes are. [82]
EMERGING MARKET BOND INDEX - J.P. Morgan’s EMBI data. [237]
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ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION - The probability that two indi-
viduals selected at random in a given country will be from different
ethno-linguistic groups. [4]
ETHNIC QUOTA - Dummy variable indicating the use of ethnic
based quotas in the assembly. [169]
EXECUTIVE-PARTIES INDEX - The first components of Lijphart’s
bivariate data on consensus democracy. [139]
FEDERAL - Dummy variable indicating the country has a federal
structure where state governments have substantial taxing and spend-
ing powers. [25]
FEDERAL-UNITARY INDEX - The second component of Lijphart’s
consensus democracy measures. [139]
FEMALE LEADER - Dummy indicating the national leader is a
woman. [96]
FOREIGN INTERVENTION - Dummy variable coded ‘1’ if there is
direct involvement by a foreign power in a civil war. [95]
FRACTIONALIZATION - The probability that two randomly se-
lected assembly members will belong to different parties. [25]
FRACTIONALIZATION(BANKS) - Fractionalization according to
Banks. [16]
FRAGMENT - This variable codes the operational existence of a
separate polity, or polities, comprising substantial territory and pop-
ulation within the recognized borders of the state and over which the
coded polity exercises no effective authority (effective authority may
be participatory or coercive). [151]
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FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM - Dummy variable from Persson and
Tabellini. [174]
FUEL EXPORTS - Exports of fuel minerals as a percentage of mer-
chandise exports. [237]
GDP - Gross Domestic Product at constant 2005 USD. [237]
GENERAL STRIKES - Number of General Strikes. [16]
GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM - Dummy variable from Persson and
Tabellini. [174]
GOVERNMENT CRISIS - Dummy variable indicating the onset of
a major government crisis. [16]
GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS - factorized index of citizen per-
ceptions of governmental effectiveness. [122]
GRAND COALITION - Coalition of at least the two largest parties
in the assembly. [25]
GROWTH - Growth series transformation of the variable ‘GDP’.
GUERILLA WARFARE - Number of acts of guerilla warfare. [16]
HEALTH - Public healthcare expenditure as a share of GDP. [237]
HOMELAND TERRITORY GAIN WAR - dummy indicating a year
in which the country gains homeland territory through military vic-
tory. [191]
HOMELAND TERRITORY LOSS WAR - dummy indicating a year
in which the country loses homeland territory through military de-
feat. [191]
HOMELESS - Number of people needing immediate assistance for
shelter due to natural disaster. [46]
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INITIATOR WAR - Dummy variable indicating the country is the
party who initiates a war. [191]
INITIATOR MILITARIZED INTERSTATE DISPUTE - State is the
party initiating a MID. [91]
INJURED - Number of people suffering from physical injuries, trauma
or an illness requiring medical treatment as a direct result of a disas-
ter. [46]
INTERIM - Dummy variable indicating an interim constitution is
in effect. [93]
INTEREST - Central government interest payments as a share of
GDP. [237]
KILLED - Persons confirmed as dead and persons missing and pre-
sumed dead (official figures when available). [46]
LANDMASS - Surface area within country’s political boundaries. [16]
LATITUDE - Absolute value of the scaled latitude of the political
capitol.
LEADER AGE - Age of national leader at the time of taking of-
fice. [96]
LEADER CHANGE - Dummy variable indicating the national leader
loses power in the current year. [96]
LEADER INSTALLED FOREIGN POWER - Dummy indicating the
national leader was put into power by a foreign force. [96]
LEADER TERM EXILE - Dummy variable indicating the national
leader is forced into exile at the termination of his reign. [96]
LEFTWING - Dummy variable indicating the presence of a left-
wing government. [25]
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MAJORITARIANISM - Dummy variable indicating the majority of
assembly seats a elected according to first-past-the-post. [25]
MEAN EFFECTIVE NUMBER ELECTORAL PARTIES - Number of
effective political parties in the assembly. [84]
MINORITY VETO - Dummy variable indicating the government’s
assembly majority is dependent on the smallest coalition partner. Con-
structed from the DPI. [25]
NATURAL DEATH - dummy indicating the national leader dies of
natural causes. [96]
NEW CONSTITUTION - dummy variable indicating the promul-
gation of a new constitution in the current year. [93]
NONDEMOCRACY - Dummy variable indicating the state is either
a military, civilian or royalist dictatorship according to Cheibub. [48]
OIL PRICES - Average global price of crude oil per barrel. [38]
OIL PRODUCTION - National crude oil output. [38]
OUTPUT SHOCK - dummy variable coded ‘1’ for any country-year
where there is an annual decline in real GDP of at least three percent
in the current or preceding two years. [94]
PARLIAMENTARY - Dummy indicating a state is classified as a
parliamentary regime according to Cheibub’s typology. [48]
PARTICIPATION - Vanhanen’s measurement of democratic partici-
pation. [226]
POLARIZATION - Ideological distance between the government
and the assembly. [25]
POLITICAL RIGHTS - Freedom House index of political rights. [80]
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POLITICAL STABILITY - Factorized index of citizen perceptions of
political stability and terrorism. [122]
POLITY2 - Polity IV’s revised democratization score. [151]
POPULATION - Size of the nation’s population. [237]
POPULATION OVER 64 - Percentage of nation’s population 65 and
older. [237]
PRESIDENTIAL - Dummy variable indicating the state is a presi-
dential regime according to Cheibub. [48]
PRESIDENTIAL DOMINANCE - Dummy variable indicating the
president has effective control of the budget process. As defined by
‘DOM1’ in Cheibub. [48]
PREVIOUS TIMES IN OFFICE - Number of times national leader
was previously national leader. [96]
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION - Dummy variable indicat-
ing that the majority of assembly seats are elected according to a PR
formula. [25]
PUBLIC SECTOR SIZE - Central government expenses as a percent-
age of GDP. [237]
PURGES - Number of government purges. [16]
REAL GDP - Extended output data from Gleditsch. [94]
REGIME AGE - Years since a country has maintained its current
regime type according to Cheibub’s six fold typology. [48]
REGIONAL SHARE SEMIPRESIDENTIALISM - Ratio of semi-presidential
to non-semipresidential states in a country’s geographical region.
REINSTATED - Dummy variable indicating a previous constitution
has been reinstated. [93]
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RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION - The probability that two in-
dividuals selected at random in country i will come from different
religious backgrounds. [4]
REVOLUTION - Number of political revolutionary acts. [16]
RIOTS - Number of riots. [16]
RULE OF LAW - Index of citizen perceptions of rule of law qualities
of the government. [122]
SCANDINAVIAN LEGAL SYSTEM - Dummy variable from Pers-
son and Tabellini. [174]
SCHOOL - Secondary school enrolment in thousands. [16]
SEGMENTAL AUTONOMY - a weighted score from the following
factors: the existence of self-governing regions, the existence of state
government with authority over spending, legislating and/or taxa-
tion, local elections for state government, the existence of an upper
legislative house and local elections for municipal government.[25]
SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL - Dummy for whether or not a constitu-
tional democracy is semi-presidential based on Cheibub’s 2007 dataset
and extended to 2013. [48]
SOVEREIGN BOND YIELD - Interest rate spreads on sovereign
bonds, basis points over 10-year US Treasury Bills. [236]
SURPLUS - Central government revenues minus expenses as a share
of GDP. [237]
TAX CHURNING - Measurement of the extent to which house-
holds pay for wealth transfers while receiving them. [171]
TENURE - Length of the national leader’s stay in office. [96]
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TERRITORY LOSS - Dummy variable indicating the loss of a state’s
homeland or dependent territory. [216]
TERRITORY GAIN - Dummy variable indicating a state’s gain of a
homeland or dependent territory. [216]
TRADE OPENNESS - Total trade (imports and exports) as a per-
centage of GDP. Constant prices with base-year 1996. [109]
VANQUISHED NEW WAR - Dummy indicating the country is the
losing party in the currently commencing war. [191]
VETO PLAYERS - Number of actors in the political system with
policy veto power. As measured in the DPI. [25]
WELFARE EXPENDITURE - Total government expenditure on so-
cial security and welfare programs as a percentage of GDP. [72]
YEARS SINCE INDEPENENCE FROM UK - Variable from Persson
and Tabellini. [174]
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a.2 tables and figures not included in main chapters
Table 33: Propensity Scores used in Chapter Five
Country 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
United States 0.012 0 0.009 0.022 0.023 0.027 0.036 0.005 0.037 0 0.001 0 0
United Kingdom 0.131 0 0.066 0.007 0.032 0.017 0.016 0.05 0.052 0.022 0.051 0.02 0.033
Austria 0.07 0.17 0.23 0.194 0.222 0.229 0.211 0.184 0.125 0.179 0.134 0.134 0.106
Belgium 0.704 0.152 0.309 0.691 0.27 0.248 0.102 0.167 0.085 0.233 0.135 0.08 0.061
Denmark 0.14 0.426 0.272 0.196 0.11 0.217 0.327 0.298 0.228 0.307 0.229 0.278 0.259
France 0.852 0.986 0.879 0.622 0.522 0.336 0.47 0.455 0.506 0.443 0.531 0.529 0.399
Germany 0.298 0.073 0.263 0.246 0.46 0.467 0.55 0.444 0.475 0.243 0.314 0.273 0.275
Italy 0.186 NA NA 0.642 0.723 0.734 0.502 0.67 0.538 0.694 0.578 0.51 0.452
Luxembourg 0.65 0.429 0.671 0.862 0.602 0.51 0.63 0.672 0.651 0.696 0.713 0.816 0.802
Netherlands 0.005 0.031 0.056 0.036 0.072 0.086 0.048 0.049 0.02 0.052 0.025 0.034 0.028
Norway 0.293 0.002 0.218 0.153 0.308 0.353 0.279 0.257 0.243 0.185 0.308 0.381 0.377
Sweden 0.032 0.045 0.074 0.043 0.098 0.1 0.084 0.108 0.088 0.124 0.125 0.101 0.104
Switzerland 0 0 0.003 0.022 0.007 0.024 0.017 0.017 0.006 0 0 0 0
Canada 0 0.065 0.061 0.017 0.015 0.008 0.016 0.013 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.003
Japan 0 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.041 0.005 0.073 0.048 0.07 0.06 0.097
Finland 0.306 0.572 0.288 0.143 0.286 0.305 0.209 0.271 0.255 0.347 0.281 0.313 0.309
Greece 0.22 0.058 0.199 0.197 0.404 0.239 0.412 0.09 0.584 0.506 0.636 0.479 0.639
Ireland 0.382 0.533 0.435 0.262 0.348 0.268 0.355 0.376 0.384 0.42 0.472 0.514 0.54
Portugal 0.464 0.915 0.712 0.694 0.719 0.74 0.835 0.729 0.708 0.608 0.655 0.827 0.816
Spain 0.826 0.958 0.805 0.394 0.599 0.838 0.822 0.808 0.795 0.695 0.746 0.636 0.594
Turkey 0.399 0.012 0.253 0.438 0.375 0.458 0.426 0.137 0.482 0.644 0.656 0.396 0.628
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Africa 0.008 0 0.076 0.318 0.091 0.102 0.123 0.266 0.359 0.394 0.335 0.316 0.322
Argentina NA 0.013 0 0.001 0.042 0.054 0.079 0.061 0.035 0.036 0.009 0.016 0.01
Bolivia 0 0 0 0.023 0.011 0.008 0.022 0.07 0.075 0.158 0.044 0.014 0.006
Brazil 0 0 0 0.007 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 0 0.001 0
Chile 0.236 0.128 0.219 0.022 0.028 0.04 0.015 0.045 0.034 0.023 0.017 0.054 0.028
Colombia 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.002 0.001 0 0.001
Costa Rica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dominican Republic 0 0 0.002 0.001 0.017 0.007 0.025 0.012 0.011 0.016 0.006 0.008 0.005
Ecuador 0.003 0 NA 0.017 0.012 0.005 0.011 0 0.007 0.019 0.029 0.043 0.047
El Salvador 0.002 0 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.001 0.001
Guatemala 0.002 0.14 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.002 0.003 0.001
Honduras 0 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.027 0.034 0.019 0.015 0.01 0.037 0.012 0.002 0.001
*Note: rounding error to 3 decimal places. There are no cases where Pr(Tr==1)=0.
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Table 34: Propensity Scores used in Chapter Five (cont’d)
Country 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Mexico NA NA 0.327 0.18 0.204 0.094 0.13 0.105 0.157 0.131 0.077 0.058 0.037
Nicaragua NA 0 0 0.002 0.027 0.039 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.004
Panama 0.22 0.052 0.105 0.138 0.091 0.082 0.163 0.098 0 0 0 0 0
Paraguay 0 0.002 0.004 0.092 0.235 0.21 0.135 0.142 0.096 0.082 0.019 0.112 0.078
Peru NA NA NA 0.014 0.006 0.01 0.039 0.016 0.027 0.037 0.021 0.021 0.025
Uruguay 0 0 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002
Venezuela, RB 0.001 0 0 0 0 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.02 0.052 0.01 0.041
Guyana 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.002 0 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.004
Jamaica 0 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.001 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.004 0.01 0.005
Suriname 0 NA NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trinidad and Tobago 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.001 0
Cyprus 0.006 0.056 0.27 0.12 0.095 0.116 0.161 0.158 0.091 0.184 0.173 0.255 0.241
Israel 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0.002 0 0 0
Bangladesh 0.201 0.064 0.079 0.129 0.091 0.126 0.255 0.673 NA NA NA NA NA
Bhutan NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.515 0.598 0.414
Sri Lanka 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.01 0.004 0.014 0.01
Taiwan 0.648 0.22 0.037 0.041 0.087 0.172 0.097 0.15 0.239 0.07 0.245 0.167 0.342
India 0.001 0.178 0.082 0.014 0.021 0.054 0.044 0.04 0.028 0.036 0.009 0.036 0.018
Indonesia NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.068 0.016 0.017 0.027 0.009 0.009 0.014
Korea, Rep. 0.167 0.175 0.068 0.017 0.104 0.032 0.189 0.025 0.337 0.077 0.102 0.054 0.108
Nepal 0.082 0.234 0.115 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.15 0.173 0.138
Pakistan 0.026 0.044 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.55 0.185 0.066 0.118
Philippines 0.002 0.04 0.083 0.074 0.088 0.091 0.187 0.147 0.367 NA NA NA 0.116
Thailand NA 0.157 0.08 0.017 0.039 0.029 0.258 NA NA 0.328 0.499 0.55 0.316
Burundi NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.013 0.004 0.114 0.129 0.114 0.127 0.057
Cape Verde NA 0.667 0.831 0.539 0.452 0.555 0.433 0.38 0.502 0.484 0.59 0.566 0.629
Central African Republic 0.657 0.443 0.282 0.468 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Comoros NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.396 0.413 0.745 0.457 0.205 0.617 0.661
Congo, Rep. 0.78 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Benin 0.013 0.004 0.018 0.058 0.044 0.032 0.015 0.002 0.004 0.02 0.012 0.008 0.011
Ghana 0.427 0.44 0.291 0.098 0.098 0.031 0.02 0.005 0.036 0.059 0.205 0.154 0.225
Guinea-Bissau NA NA 0.975 0.991 NA 0.971 0.981 0.487 0.293 0.393 0.314 0.335
Kenya NA 0 0 0.015 0.016 0.012 0.029 0 0.053 0.032 0.067 0.009 0.029
*Note: rounding error to 3 decimal places. There are no cases where Pr(Tm==1)=0.
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Table 35: Propensity Scores used in Chapter Five (cont’d)
Country 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Liberia NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.085 0.13 0.202 0.054 0.025 0.03
Madagascar 0.51 0.826 0.855 0.604 0.311 0.311 0.167 0.335 0.449 0.589 0.683 0.716 NA
Malawi 0.278 0.244 0.531 0.316 0.155 0.092 0.068 0.135 0.139 0.136 0.027 0.052 0.04
Mali 0.886 0.985 0.828 0.806 NA NA NA NA NA 0.203 0.099 0.086 0.087
Mauritania NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.796 NA NA NA NA
Mauritius 0 0.008 0.097 0.117 0.021 0.043 0 0.007 0.012 0.03 0.04 0.048 0.03
Niger NA NA 0.956 0.996 0.974 0.996 0.432 0.262 0.4 0.337 0.531 0.793 0.599
Nigeria NA NA 0.074 0.503 0.068 0.086 0.131 0.154 0.345 0.443 0.542 0.304 0.248
Senegal NA NA 0.998 0.876 0.988 0.985 0.873 0.921 0.3 0.847 0.543 0.511 0.459
Sierra Leone NA 0.021 0.019 0.151 0.079 0.125 0.035 0.138 0.16 0.346 0.342 0.233 0.257
Solomon Islands NA 0 0 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.009 0.002 0.008 0 0 0
Fiji 0 0.001 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Papua New Guinea 0 0.002 0.001 0.001 0 0.002 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0
Armenia 0.747 0.732 0.3 0.746 0.691 0.873 0.636 0.861 0.881 0.719 0.882 0.968 0.925
Albania 0.694 0.264 0.558 0.521 0.837 0.769 0.662 0.749 0.703 0.664 0.408 0.553 0.455
Georgia NA NA NA NA NA 0.67 0.746 0.771 0.847 0.882 0.853 0.879 0.822
Kyrgyz Republic NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.999 0.887 0.865 0.929 0.927 0.757 0.862
Bulgaria 0.766 0.658 0.659 0.681 0.288 0.247 0.502 0.54 0.403 0.411 0.354 0.526 0.53
Moldova 0.749 0.793 0.951 0.724 0.569 0.73 0.545 0.813 0.782 0.886 0.783 0.687 0.528
Russian Federation 1 0.948 0.965 0.999 0.957 0.937 0.997 0.982 0.995 0.868 0.988 0.994 0.987
Ukraine 0.999 1 NA NA 0.992 1 0.997 0.864 0.799 0.671 0.683 0.66 0.7
Czech Republic 0.013 0.051 0.097 0.127 0.142 0.133 0.287 0.216 0.203 0.181 0.274 0.31 0.217
Slovak Republic 0.342 0.698 0.36 0.686 0.354 0.306 0.294 0.293 0.239 0.258 0.291 0.293 0.346
Estonia 0.504 0.67 0.696 0.738 0.711 0.605 0.734 0.738 0.768 0.641 0.758 0.736 0.822
Latvia 0.452 0.001 0.495 0.222 0.192 0.189 0.222 0.195 0.18 0.354 0.137 0.094 0.159
Hungary 0.002 0.046 0.115 0.162 0.13 0.129 0.195 0.174 0.118 0.196 0.249 0.198 0.179
Lithuania 0.886 0.996 0.954 0.907 0.603 NA 0.55 0.651 0.715 0.717 0.778 0.825 0.825
Mongolia 0.412 0.521 0.48 0.912 0.872 0.856 0.688 0.778 0.874 0.652 0.398 0.493 0.454
Croatia 0.682 0.863 0.984 0.917 0.975 0.958 0.982 0.953 0.952 0.932 0.918 0.925 0.946
Slovenia 0.305 0.185 0.478 0.454 0.406 0.331 0.387 0.351 0.257 0.303 0.366 0.314 0.331
Macedonia, FYR 0.95 1 0.919 0.839 0.918 0.914 0.908 0.912 0.874 0.812 0.762 0.701 0.717
Poland 0.928 0.931 0.876 0.937 0.783 0.642 0.879 0.846 0.859 0.863 0.924 0.938 0.95
Romania 0.434 0.961 0.972 0.699 0.815 0.88 0.76 0.693 0.757 0.702 0.617 0.6 0.563
*Note: rounding error to 3 decimal places. There are no cases where Pr(Tm==1)=0.
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Figure 23: Results from Genetic Matching, 90 percent CIs (emboldened
line=50% CI)
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Figure 24: Results from Genetic Matching (cont’d)
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Figure 25: Results from Genetic Matching (cont’d)
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Table 36: ATT estimates from matching on the propensity score
Political Stability Govt Effectiveness Rule of Law
Year ATT Abadie-Imbens SE ATT A-I SE ATT A-I SE
1996 -0.1 0.4 -0.6 0.4 -0.3 0.4
1997 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1998 -0.2 0.4 -0.6 0.5 -0.3 0.4
1999 NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 -0.4 0.4 -0.9 0.5 -0.7 0.4
2001 NA NA NA NA NA NA
2002 -0.4 0.4 -0.8 0.4 -0.6 0.4
2003 0 0.3 -0.4 0.3 -0.3 0.3
2004 -0.1 0.2 -0.6 0.3 -0.4 0.3
2005 -0.2 0.2 -0.5 0.3 -0.4 0.3
2006 0 0.2 -0.4 0.3 -0.5 0.3
2007 0.4 0.3 -0.2 0.4 -0.3 0.4
2008 0.1 0.3 -0.3 0.4 -0.4 0.4
2009 -0.1 0.2 -0.6 0.3 -0.6 0.3
2010 0 0.3 -0.4 0.3 -0.5 0.4
2011 0 0.3 -0.2 0.3 -0.3 0.3
Pooled 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.1
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Table 37: ATT estimates from Genetic Matching
Political Stability Govt Effectiveness Rule of Law
Year ATT Abadie-Imbens SE ATT A-I SE ATT A-I SE
1996 0.04 0.18 -0.44 0.16 -0.3 0.18
1997 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1998 0.02 0.15 -0.58 0.18 -0.28 0.17
1999 NA NA NA NA NA NA
2000 0.11 0.17 -0.37 0.15 -0.21 0.16
2001 NA NA NA NA NA NA
2002 0.14 0.13 -0.01 0.14 -0.05 0.14
2003 0.12 0.14 -0.04 0.13 -0.16 0.15
2004 0 0.17 0.04 0.15 -0.02 0.16
2005 0 0.2 -0.59 0.22 -0.25 0.13
2006 -0.05 0.18 -0.36 0.2 -0.48 0.21
2007 0.17 0.16 0 0.18 -0.1 0.22
2008 0.33 0.12 0.04 0.13 -0.16 0.17
2009 0.37 0.11 0.01 0.19 0.09 0.2
2010 0.23 0.09 -0.02 0.13 -0.1 0.19
2011 0 0.1 -0.39 0.14 -0.34 0.14
Pooled 0.28 0.07 -0.14 0.07 -0.27 0.08
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Table 39: Guerilla Warfare LPM and Logit Estimates
LSDV-LPM LSDV-LPM COND.LOGIT COND.LOGIT LSDV-LPM LSDV-LPM COND.LOGIT COND.LOGIT
Constant 0.139 0.448 0.164 -1.033
(0.013) (2.922) (0.035) (3.772)
Govt Frac -0.083 -0.165 -0.987 -0.595
(0.054) (0.102) (0.601) (0.623)
Veto -0.012 0 -0.109 -0.033
(0.009) (0.013) (0.071) (0.067)
ln(GDP) -0.056 0.003 -0.06 -0.03
(0.181) (1.285) (0.191) (1.285)
Output shock -0.047 0.257 -0.044 -0.17
(0.067) (0.692) (0.056) (0.843)
ln(School) 0.034 -0.065
(0.079) (0.087)
ln(Pop) 0.016 -2.439 0.136 -2.709
(0.242) (1.365) (0.252) (1.273)
% Pop below 65 -0.002 0.163 0.009 0.201
(0.021) (0.212) (0.024) (0.191)
Foreign Intervention 0.022 -0.982 -0.084 -0.978
(0.086) (0.668) (0.116) (0.67)
R2-within 0.004 0.046 0.003 0.044
Pseudo-R2 0.009 0.051 0.006 0.055
F-stat 2.33 0.87 1.57 0.85
Wald χ2 2.69 15.01 2.32 16.43
N 2187 463 902 822 2193 467 942 859
Countries 117 97 43 41 119 95 45 43
Years 1975-2006 1975-2001 1975-2006 1975-2004 1975-2006 1975-2001 1975-2006 1976-2004
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No No No Yes No No
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Table 40: Guerilla Warfare LPM and Logit Estimates (cont’d)
LSDV-LPM LSDV-LPM COND.LOGIT COND.LOGIT FGLS-LPM FGLS-LPM FGLS-LOGIT
Constant 0.113 -8.000 0.125 -0.553 -3.809 -2.337
(0.005) (2.739) (0.074) (1.017) (1.125) (27.289)
Minority Veto -0.007 -0.037 -0.109 0.147
(0.021) (0.043) (0.359) (0.372)
Segmental Autonomy -0.025 -0.032 -0.388 -0.91
(0.026) (0.055) (0.279) (0.742)
ln(GDP) 0.209 1.004 -0.003 1.156
(0.177) (1.092) (0.082) (1.428)
Output Shock -0.08 -0.44 0.015 1.62
(0.049) (0.93) (0.031) (1.889)
ln(school) -0.190 0.091
(0.104) (0.072)
ln(Pop) 0.519 -2.679 -0.071 0.579
(0.283) (1.424) (0.077) (0.743)
% Population below 65 0.031 0.275 0.008 -0.095
(0.02) (0.185) (0.008) (0.209)
Foreign Intervention -0.043 -0.914 0.006 1.111
(0.098) (0.619) (0.036) (1.171)
ln(area) 0.001 -0.682
(0.031) (0.704)
Outside Euro/NA 0.061 -0.559
(0.071) (2.804)
Ethnic Frac 0.153 5.986
(0.33) (5.19)
Religious Frac -0.144 -3.007
(0.19) (4.841)
R2-within 0 0.059
R2-overall/Pseudo-R2 0 0.042 0.006 0.022
F-stat 0.1 0.94
Wald χ2 0.09 0.91 3.84 1.93 7.36
0.376 0.858
N 1778 397 697 625 417 90 417 413
Countries 115 88 39 38 27 21 27 26
Years 1975-2006 1975-2001 1975-2006 1975-2004 1975-2004 1975-2000 1975-2004 1975-2004
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No No No
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Table 41: Guerilla Warfare LPM and Logit Estimates (cont’d)
FGLS-LPM FGLS-LPM FGLS-LOGIT FGLS-LOGIT LSDV-LPM FGLS-LPM FGLS-LPM COND.LOGIT FGLS-LOGIT FGLS-LOGIT
Constant 0.198 -0.859 -2.522 -33.25 0.143 0.104 -2.014 -3.684 -25.355
(0.037) (2.011) (0.398) (11.196) (0.013) (0.027) (0.987) (0.481) (12.19)
Federalism 0.031 -0.023 0.439 -0.439
(0.089) (0.088) (0.812) (0.82)
Electoral Disprop -0.005 -0.003 0.001 -0.0650 -0.063 -0.061
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.027) (0.035) (0.038)
Ethnic Quota 0.109 0.03 1.281 0.448
(0.076) (0.067) (0.635) (0.626)
ln(GDP) -0.065 -0.405 -0.067 -0.705
(0.086) (0.34) (0.052) (0.494)
Output Shock -0.017 0.239 0.028 0.22
(0.101) (1.073) (0.06) (0.947)
ln(School) -0.008 0.054
(0.05) (0.056)
ln(Pop) 0.09 0.805 0.049 1.164
(0.066) (0.218) (0.062) (0.292)
% Pop below 65 0.009 0.305 0.025 0.260
(0.014) (0.096) (0.007) (0.097)
Foreign Intervention 0.071 0.495 0.074 -0.592
(0.113) (0.494) (0.153) (0.452)
ln(area) 0.001 -0.092 -0.026 -0.409
(0.013) (0.212) (0.013) (0.238)
Outside Euro/NA -0.017 0.462 0.120 0.787
(0.079) (0.801) (0.071) (0.815)
Ethnic Frac 0.133 -0.389 0.1 -1.26
(0.151) (1.402) (0.147) (1.545)
Religious Frac -0.06 -0.164 -0.288 -1.887
(0.155) (1.306) (0.149) (1.419)
R2-within 0.004
R2-overall/Pseudo-R2 0 0.16 0.023 0.207 0.009
F-stat 5.70
Wald χ2 0.12 55.67 0.29 48.54 4.45 57.58 5.9 5.48 44.25
Hausman Test p-value 0.104 0.008 0.294 0.004
N 1576 890 1576 1575 2132 1419 427 1358 1419 1419
Countries 53 53 53 53 73 71 63 37 71 71
Years 1960-1998 1960-1998 1960-1998 1960-1998 1947-2006 1972-2004 1972-2001 1946-2006 1972-2004 1972-2004
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No No No
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Table 42: Guerilla Warfare LPM and Logit Estimates (cont’d)
FGLS-LPM FGLS-LPM FGLS-LOGIT FGLS-LOGIT
Constant 0.107 -2.009 -3.703 -24.74
(0.02) (0.879) (0.248) (9.069)
Autonomous Region 0.007 0.069 0.28 0.839
(0.098) (0.118) (0.393) (0.437)
ln(GDP) -0.014 -0.331
(0.043) (0.291)
Output Shock 0.134 0.432
(0.096) (0.658)
ln(School) 0.006
(0.047)
ln(pop) 0.061 0.510
(0.052) (0.214)
% Pop below 65 0.019 0.228
(0.005) (0.08)
Foreign Intervention 0.078 -0.686
(0.1) (0.397)
ln(area) -0.005 -0.053
(0.013) (0.19)
Outside Euro/NA 0.053 0.479
(0.062) (0.721)
Ethnic Frac -0.018 -2.098
(0.102) (1.154)
Religious Frac -0.069 -0.793
(0.095) (0.998)
R2-overall/Pseudo-R2 0.005 0.138
Wald χ2 0.01 54.93 0.51 38.66
Hausman Test p-value 0.055 0.984
N 2146 480 2146 1927
Countries 113 94 113 108
Years 1976-2006 1975-1999 1975-2006 1975-2004
Year Fixed Effects No No No No
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Figure 26: Ordered t-statistics from POLS estimates
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Figure 27: Ordered t-statistics from POLS estimates (cont’d)
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Table
48:PO
LS
Estim
ates
for
SocialEquality
V
ariables
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ependentvariable:
-ginidc
incq1dc
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fem
alit
enrprfm
enrscfm
enrhgfm
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
execpartindx_4596
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0.008 ∗∗∗
0.019 ∗∗∗
0.027 ∗∗∗
−
0.032 ∗∗
−
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−
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−
0.014
−
0.045 ∗∗
(0.685)
(0.002)
(0.006)
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(0.014)
(1.512)
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(0.020)
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−
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Table 51: SUR Estimates for “Quality of Government” Variables
SUR System:
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
Dependent variable:
expropr gvtrepud burqual rulelaw corrupt civlib humright -childlab polrght militpol
execparties 0.57∗∗∗ 0.6∗∗ 0.4∗∗ 0.27 0.51∗∗ -0.17∗∗ 2.23 2.99∗∗ -0.01 0.07
(0.18) (0.23) (0.17) (0.22) (0.19) (0.07) (1.6) (1.14) (0.06) (0.19)
feduni -0.15 -0.4 0.01 0.06 -0.14 -0.06 -0.51 -1.41 -0.09 0.16
(0.22) (0.28) (0.19) (0.24) (0.22) (0.08) (1.88) (1.19) (0.07) (0.23)
Y70 0.43∗∗ 4.11∗ 0.5 ∗∗∗
(0.18) (2.35) (0.14)
Y80 -1.55∗∗∗ -0.51 0.35 0.56 0.47 0.13 1.49 3.02 0.18 -0.13
(0.42) (0.53) (0.34) (0.43) (0.38) (0.2) (3.59) (3.39) (0.17) (0.46)
Y90 3.51
(3.81)
GDP 3E-13∗∗ 4E-13∗∗ 3E-13∗ 2E-13 2E-13 -2E-13∗∗ 1E-12 2E-12 -7E-14 1E-13
(1E-13) (2E-13) (1E-13) (2E-13) (2E-13) (8E-14) (1E-12) (2E-12) (7E-14) (2E-13)
constant 8.78∗∗∗ 8.05∗∗∗ 4.74∗∗∗ 4.56∗∗∗ 4.5∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗ 87.37∗∗∗ -8.89∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ 5.33∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.31) (0.27) (0.35) (0.29) (0.15) (2.68) (1.67) (0.12) (0.34)
OLS-R2 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
McElroy-R2 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 -1.72 -1.72 -1.72 -1.72 -1.72
System-N 262 262 262 262 262 382 382 382 382 382
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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-0.0447
(0.0502)
(0.0021)
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(0.002)
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(0.229)
(20.267)
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-0.0474
0.0026
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(0.0576)
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(0.044)
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(0.0024)
(0.0002)
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(23.0689)
(0.2812)
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(0.1813)
Y
70
0.198
-0.0549 ∗∗∗
-0.5527 ∗∗∗
-0.8951 ∗∗∗
-0.0124
∗∗
-0.0047 ∗∗∗
-0.0464
0.2651 ∗∗∗
0.416
44.2291
(0.155)
(0.0051)
(0.1096)
(0.2288)
(0.0055)
(0.0005)
(0.0325)
(0.0123)
(0.6187)
(57.0772)
Y
80
0.1703
0.0015
-0.0696
0.2615
-0.0074
0.0002
0.0244
0.3202 ∗∗∗
0.9641
39.9081
-0.5548
0.094
-0.1552
(0.1667)
(0.0049)
(0.1165)
(0.2281)
(0.0057)
(0.0005)
(0.0331)
(0.0122)
(0.6946)
(68.9145)
(0.5888)
(0.2227)
(0.4047)
Y
90
-0.1446
0.3157
0.3185
0.7693
90.205
(0.1149)
(0.2012)
(0.0109)
(0.676)
(59.6816)
G
D
P
-3E-14
1E-15
-7E-14 ∗
3E-14
1E-15
9E-16 ∗∗∗
7E-15
2E-14 ∗∗∗
-4E-13
-9E-11 ∗∗∗
-8E-13 ∗∗∗
-9E-15
-3E-13 ∗∗
(6E-14)
(3E-15)
(5E-14)
(7E-14)
(3E-15)
(3E-16)
(2E-14)
(4E-15)
(3E-13)
(3E-11)
(2E-13)
(9E-14)
(2E-13)
constant
-0.559 ∗∗∗
-0.0035
-0.033
-0.5382 ∗∗∗
-0.0017
-0.0005
-0.0451
∗
-0.3276 ∗∗∗
-1.2473 ∗∗∗
-55.2951
9.6981 ∗∗∗
5.2792 ∗∗∗
4.9761 ∗∗∗
(0.1173)
(0.0036)
(0.0826)
(0.1703)
(0.0041)
(0.0004)
(0.025)
(0.0091)
(0.4615)
(40.9419)
(0.4198)
(0.1524)
(0.2915)
O
LS-R
2
-0.1102
-0.1102
-0.1102
-0.1102
-0.1102
-0.1102
-0.1102
-0.1102
-0.1102
-0.1102
-0.1102
-0.1102
-0.1102
M
cElroy-R
2
-21.8717
-21.8717
-21.8717
-21.8717
-21.8717
-21.8717
-21.8717
-21.8717
-21.8717
-21.8717
-21.8717
-21.8717
-21.8717
SysN
1229
1229
1229
1229
1229
1229
1229
1229
1229
1229
1229
1229
1229
∗p
<
0.1; ∗∗p
<
0.05; ∗∗∗p
<
0.01
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Table 53: SUR Estimates for “Education and Culture” Variables
SUR System:
(4)
Dependent variable:
nsschl nsillit -nsnosch nshenrl nssenrl nspenrl museum books
execparties 0.333∗ 1.184 -0.768 0.014∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗ -0.014∗∗ 10.022∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗
(0.178) (0.967) (0.987) (0.005) (0.015) (0.007) (1.827) (0.031)
feduni -0.29 -4.66∗∗∗ -5.37∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ -0.043∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -3.961∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.213) (1.189) (1.267) (0.006) (0.018) (0.008) (2.051) (0.034)
Y70 0.806 4.216 4.652 0.063∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.031 3.327 0.079
(0.562) (3.276) (3.866) (0.015) (0.046) (0.02) (3.971) (0.076)
Y80 2.755∗∗∗ 15.42∗∗∗ 19.691∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗
(0.537) (3.106) (3.703) (0.015) (0.045) (0.02) (0.073)
Y90 2.557∗∗∗ 17.032∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.512) (2.849) (0.015) (0.043) (0.019)
GDP 8E-13∗∗∗ 4E-12∗∗∗ 4E-12∗∗∗ 6E-14∗∗∗ 7E-14∗∗∗ 1E-14∗ -4E-12 -1E-14
(2E-13) (1E-12) (1E-12) (6E-15) (2E-14) (7E-15) (3E-12) (4E-14)
constant 4.184∗∗∗ 75.976∗∗∗ -28.594 ∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.888∗∗∗ 14.584∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗
(0.392) (2.193) (2.484) (0.011) (0.032) (0.014) (3.12) (0.057)
OLS-R2 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027
McElroy-R2 -1.31 -1.31 -1.31 -1.31 -1.31 -1.31 -1.31 -1.31
SysN 833 833 833 833 833 833 833 833
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table
54:SU
R
Estim
ates
for
“H
ealth
and
Sanitation”
V
ariables
SU
R
System
:
(5)
(6)
(7)
D
ependentvariable:
nslifex
-nsm
ort
-nsm
ortu5
nsdci
nsdpi
nshosbed
doctor
nurse
nspopw
nsrpopw
nsupopw
sanit
sanitrur
saniturb
execparties
1.9 ∗∗∗
8.7 ∗∗∗
7.5 ∗∗∗
135.5 ∗∗∗
4.5 ∗∗∗
14.4
3.3 ∗∗∗
5.1 ∗
2.7
4.7
-2.8
-1
3.8
4.5 ∗
(0.4)
(1.5)
(2.8)
(33.7)
(1.3)
(18.2)
(0.7)
(2.9)
(6)
(6.9)
(3.6)
(2.7)
(4.8)
(2.3)
feduni
-2.4 ∗∗∗
-12.2 ∗∗∗
-10.4 ∗∗∗
-84.6 ∗∗
-6 ∗∗∗
30.8
-0.4
-3.1
-16.6
-13.4
-7
-4.8
-2.8
-5.7 ∗
(0.5)
(1.9)
(3.3)
(37.2)
(1.4)
(20.2)
(0.8)
(3.4)
(11
)
(13.1)
(6.6)
(3.2)
(5.2)
(2.8)
Y
70
3.9
∗∗∗
21.1 ∗∗∗
24.3 ∗∗∗
-150.7
-4.3
30.2
2.9
17
-3.7
-10
-5.6
-42.7 ∗∗∗
(1.2)
(4.5)
(8.9)
(93)
(3.5)
(47.6)
(1.8)
(7.6)
(11.3)
(14.2)
(6.9)
(6.9
Y
80
6 ∗∗∗
32.4 ∗∗∗
40.4 ∗∗∗
-71
-2.1
-47.2 ∗∗∗
6.6
32.3 ∗∗∗
-3.7
-11.1
8.2
(1.2)
(4.5)
(8.8)
(91.5)
(3.5)
(52.5)
(1.8)
(7)
(5.5)
(10.9)
(5.6)
Y
90
7 ∗∗∗
38.3 ∗∗∗
-51.5
12.3 ∗∗∗
9.2
(1.1)
(4.4)
(50.9)
(2.2)
(16.4)
G
D
P
2E-12 ∗∗∗
1E-11 ∗∗∗
6E-12
1E-10 ∗∗∗
7E-12 ∗∗∗
3E-10 ∗∗∗
2E-12 ∗
4E-12
4E-11
2E-11
-2E-11
5E-12
1E-11
1E-11 ∗
(6E-13)
(3E-12)
(4E-12)
(4E-11)
(1E-12)
(2E-11)
(1E-12)
(4E-12)
(1E-10)
(1E-10)
(7E-11)
(3E-12)
(1E-11)
(6E-12)
constant
64.8 ∗∗∗
-60.3 ∗∗∗
-68.1 ∗∗∗
3111.7 ∗∗∗
89 ∗∗∗
112.9 ∗∗∗
9 ∗∗∗
24.2 ∗∗∗
79.5 ∗∗∗
72.6 ∗∗∗
93.8 ∗∗∗
88.4 ∗∗∗
80 ∗∗∗
87.8 ∗∗∗
(0.7)
(2)
(6.4)
(65.7)
(2.4)
(34.6)
(1.2)
(5)
(11.4)
(14.8)
(7)
(4.4)
(6.4)
(3.2)
O
LS-R
2
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
M
cElroy-R
2
-0.05
-0.05
-0.05
-0.05
-0.05
-0.05
-0.05
-0.46
-0.46
-0.46
-0.46
-0.36
-0.36
-0.36
SysN
735
735
735
735
735
735
735
150
150
150
150
127
127
127
∗p
<
0.1; ∗∗p
<
0.05; ∗∗∗p
<
0.01
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Table 55: SUR Estimates for “Transportation and Communication” Variables
SUR System:
(8) (9)
Dependent variable:
road rdhigh nsrr nstelpcb telegr nsradpc nstvpcb nsmailpc
execparties 0.006 6.399∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ -189.217∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ 0.002 13.74∗
(0.018) (3.557) (0.006) (0.01) (58.687) (0.014) (0.006) (7.559)
feduni 0.079∗∗∗ -10.678 ∗∗ 0.006 -0.006 -191.336∗∗∗ -0.004 0.019∗∗ 13.217
(0.018) (4.126) (0.007) (0.012) (59.488) (0.016) (0.007) (8.319)
Y70 -0.017 0.089∗∗ 135.505 0.074 0.106∗∗∗ 6.303
(0.017) (0.044) (127.896) (0.056) (0.028) (23.557)
Y80 2.575 -0.023 0.209∗∗∗ -244.105 0.148∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(7.016) (0.016) (0.037) (173.425) (0.047) (0.024)
Y90 -0.347∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.037) (0.047) (0.023)
GDP -3E-14∗ 5E-12 1E-14∗ 9E-14∗∗∗ 3E-11 2E-13∗∗∗ 5E-14∗∗∗ 6E-11∗∗∗
(2E-14) (3E-12) (9E-15) (1E-14) (6E-11) (1E-14) (6E-15) (1E-11)
constant 0.448∗∗∗ 60.372∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 399.931∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 101.473∗∗∗
(0.023) (5.362) (0.013) (0.033) (103.678) (0.04) (0.021) (17.733)
OLS-R2 0.074 0.074 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.213
McElroy-R2 -2.856 -2.856 -0.356 -0.357 -0.357 -0.357 -0.357 -0.357
SysN 116 116 561 561 561 561 561 561
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 56: SUR Estimates for “Social Inequality” Variables
SUR System:
(10) (11)
Dependent variable:
-ginidc incq1dc -incq5dc avgschfm incmid60 femalit enrprfm enrscfm enrhgfm
execparties 3.392∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ -1.268 -0.012∗ 0.001 -0.042∗∗
(0.591) (0.002) (0.006) (0.013) (0.007) (1.002) (0.006) (0.015) (0.017)
feduni 1.784∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.014∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.003 -0.018∗∗ -0.025 -0.04∗∗
(0.636) (0.002) (0.007) (0.016) (0.007) (1.207) (0.007) (0.017) (0.02)
Y70 0.805 0 0.009 0.019 0.022 -1.844 0.04∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗
(1.632) (0.005) (0.018) (0.038) (0.02) (3.032) (0.02) (0.045) (0.05)
Y80 6.733∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.017 0.026 1.499 0.021 0.199∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗
(1.631) (0.005) (0.017) (0.038) (0.02) (3.027) (0.023) (0.05) (0.051)
Y90 5.81∗∗∗ 0.009∗ 0.033 0.025 0.018 -2.62 0.028 0.194∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗
(1.899) (0.005) (0.02) (0.038) (0.022) (3.18) (0.02) (0.045) (0.05)
GDP -2E-13 -2E-15 -1E-15 4E-14∗∗∗ 4E-15 1E-12 5E-15 1E-14 2E-14
(6E-13) (2E-15) (6E-15) (1E-14) (7E-15) (1E-12) (6E-15) (2E-14) (2E-14)
constant -40.659 ∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ -0.449∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 94.536∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗
(1.169) (0.003) (0.013) (0.027) (0.017) (2.242) (0.016) (0.036) (0.038)
OLS-R2 0.316 0.316 0.316 0.316 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053
McElroy-R2 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 -0.638 -0.638 -0.638 -0.638 -0.638
SysN 409 409 409 409 545 545 545 545 545
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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